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ABSTRACT 
 
ILYSE R. MORGENSTEIN FUERST: Religions of Empire: Islamicate Texts, Imperial 
Taxonomies, and South Asian Definitions of Religion 
(under the direction of Carl W. Ernst) 
 
 This dissertation explores South Asian, Islamicate definitions of religion, imperial 
uses of those definitions, and their relationship to later colonial definitions and uses.  
Contemporary debates in religious studies center on the relationship between the 
developments of the discipline of religious studies itself alongside European colonial and 
imperial missions of the modern period.  This dissertation takes seriously these debates, 
and offers a South Asian set of examples by which to further consider the term “religion” 
and the field of study it spawned.  It traces, genealogically, Persianate and Islamicate 
understandings of religion (dīn) through two primary sources: first, Abu’l al-Fazl ibn 
Mubarak’s Ā'īn-i Akbarī or Institutes of Akbar (c. 1590 CE); and second, Mathurānāth’s 
Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions (1813 CE).  Both texts demonstrate a robust 
structure of classification for universal concepts of religion as well as particular and 
varied religions, and in this way demonstrate that definitions of religion are and can be 
indigenous to Islamicate and South Asian systems.  This dissertation posits two primary 
arguments.  First, that contemporary debates that focus on “religion” as a foreign 
imposition upon non-Western locations, intellectual systems, and cultures ignore 
corollaries found within indigenous institutions; I therefore argue that “religion” cannot 
be imagined as entirely foreign, but instead must be read alongside indigenous definitions 
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and systems.  Second, this dissertation argues that Islamicate definitions of religion came 
to inform those of European Orientalists through a process of co-imperialism; I therefore 
argue that multiple agents of Mughal and British imperial entities crafted, maintained, 
and constituted definitions of religion together.  
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
 
This dissertation utilizes a number of languages that require transliteration, primarily 
Persian and Sanskrit, though occasionally involving Urdu and Hindi, and—rarer still—
Arabic.  I have used standard transliteration guidelines and styles for each language.  
 
Well-known proper names are typically listed without diacritic marks (like Varanasi).  In 
the cases of names of lesser notoriety, like Mathurānāth, I have retained diacritic marks.  
Where a common full name, title, or phrase is listed in a foreign language, I have retained 
the transliterated style until offering my own commentary (e.g. Viṣṇu and Vishnu).  
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1813: A Pivotal Year  
 
In 1813, a Brahmin Hindu pandita1 wrote a treatise on the religious groups of 
Benares—now Varanasi2—for the British East India Company in two languages: Persian 
and Sanskrit.  The former comprises the bulk of the body of the text; the latter makes up 
some of the body, and all of the insertions and marginalia.  Prior to 1813, this same 
Brahmin Hindu pandita was a courtly scribe for the Mughal officials of Benares and the 
surrounding region.3  He is an emblem of South Asian multiple identities: simultaneously 
employed by competing imperial and colonial entities, literate in the elite languages of 
both political and religious spheres, able to discuss religion as a category as well as 
specific followers of religions.  Mathurānāth—his circumstances, his persona, and his 
text, all of which will be discussed below—reflect a world that is Persian but not limited 
                                                
 
1 “Pandita” literally means “wise one” or “learned” and is most often used in the sense of 
religious teacher; it is also a cognate with the English word “pundit.”  Because “pundit” has such 
obvious negative connotations in our own usage, I have retained the transliterated Sanskrit 
spelling. 
 
2 The city of Varanasi, as it is known primarily today, went by Benares during the British Raj and 
has historically also been known as Kashi.  The terms are interchangeable to some, and to others 
the specific names carry particular meaning.  I will use the name “Benares” when I discuss the 
city during the British period to maintain historical accuracy; otherwise, I will use the current city 
name, Varanasi. 
 
3 Mathurānāth’s “known history” is cited in the East India Company records.   
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to those of Persian ancestry, a world that reflects Islamic ideals even for those who are 
not Muslim. In the words of Marshall Hodgson, he occupied a Persianate and Islamicate 
world, and because the British sponsored and utilized his work, his profile ultimately 
suggests that the Persianate, Islamicate sphere of which he was a part inform and shape 
later European imperial powers and agents.  Mathurānāth is not necessarily unique, but 
he represents a major element of social mobility and religious fluidity and so will be a 
major subject of this book.   
In 1813, Benares was a major stronghold of imperial and religious power for 
Hindus, Muslims, Mughals and British authorities.  The City of Light, as it has been 
known,4 has largely been considered one of the holiest places for Hindus; however, in the 
course of its long history, it also housed nearly 100 mosques.5  Mughal kings may have 
ruled from Delhi or, briefly, Fatehpur Sikri, but Mughal elites held long dominated 
Benares.  The British established colonial businesses in the form most famously of the 
East India Company, well before formally absorbing South Asia into its sprawling 
empire; Benares was one of a handful of city-based strongholds for the Company.  
Politically and religiously, this was a city teeming with diversity, elites, and contested 
power structures—it was also, vitally, a city of overlap, interplay, and shared resources. 
 In 1813, the Mughals were, by most historical accounts, not nearly as powerful as 
they had once been.  While I resist labeling empires as either rising or falling,6 there can 
                                                
 
4 See for example: Diana Eck, Banaras, City of Light (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1993). 
  
5 Eck, 127-129. 
 
6 The issues surrounding historical models of rise-and-fall figure rather prominently in chapters 2 
and 3, and will be discussed at great length there. 
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be no doubt that the reach of the empire had shrunk considerably, and in-fighting, 
dispersed leadership, and fragmentation had set in by the early nineteenth century.  At its 
greatest extent, Mughal authority spread, west to east, from the contemporary nation-
states of Afghanistan to Bangladesh and southwestern China; from north to south, it 
encompassed almost the entire Indian subcontinent, with influences and lineages 
claiming northward Tajik ancestry and victories as far south as the present-day states of 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu.  In short, it was massive.  Mughal rule had nearly always been 
typified by a blend of Persianate traditions of court alongside Islamicate norms, which 
included mainline Sufi conceptions.  It was therefore a diverse, dynamic place, marked 
by a confluence of lineages.   
The Mughals themselves were Turko-Mongol in origin7 but Persian in their 
literary and social tastes; their subjects were as varied as that, ranging from Brahmin 
Hindus literate in Sanskrit to Telugu-speaking fishermen in Andra Pradesh to Jain 
merchants along the western coasts.  After many years, the court, alongside other local 
elites, established its own variety of a Persianate system, one that scholars today widely 
refer to as Indo-Persian.  The Mughal Empire was massive and broad, comparable to its 
contemporary rivals, the Safavids and Ottomans but unlike them, existed as a minority 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
7 Turko-Mongol refers to the subset of Mongol peoples who were increasingly Turkic in cultural 
norms, linguistic groups, and practices, and were geographically located largely within the 
Central Asian steppe.  These regions and peoples may be characterized by a slow conversion to 
Islam, and the adoption, in some cases, of Persian cultural elements as well.  Besides the Mughal 
Empire, other Turko-Mongol empires include that of Timer Lang (or Tamerlane in European 
pronunciation), and, earlier, the Ilkhanate, the Chagatai Khanate, and the Golden Horde. 
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Muslim ruling elite who fundamentally helped define hallmarks of South Asia, South 
Asian culture, and South Asian religions.8  
By 1813, though, the empire’s reach comprised significantly less territory, and 
was no longer contiguous—British stronghold states, princely states, and independent (or 
defiant) local rulers pockmarked the once-unified area.9  The official Mughal rulers at 
this exact moment were Shah Allah II and Akbar Shah II; but Akbar Shah II exercised 
nominal rule since he was largely in league with, and under the influence of, the British 
East India Company.  Benares itself, as a British-controlled city, would have been under 
the control of multiple collectors, regents, and even military officials.10  
 In 1813, the British were in the process of both formalizing their control over the 
subcontinent and losing sole financial authority over the region.  Technically, the East 
India Company operated in league with, but apart from, the British Crown and controlled 
quite large tracts of land throughout South Asia, centered on trading capitals like Madras 
(Chennai), Calcutta (Kolkata), Bombay (Mumbai), and Benares (Varanasi).  In 1813, 
however, the British East India Company lost its monopoly rights over India.11  
Obviously, this was a major blow to the financial, entrepreneurial sphere of control for 
the British in India.  Just a few decades later, after the 1857 Rebellion, the Crown 
                                                
 
8 Stephen F. Dale, The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 
9 See, for example, the British maps of early 19th century India: “India in 1805” in Royal India 
Gazette (reprint, 1907). 
 
10 Bernard S. Cohn, “The British in Benares: A Nineteenth Century Colonial Society,” Society for 
Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 4, No. 2 (Jan., 1962), pp. 169-199. 
 
11 This is due to the Charter Act of 1813.  See: Arthur Berriedale Keith, A Constitutional History 
of India 1600–1935 ( London: Methuen, 1936), 128. 
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formally took over the East India Company’s tracts, redefined India’s relationship to the 
Empire, and in so doing became the largest empire in the world.  It also had to rule the 
most populous Muslim community. 
 1813 serves as a watershed year for this book, because in what follows I take 
seriously the local, regional, and global realities that represent themselves most obviously 
in Mathurānāth’s 1813 work, Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions.  By exploring the 
terminologies that Mathurānāth employs and deploys about religion, one can begin to 
think through the relationships of religion, empire, and taxonomy.  Starting from 1813 
and then working backward, I will provide a genealogical framework for tracing the 
taxonomy of religion as it appears in the South Asian, Islamicate context of northern 
India.  The technical terms I trace appear in Mathurānāth’s work, but they find 
resonances with texts that far predate it and ripple effects that stem from it.     
 In this book, I will question the relationship between external and internal notions 
of religion.  British Orientalist definitions of religion have often been imported into South 
Asian definitions and put to imperial uses.  While much of the existent genealogical 
discussion of religion has accepted Western categories, I will challenge and complicate 
this narrative by looking at the intersection of Western, Islamic, and South Asian 
constructions of religion.  I will engage a Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions 
because it is a text paradigmatic of the fluidity of South Asian political and religious 
identities.  On the one hand, it is limited: it is an early-nineteenth century work written by 
a Brahmin Hindu in both Persian and Sanskrit, commissioned by the East India 
Company; it mainly describes the religious affiliations of the people of Varanasi, India.  
Yet I use this text to trace the genealogy of religious terminologies and religious group 
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definitions to Mughal courtly writings.  In doing so, I demonstrate the ways in which 
precolonial classification systems informed colonial taxonomies.  Attending to a 
distinctive text and its terminological genealogy also allows me to propose an alternative 
historical model that de-centers British colonial authority and re-imagines Indo-Islamic 
and Hindu contributions to Orientalist scholarship.  Throughout this work, I will argue 
that Mathurānāth’s work exemplifies a Persianate, Islamicate understanding of religion 
and religions, and that this work in turn contributed to British understandings; in so 
doing, I will argue that a concept analogous to universal religion exists in South Asia, and 
its very existence is a contrapuntal challenge to the postcolonial and post-Orientalist 
critiques of universal religion.   
 
Mathurānāth: Islamicate Incarnate 
 
Let me re-introduce a major protagonist of the story line that animates this book.  
Mathurānāth was from Benares, and had been employed by local Mughal-affiliated elites 
before being commissioned in 1812 by the British to write a text describing and 
delineating the inhabitants of the city.  He completed the work in 1813.  Mathurānāth was 
a Hindu Brahmin pandita, literate in two languages of authority: first, in Sanskrit, the 
language of erudite, typically Brahmin, Hindu religious authorities; and second, in 
Persian, the language of the Mughal—and early British Raj—courts.  Why would 
Mathurānāth, a Brahmin pandita and former courtly author to the Mughal Empire, be 
commissioned by John Glynn, the British East India Company’s Benares regent, to write 
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a book exploring all of the myriad religions present in that city?12 And how could he 
write such a book in little more than a year? A blurring of boundaries and possibilities, 
his difference is astonishing in retrospect but not in his own time.  Such a messy 
confabulation of difference is, I argue, not only a standard trope within South Asian 
history, but also vitally important to the development of religion, religions, and religious 
identities. 
In many ways, Mathurānāth is not a unique character.  Literate elites—especially 
those employed by or affiliated with the court—throughout the Mughal period (1526-
1857 CE) would have had some familiarity with the language of the court, Persian.  
Further, literate Hindu elites would have received training in Sanskrit.  While the 
population of literates during the early modern period in South Asia was not statistically 
sizeable, the influence of such figures and the sphere of influence the literati cannot be 
overstated.  Persianate literary culture and Brahmanical literary culture coalesced in 
northern India, creating a viable, important, and unique Indo-Persian style that spanned 
custom, literature, and art.  Mathurānāth’s Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions is an 
exceptional text, as I will show, but that does not necessarily make Mathurānāth himself 
an aberration; instead, he symbolizes and represents a very particular subset of a Mughal 
elite culture: literate in Persian and Sanskrit, Mathurānāth can be read as both Persianate 
and Islamicate. 
Marshall Hodgson explained why he coined the phrase “Islamicate.”  Just as the 
term “Italianate” was used largely to describe architectural types that take on Italian form, 
ideas, and structure but are not actually Italian, so Islamicate “would refer not directly to 
                                                
 
12 Mathurānāth, Riyāz al-maẓāhib, 5.  BL MSS 3404. 
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the religion, Islam, itself, but to the social and cultural complex historically associated 
with Islam and the Muslims, both among Muslims themselves and even when found 
among non-Muslims.”13  Persianate has the same connotation, and refers to that which is 
not directly Persian, but has, maintains, or is associated with Persia and Persians.  The 
Mughals, as a Turko-Mongol and Persian lineage, inherited and elaborated upon Persian 
forms of kingship, culture, and religion; South Asia during and after the Mughal period 
becomes a site of Persianate rule, art and architecture, and culture.14  Along these lines, 
then, Mathurānāth can typify what a person might look like if he or she were to reflect 
the concepts of Islamicate or Persianate: a non-Muslim living under Muslim rule, 
affected by literary forms as well as language itself, he is part of a social, historical, and 
cultural matrix that is undeniably associated with Islam and Muslims. 
Within this framework, Mathurānāth as emblem stands to reiterate the position of 
South Asia within the field of Islamic Studies.  Long understood as an outlier or 
peripheral sphere, South Asian Islam is comparatively understudied,15 and South Asian 
Muslim rulers are under-theorized precisely within the terms Hodgson suggested.  Yet 
                                                
 
13 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Volume 1: The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 1977), 59. 
 
14 Bruce B. Lawrence, “Islamicate Civilization: The View from Asia,” in Teaching Islam, ed. 
Brannon Wheeler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 61-76. 
 
15 Many scholars have commented and written about the positioning of ethnically Arab and 
Arabic-language as central, while non-Arab or non-Arabic forms of Islam, Muslim culture, and 
practice are peripheral.  This mode of center and periphery implies, at its worst, a deviation from 
“authentic” or “real” Islam, which is necessarily Arab; at its best, it understands the ties the ties 
of Arabic language and the Qur’an as always primary while ignoring or making subservient those 
local languages, customs, and interpretations.  Scholars like Bruce B. Lawrence, Carl W. Ernst, 
Vernon Schubel, and Omid Safi have, in their writings, personal communications with the author, 
and public lectures, have specifically criticized this model of center and periphery, instead 
arguing that South Asian Islam (as elsewhere) is a vital, authentic, and no less central expression 
of Islam and Muslim life. 
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South Asia presents a unique location in which to examine the cultural, religious, and 
linguistic effects of Muslims and Islam within a non-Muslim majority region—it is worth 
mentioning that the Mughals represent the only such empire within the history of Islam, 
Muslim rule, and Muslim kings.16 Mathurānāth, therefore, provides not only a text to 
analyze but a position, context, and status exclusively South Asian.   
Mathurānāth himself is more of an historical enigma than many people in his 
position.  It is, in fact, fairly simple to place him within a context of other literate elites 
who worked for multiple—and often competing—empires.  It is rather difficult, however, 
to find information relating to his specific life story; he does not write about himself, and 
as far as manuscripts are concerned, it is only clear that he penned the one text that will 
comprise a good deal of the study herein, Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions.  This 
is not to say there is no evidence elsewhere to support a more general portrait of who he 
may have been.  We do know that Robert John Glynn, a regent and registrar for the East 
India Company from 1808-1823, hired Mathurānāth to write the manuscript.17  As East 
India Company records indicate, Glynn had commissioned other local people literate in 
Persian to write treatises for the Company; it is Mathurānāth, however, who was charged 
                                                
 
16 Dale, The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, 96-105. 
 
17 East India Register and Directory, 1813 1st Ed. 3; corrected to the 30th December 1812; 
Complete Lists of the Company’s Servants, civil, military and marine, with their respective 
Appointments at the different Presidencies in the East-Indies; With Indexes to the same, and lists 
of casualties during the last year. Together with Lists of Europeans, Mariners &c., not in the 
service of the East-India Company; and Merchant Vessels employed in the country trade. 
Compiled, by Permission of the Honourable East-India Company, from the Official Returns 
received at the East-India House: by John Mathison & Alexander Way Mason, of the secretary’s 
office, East-India House, 12, 17, 363. 
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with doing the survey of the city of Benares, its religions and its religious groups.18  
Given Glynn’s other local contacts, it is reasonable to infer that Glynn’s selection of 
Mathurānāth may have been based on the latter’s particular knowledge, familiarity with 
the city, or personal relationship with Glynn; in any event, it is clear Glynn had other 
contacts, other options, yet chose Mathurānāth from them.  While we may not be able to 
pinpoint Mathurānāth’s particular personal history, we can piece together his relationship 
to the Company, the Mughals, and Glynn specifically using the data available.  Further, 
as will be discussed in great detail in chapter 3, “Garden of Religions: Dīn, Universality, 
and Particularity,” his text, Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions stands as the single 
largest body of evidence about Mathurānāth as well as about early nineteenth century 
Benares’ religious activities.19 
What is known about Mathurānāth indicates on the one hand his distinctive 
approach to the religions of Benares in the early nineteenth century. Riyāz al-maẓāhib 
reads quite like a proto-ethnography: in it, Mathurānāth details the people he happens to 
see and know of in the city.  For example, he talks about the followers of a particular 
                                                
 
18 Mathurānāth, Riyāz al-maẓāhib, 2-3. 
 
19 In this dissertation, I work exclusively with the version of the manuscript held at the British 
Library (MS 3404) and available via microform (UNC Libraries, 1-5324, pos. 1).   Other versions 
of the text exist, and will factor into later studies as well as the book project that will stem from 
this dissertation manuscript.  Two of these are full versions of the text, including, unlike the MS 
used here, illustrations.  One, Riyāz al-maẓāhib can be located at the Rampur Raza Library, as 
listed in this catalogue: Fihrist-i Makhtutat-i Farsi, Rampur Raza Library, ed. Imtiyaz `Ali `Arshi 
et al., introduction by Shayista Khan (Patna: Khudabakhsh Oriental Public Library, 1995).  The 
other is also located at the British Library, but has been entered with a misspelled title and author 
name: Riyaz-i al-mazdhib, Asia & African Studies, Add.24035.  Further, an abridged version of 
the text exists in microform as well: Kunh-i zat-i majma` al-sifat, Harvard University library, 
Harvard Depository Film M 987.  
These extant manifold versions point toward the value of the original text, its impact, and 
Mathurānāth’s authorial prowess.   
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shaykh and, later, about those who worship Ganesha, the elephant-headed deity.  He lists 
gurus, panditas, shaykhs, and a few imams, as well as a number of yogis or sanyassins, 
ascetic holy men.20 Mathurānāth typically describes these people and their religious 
groups with what might be best called a scientific tone: his is a truly descriptive 
approach, neither presumptive nor prescriptive.  On the other hand, however, this tactic 
of description is certainly not new within the context of South Asian religions and 
treatises thereof.  As will be discussed in chapter 2 “Genealogies and Imaginaries: Abu’l 
Fazl, the Ā'īn-i Akbarī, and the Impact of Islamicate Definitions,” Mathurānāth is very 
readily located within a long line of South Asian Islamicate and Islamic histories and 
descriptions of religions in South Asia, especially those of Abu’l Fazl (d. 1602 CE), 
Akbar’s courtly author, and Shahrastānī (d. 1153 CE). Mathurānāth utilizes lineages of 
definition—extant taxonomies—to interpret his present-day religious, social, and cultural 
milieu.  In this way, he is both influenced by Islamicate systems and perpetuates those 
systems for his British sponsors. 
 
A Note on Terminology 
  
 Although this work directly confronts issues of taxonomy and definitions of 
“religion” and “religions,” it does not provide a comprehensive summation of all of the 
terms and their etymologies that could fit within this rubric.  This is to say that I follow 
the terms used by the authors in question—especially Mathurānāth and Abu’l Fazl—as 
well as those senses of the terms employed by South Asian and Euro-American scholars.  
I necessarily focus on the tension between universality and particularity; my aim is to 
                                                
 
20 Riyāz al-maẓāhib, 7-10, 13-30. 
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weave South Asian terms and their uses, theories of religion that stem from the Euro-
American academy, and the tensions between a totalizing “religion” on the one hand and 
the peculiarities of varieties of religions on the other.  In so doing, I privilege some terms 
over and above others.  In this brief section, I simply want to note the terms on which I 
focus, as well as those that, in future projects, may deserve greater attention; overall, this 
section aims to delineate the terms I use, why I use them, and the spectrum of terms—
both highlighted and ignored here—that can all fit within the exceptionally broad 
category of “religion.” 
 Religion, in English and in its correlated translations across languages, has myriad 
applications that can and do range from theological interpretation to customary practice 
to legal categories across time and space.  In many ways, much of the critique of the term 
and its study—a subject discussed in the next section of this introduction—hinges upon 
this breadth: a term that encompasses so much, that can be read in so many ways must be 
viewed judiciously.  If it can mean so many different things to so many varied observers, 
does “religion” as a category, a label, and a site of investigation hold specific merit?  As 
will be shown below, I certainly would not argue that it is a complex, historically 
contingent term, but I also think it is worthy of attention.  I simply argue that 
understanding “religion”—in English and across, as is the example here, Islamicate 
languages—requires an examination of the particular uses of the terms in question, as 
well as an acknowledgement of the spectrum of terminologies that can fit within the 
rubric of “religion.” 
 For Islamicate languages, authors, and traditions, these terms are varied and 
multitudinous.  As a means to illustrate both the depth and breadth of these words, as well 
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as their extensive range, it is worthwhile to briefly explore a number of terms that are 
relevant to the topic at hand, but do not necessarily figure heavily in the discussion 
throughout this dissertation.  Many of the terms that can be considered have resonances 
with those used in English; the vocabulary we employ to describe myriad associations, 
groupings, and belief systems is plentiful, and carries with it both sharp and hazy tones.  
“Sect,” “denomination,” “group,” “association,” “order,” “school,” “faith,” “belief,” 
“philosophy,” “spirit,”—these are but a few examples of the ways in which “religion” is 
both a specific idea as well as one with a multitude of supporting concepts, which belong 
to organizational notions (e.g. “sect,” “group”) and contemplative ideas (e.g. “spirit,” 
“belief”).  Islamicate texts employ many of these same ideas.  Terms that contribute to 
the spectrum of terms associated with “religion” include, but are not limited to: firqa 
(division, sect); ra’y and its plural ārā’ (view and views); faqīr (order, especially of 
mendicants); goruh (group); darvish (ascetic); and i`tiqād (belief).21  Furthermore, while 
not expressly part of Islamicate languages, related Indic terms made their way into 
Persian texts.  For example, the terms dharma (religion, order, obligation); darśana 
(group, philosophical school); and panth (order) appear with some regularity in Persian 
works completed in South Asia. 
                                                
 
21 In future studies, an obvious point of investigation will be the Dabistān-e Maẓāhib or School of 
Religions, a seventeenth century Persian text which accounts for the religions and sects of 
Hindustan in its time period.  Much attention in the text is spent on Hindu groups, which include 
Sikhs and Jains.  The very outline of the work demonstrates what I have tried to illuminate here: 
the rich way in which a tapestry of sects, groups, orders, and religions are woven stands to further 
underscore not only the definitions of those terms and the larger category to which they may 
belong (i.e. religion) but also the varied way in which thinkers envision and employ that category.  
For the dated English translation, see: The Dabistán: or, School of manners, the religious beliefs, 
observances, philosophic opinions and social customs of the nations of the East, trans. David 
Shea and Anthony Troyer, with a special introduction by A. V. Williams Jackson (Washington: 
M. Walter Dunne, 1901).  In Persian: Dabistan-e Maẓāhib, Kaykhusraw Isfandiyār; Muḥsin 
Fānī; Raḥīm Rizāzādah-’i Malik Tihran, eds. (Kitābkhānah-’i Ṭahūrī, 1362 [1983]). 
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Of course, beyond terms I do not focus on, there are those upon which I do.  
Primarily, these are dīn and its plural adyan (religion/religions) and maẓhab and its 
plural—which appears in the title of Mathurānāth’s text—maẓāhib (religion/religions, 
sect/sects).  Both terms have incredibly wide usages, and it is not my purpose to explicate 
those rich histories here.  I focus on these terms because they appear frequently in the 
source material; as will be expounded upon below, I interpret them as such following 
scholars like W. C. Smith.  It is worth mentioning, however briefly, the contours of each 
term.  Perhaps the more complicated of the two is dīn and its plural adyan.  In chapter 3, I 
spent a good deal of time illustrating how and why I choose to define this term; for now, 
it is important to delineate the basics of that argument.   
Dīn appears in the Qur’an, and as such is, in many ways, foundational to the 
understanding of religion in Islam, Islamicate contexts, and Islamicate texts.  W. C. Smith 
addresses not only the Qur’anic senses of the term—and the lack of its plural within the 
text—but also the ways in which this corollary understanding of “religion” can and does 
speak toward non-Western systems for “religion.”22  However, limiting dīn to its 
Qur’anic meanings would be shortsighted indeed; centuries of commentary, history, and 
the development of multiple centers of learning within Islamicate contexts certainly 
assume such a broad term to have multiple glosses.  One scholar notes that the term’s 
specific history has not been attempted given this broad range of location, time, and use.  
He goes on to note that dīn functions distinctively in public and private spheres; it 
                                                
 
22 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Fortress Press, 1991 
[1962]), 80-85.  For a different gloss of dīn in the Qur’an, see: Carl W. Ernst, How to Read the 
Qur’an: A New Guide with Select Translations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2011). 
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operates differently in intellectual circles focused on law, poetry, theology, philosophy, 
science, and historiography; and that none of these uses, examined on their own, properly 
attend to the possible social and cultural treatments, understandings, or deployments 
thereof.23 
All of this is to say that dīn can be glossed as “religion,” as I do in this 
dissertation, but it also can be glossed in a variety of other ways.  I interpret it as such for 
two primary purposes: first, it places my discussion in a long-standing conversation 
which aims to bridge Euro-American definitions and uses of religion with corresponding 
terminologies from elsewhere, especially those found in Islamicate contexts; second, it 
places my discussion of South Asian religions, sects, groups, and categories within a 
conversation happening in the Euro-American academy about the broad term “religion.”  
In other words, throughout this project, I mean to connect the terminologies in play in the 
historic, primary, and secondary sources from and about South Asia and South Asian 
Islam to those historic and theoretical conversations happening about and around the 
category of religion. 
Beyond dīn, the other major term at play in this project is maẓhab and its plural 
maẓāhib—which features far more prominently in Mathurānāth’s work.  Both the plural 
and the singular have an equally vital history in the context of Islam and Islamicate 
contexts.  Mathurānāth clearly uses the term in the sense of “religions” or “sects,” 
indicating the plurality of groups most often under a larger banner—like Hindu traditions. 
Most notably in the term’s history, though, is the use of maẓhab to denote “school” 
                                                
 
23 Ahmet T. Karamustafa, “Islamic Dīn as an Alternative to Western Models of ‘Religion’,” 
unpublished paper. 
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rather than “sect” in terms of traditions of legal interpretation.  For example, when one 
discusses the predominant legal schools in Islam, one notes the four major Sunni 
maẓāhib or, using Arabic transliteration, maddhāhib (often published as the singular 
maddhab and pluralized following English rules: maddhabs).   
Despite the contemporary use of maẓhab rather exclusively to denote the legal 
schools, Mathurānāth’s use of maẓāhib as “sects” or “religions” is, however, not an 
anomaly or a misreading; he stands in a longer tradition of Persianate and Islamicate 
authors and texts who employ the term similarly.  Naser Khosrow, an eleventh century 
author who lived in Central Asia, used the term in his famous work, Safarnāma (Book of 
Travels).24  The Dabistan-e Maẓāhib or School of Religions, a seventeenth century 
Persian text which accounts for the religions and sects of Hindustan in its time period, 
both immediately predates Mathurānāth’s work and uses the term in a similar fashion.  
Though clearly far from an exhaustive list of prominent works that utilize maẓāhib as 
Mathurānāth did, these examples illustrate the ways in which he can be located within 
Persianate and Islamicate textual traditions.  Further, these examples help illuminate 
predecessor taxonomies of a key term within Mathurānāth’s work. 
Much like dīn, maẓāhib can and has been read in a variety of ways over the 
course of history, and across geographic locations.  I suggest that in the course of this 
project, the understanding of dīn as “religion,” and of maẓāhib as “sects” or “religions,” 
follows the tenor of the manuscript in question.  As will be discussed in greater detail in 
the next section—and again in chapters 1 and 3—Mathurānāth’s text oscillates between a 
                                                
 
24 Nasir Husrau; trans., Wheeler M Thackston, Nasir-i Khusraw's Book of travels [Safarnama]: a 
parallel Persian-English text (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2001). 
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sense of “religion” that looks to be universally applied and experienced, and the 
expressions of religiosity that are particular and divergent.  To capture this relational 
system of universality and particularity, I have chosen to render dīn and maẓāhib 
accordingly.  Additionally, the language of “religion” and “religions” further assists is 
drawing greater comparison, parallels, and analysis between and among the Euro-
American system—which dominates nearly all discussions of “religion”—and those 
Islamicate systems in question here.  In other words, I hope that rendering the terms in 
such a way both holds merit in terms of its linguistic veracity as well as in 
communicating corresponding definitional systems; in this way, I hope to more obviously 
place these systems in conversation with one another to explore the historical 
development of the terms in their contexts and within global, cosmopolitan arenas. 
 
Religion, Religions and Co-constitutive Definitions  
 
Mathurānāth’s personal history, his work for the Mughals and the British, and his 
work help to highlight a number of salient issues within contemporary debates about 
religion, Islam, and South Asia.  The primary, overarching theoretical issue that his 
text—and context—addresses is that of the nature of religion.  Recent work in religious 
studies has addressed the role of religion itself: scholars have debated whether or not 
religion is universal, real, or an adequate term to describe the cultural, social, political, 
and even internal experiences of the divine.  An important linguistic way of seeing the 
conversation about and history of the very category of religion is Jonathan Z. Smith’s 
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famous titular articulation of “religion, religions, religious.”25  In this article, he delineates 
the ways in which religion, as one universal concept, was transformed theoretically and 
in practice to religions, a formal recognition of multiple faith and textual traditions; he 
reads these terms against religious, which instead refers to praxis, that is, internal 
understandings of self and divinity, and, in some cases, dogma.  I retain the distinction 
between religion as a unitary, universal conceptualization and religions as a plural—if not 
pluralistic—understanding of these phenomena.   
I do so for three reasons: first, to follow J. Z. Smith’s formulation as a way by 
which to organize and highlight my contributions to this ongoing discussion; second, to 
acknowledge and account for the development of the terms in their Euro-American 
scholastic contexts; and third, to reflect the ways in which the Islamicate texts I 
interrogate move between concepts of universality and particularity and typically do so 
by using singular (universality) and plural (particularity) nouns.  Most important to the 
discussion in this book is the differentiation between the singular and the plural; if 
religion is the category—the overarching umbrella term—then religions refers to multiple 
elements of that category.  For my purposes here, the relationship between a purportedly 
universal concept and multiple manifestations of that concept will be both theoretically 
and substantively important, addressed, and theorized.  On its surface, this follows J. Z. 
Smith’s distinction between the two terms, but I complicate his insistence that the terms 
and their distinction stem from a European historical narrative by locating similar terms 
and distinctions in Islamicate taxonomies. 
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The idea that religion is universal has a long history—and, of late, a long history 
of critique.  Conceptually, one can trace universality in religion—which is to say that all 
people have religion or the denial thereof—to the seventeenth century.  It perhaps goes 
without saying that universality is tied to Christianity, and Christian commentaries, ideas, 
and practice; after all, the literal definition of catholic is universal.  However, the 
application of universality is best seen, and in fact comes into sharp focus, during the 
early modern and modern periods—that is, during the colonial and imperial expansion of 
Europe.  A brilliantly illustrative example is the nineteenth century treatise by Samuel 
Johnson entitled Oriental Religions and their Relation to Universal Religions.26  Here, 
universal is stated in terms of Church: it is the Church that is universal, and Church here 
is clearly the metric by which religion is stated and measured.27  This is not a  definition 
unique to Johnson; rather the idea of the Church—be it Catholic or a Protestant notion of 
unity—has long stood in for universality.  As J. Z. Smith points out, it is this exact 
connection between the universal and an exclusive tradition that muddies any reality of 
the inclusivity of religion.28   
Recent scholarly work on religion as a category debates the utility of the term 
itself.  Likewise, Smith argues that given this muddied history, religion is never 
universal, always particular, and with reference to non-Christian traditions, necessarily 
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foreign.29  Other scholars echo this analysis.  Wilfred Cantwell Smith critiqued the very 
term “religion” because of its inherent essentialism.30  Timothy Fitzgerald added his 
voice to the din of scholars arguing to jettison the term altogether.  He claimed that the 
term is so broad and incorporates so many and so varied phenomena as to be utterly 
useless.31  Scholars like Russel McCutcheon32 and Tomoko Masuzawa,33 among others, 
state with varying levels of adamancy the need to abandon the category of religion 
altogether.  Citing its problematic, seemingly monolithic European history, these scholars 
point out the ways in which knowledge about and knowledge of religion has been 
dictated by preconceived notions firmly rooted in Christian, Euro-American, and liberal 
ideologies.  They question whether or not religion exists, as a universal field of inquiry as 
well as a universal phenomena.   
The main purpose of these arguments—and they will be discussed in depth in 
chapter 1, “Religion and Intellectual Empires”—usually fits within two forms: first, those 
that discredit the term “religion” as exclusive, ridden with a problematic Western or 
Christian history; and second, those that problematize the academic use of religion as 
well as the academic discipline of religious studies.   
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Furthermore, scholars that deal with religious groups typically affected by 
colonialism, Orientalism, and the disciplinary legacies thereof have addressed the 
problems of religion as a field of inquiry.  Many of these are part of the postcolonial and 
decolonial movements which seek to eliminate academic—and political—discourse about 
Christianity’s and the West’s religious others from their relational modes.  This is to 
argue that these groups of scholars theorize the looming violence that the very term 
“religion” has wrought as part of colonial, imperial, or Orientalist processes, and that 
scholarship should remove itself from the perpetuation of that intellectual violence.  
Many of these scholars’ regional field of study was the traditional Orient: South and 
Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa.  As will be discussed in full in the next chapter, the 
scholarly movement to historicize the claims about religion is one that weighs heavily 
within theories of non-Christian populations; specifically for the purposes of this work, I 
will take on critiques that South Asianist and scholars of Islam undertake on the category 
of religion. 
Critiques of religion, critiques of the discipline, and critiques of colonialism, 
imperialism or Orientalism are vital for the contemporary study of South Asia, Islam, and 
the history of the discipline.  All of these fields of critique directly challenge the 
academy—and, to be clear, the academy is located in, produced by, and maintained in 
and by Euro-American institutions.  These challenges almost appear to be self-evident: of 
course Christianity stands in for “universal” and is the metric by which all other traditions 
are measured, and this can be easily accounted for by examining any number of texts on 
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religion, theology, power, progress, liberal philosophy, and even secularism.34  Talal 
Asad’s work famously and influentially addresses these very issues.35  To summarize, 
Asad’s work—and the scholars who follow him—attempts to locate intellectual, 
epistemic violence within the process of forcing all world cultures, religions, ethnicities, 
and nation-states to conform to Euro-American definitions of those phenomena.  Asad 
locates himself within a conversation between critics like W. C. Smith and Edward Said, 
all of whom articulate the problem of Euro-American labeling, and the requirement 
placed upon non-Western locations to answer, heed, and respond to those very labels in 
order to acquire legitimacy.36 
As important as these critiques have been and remain, they fail in some regard—
especially when considered in light of the topic of this book.  These critiques in some 
manner ignore, obscure, or simply fail to address the possibility of indigenous, corollary 
ideas about, in this particular case, universal religions.  While the uses of religion in 
scholarship both historically and contemporarily rely on definitions and taxonomies that 
are Euro-American and “Western,” it is problematic to assume that Euro-American 
academic culture is the only institution that has developed notions of religion, the 
universality of religion, and even a universal religion.   
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To be blunt, I do not imagine religion to be part of some transregional hegemonic 
theme of conquest and conversion.  While taking seriously issues of epistemic violence, 
colonial encounter, and imperial domination, I do not view the category of religion to 
necessarily only reflect such hegemonies.  Instead, as this book will demonstrate, I argue 
that Islamicate and Persianate taxonomies of corollaries for “religion” (namely dīn) 
demonstrate a normative local category.  Terms for religion and the category itself are 
deployed and maintained through philosophical, theological, and imperial channels, and 
are interpreted and used in various capacities over time.  But despite these differences, in 
all cases examined below, I will explore and indeed stress the ways in which “religion” 
must be understood as a meaningful local category. 
In fact, the very issue Asad’s work and related critiques attempt to address can be 
said to be at play here—that is to say the forced labeling, the definition of one’s self in 
light of Euro-American definitions and definitional category is still at work within the 
critique itself.  If the history of religion entails forcing that term and its Christian-centric 
uses upon non-Western entities, and the critique of religion is therefore to resist labeling 
any religion as universal or even as religion per se, then this resistance—the insistence 
that no such universality or terminology is appropriate—is another example of Western 
academic ideas imposed upon its Others.  Put more simply, while the critique of the 
enforcement of “religion” globally is absolutely vital, it is equally important that we, in 
the Euro-American academy, not simply strip the term and concept from non-Western 
locations; in so doing, we may lose the possibility of seeing how religion actually 
functions in these places, spaces, and frameworks. 
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This book directly addresses this very set of issues.  As will be discussed 
throughout the work and especially in chapters 2 and 3, “Genealogy of Terms: Abu’l 
Fazl, the Ā'īn-i Akbarī, and the Impact of Islamicate Definitions” and “Garden of 
Religions: Dīn, Universality, and Particularity” respectively, there does exist corollary 
understandings of religion in South Asia; furthermore, there exists similar uses of the 
category to those of the Euro-American lineages.  I do not mean to imply that similarity 
of concepts somehow overrides histories of colonial, imperial, or economic oppression; 
certainly the historical reality of South Asia as a site of European colonial abuses is well-
documented and beyond question.  However, what this book will address are the ways in 
which focusing on the epistemic violence of colonialism and imperialism in South Asia 
necessarily creates its own definitional violence. 
I refer to epistemic violence for two primary reasons.  First, it has been a major 
theoretical way in which to engage with the production of knowledge both of subjects 
and about objects.37  This line of reasoning argues that in creating knowledge about, say, 
South Asia, there are multiple silences from indigenous actors largely due to the 
importing of foreign categories, terms, and theoretical apparatus on to the subject.  These 
silences are vital, and problematic.  I take seriously the ways in which epistemic violence 
structured and continues to structure the ways in which knowledge is created.  I also take 
seriously, however, the ways in which this model of epistemic violence over-theorizes the 
production of knowledge in a post-Enlightenment, colonial framework.  By focusing 
solely on the Euro-American intellectual circles that produce knowledge, multiple 
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intelligentsia and literati are ignored.  My project traces the production of the category of 
religion within a Euro-American set of discourses, but also within Islamicate, South Asia 
discourses as well.  In this way, I trace the ways in which parallel conversations about 
religion and religions create knowledge separate from each other, with multiple nodes of 
contact.  In other words, I take seriously the ways in which intellectual elite create 
taxonomies of religion and hope to create a space in which intellectual systems—both 
Euro-American and Islamicate South Asian—create, define, and maintain religious 
boundaries. 
Throughout this book, I will contend with and work against these sorts of rallying 
cries against the field, study of, and term religion.  I argue that jettisoning religion 
because it comes with the baggage of colonial, imperial and Orientalist history fails to 
recognize that South Asians—as the primary focus here—maintained, developed, and 
instituted their own corollary systems.  To ignore the correlations and parallels is to 
fundamentally dismiss the very voices, histories, and contexts critics of religion seek to 
empower.  Not only do South Asian taxonomies of religion matter, but that they stand to 
better incorporate non-Western traditions into the larger conversation about and study of 
religion.  What might it mean to the study of religion, the study of South Asia, and the 
study of Islam that the very terms of J. Z. Smith’s famous formula “religion, religions, 
religious” were not necessarily forced upon India, but instead existed in conversation 
with and with corollaries to indigenous terms and concepts?  
Further, given the particular texts in question throughout this book, I will 
demonstrate that the relationship between Euro-American taxonomies of religion and 
religious groups are not necessarily entirely unrelated or foreign—as J.Z. Smith stated as 
 36 
others had previously thought.  If, in 1813, it was possible for Mathurānāth to study the 
religious affiliations of his fellow residents of Benares (Varanasi), to report those 
findings to the British East India Company in Persian and Sanskrit, and, most 
importantly, have those findings be understood by his British sponsors, one must 
envisage a cosmopolitan location in which conversations about religion, religions, and 
religious groups took place.  That Mathurānāth was understood demonstrates a 
relationship between definitional systems.38  And, as will be discussed later on in this 
book, it points toward a co-constitutive definition of religious groups, religions, and 
religion itself. 
 
South Asian Religions: Muslims, British, and Co-imperial Definitions  
 
There exists a widely known, often repeated, and sometimes appealing story 
about religions, power, and definitional systems in South Asia.  It goes something like 
this: the British, keen to understand and control their Indian subjects, invented strict 
definitions for religious groups, fundamentally altering religion in the Indian 
Subcontinent.39  Before British intervention, India was a place of religious co-existence, 
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even if occasional misunderstandings, conflicts, and contestations took place.  Religious 
difference, in this story, is relegated to the imposition of British colonial and imperial 
authority; religious difference between Hindus and Muslims is, at best, exacerbated by 
Orientalist, racist imperial programs and legal systems and, at worst, created divisions 
from the ether.  While various and strong critiques have been levied against this position, 
including the works of David Lorenzen, Richard King, and others, it seems that a 
fundamental stress upon the colonial period as the most formative period in South Asian 
history still remains.40  I do not mean to imply that the period of the British Raj is 
unimportant, or that works that take seriously the effects of Orientalism and colonialism 
on the postcolonial nation-states of South Asia and understandings of self are outmoded, 
outdated, or wrong.  What I will stress in this book, however, are the ways in which a 
dialogue between imperial powers—the British and the Mughals—has been understated 
in the theorization of Indian identities, histories, and historiographies. 
While postcolonial and decolonial theories influence my thinking on these issues, 
I am far more interested in how the language of some postcolonial theorists still preserves 
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and maintains certain dichotomies, like “West” and “East,” indigenous and foreign, elite 
and subaltern.  Arif Dirlik talks about deploying history to reinterpret the relational nature 
between ruled/ruler in the colonial period.  He calls his method “multi-historicalism,” a 
term he says is both inelegant and necessary; by it he means to discuss the ways in which 
interactions between multiply varied subaltern and elite are just as historically important 
as obvious interactions between imperial elite and indigenous subaltern.41  Using Dirlik 
as one of many theoretical models for my work, what I will do in the chapters that follow 
is to reevaluate who exactly are the subaltern and who are the elite in the early modern 
period of South Asia.  I explore the ways in which British and Mughal elite together 
constitute an imperialism (or imperialisms) that come to effect their collective subalterns. 
One of the many voices that seeks to nuance historical models wherein the British 
create religious definitions and taxonomies in South Asia is that of David Lorenzen.  In 
his oft-cited and influential article “Who Invented Hinduism?” Lorenzen brought to bear 
a critique of postcolonial arguments about the role of the British in the development and 
creation of religions in South Asia.42  He argues that  
the claim that Hinduism was invented or constructed by 
European colonizers, mostly British, sometime after 1800 
is false. The evidence instead suggests that a Hindu religion 
theologically and devotionally grounded in texts such as the 
Bhagavad-gita, the Puranas, and philosophical 
commentaries on the six darsanas gradually acquired a 
much sharper self-conscious identity through the rivalry 
between Muslims and Hindus in the period between 1200 
and 1500, and was firmly established long before 1800.43 
                                                
 
41 Arif Dirlik, The Postcolonial Aura (Boulder, CO: WestviewPress, 1997), 17-19. 
  
42 David Lorenzen, “Who Invented Hinduism?” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 
41, No. 4 (Oct., 1999), pp. 630-659. 
 
43 Ibid., 631. 
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Lorenzen goes on to state that we should be careful not to imagine that the communalist 
understanding of history is assumed and prioritized here—it is, after all, a teleology in 
which Muslims feature as foreign, bloodthirsty invaders to the South Asian subcontinent.  
He does, however, make abundantly clear that scholarly arguments that ignore, obscure, 
or fail to recognize Hindu self-fashioning incorrectly prioritize British power, definitional 
systems, and ideas.  Lorenzen, quite simply, wants to make clear that religion in South 
Asia was not merely a colonial invention or a colonial imposition. 
 I take seriously Lorenzen’s frustration with an historical model that credits the 
modern period, modern empires, and (typically) European actors with creating the 
religious identities of their myriad Others.  I resist, however, a model in which a dialectic 
of otherness must be assumed in order to create a religious identity.  Even if Hindus and 
Muslims relate to each other and perceive difference, negative definitions cannot be the 
only way in which a group comes to have self-consciousness.  This is especially the case 
within South Asia in the medieval and early modern periods, where varieties of praxis, 
the development of orthodoxies and heterodoxies in multiple traditions, and constant 
regional, linguistic, and cultural exchange are the reigning norms.  This book attempts to 
further Lorenzen’s claim that the British did not and could not have invented religion in 
South Asia—specifically those of Islam and Hinduism—but it also aims to think more 
critically about how the mass of religious ideology, cosmology, mythology, and praxis 
begin to constitute delineated groups. 
 Even Lorenzen’s sense of the relational definitional process—however 
problematic it could be—is of import here: this project is interested in the ways in which 
the development of religions is a co-constitutive process.  I use co-constitutive to indicate 
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that, in this case, the parties “work together” to define, delineate, and interpret religious 
boundaries, but also that their respective worlds are being influenced by each other.  This 
is precisely to avoid a model of dialectic—wherein two (or more) parties advance a 
position and work to make some sort of mean between the two.  The idea of dialectic 
does not quite work in the formation of ideas and identities for many of the same reasons 
critics have dismantled terms like “hybrid” or “syncretic;” these assume a definite, 
obvious, identifiable idea or group that can come together in new ways to make a third 
entity.  However, as many scholars have pointed out, religious identities and religions do 
not function so neatly, and are themselves each incredibly diverse.44  Therefore, I use co-
constitutive to indicate an ongoing process between and among individuals and groups 
that are constantly in flux—or, at the very least, have the potential to be in flux.  For my 
purposes in this book, this quite simply means that I take seriously the ways in which 
many Muslims’ articulation of what it means to be Muslim varies, and, in turn, that both 
affects and reflects Muslim definitions of self, “Others,” and religion writ large.    
 Along these lines, tracing the taxonomy of co-constitutive definitions of religion 
from Islamicate sources to those commissioned by the British entails thinking through the 
role of imperial powers, and these issues—of Mughal and British imperial strategies and 
taxonomies—will be a primary focus in the chapters that follow.  The periods in question, 
as well as primary texts that will be examined in this study, are often understood and 
thought about in terms of their ruling elite: the Mughals and the British.  Far too often, 
however, the legacies, policies, and influences of the British Empire are understood to be 
the imperial reality of all South Asia.  Many scholars have noted—and later, resisted—
                                                
 
44 Carl W. Ernst, and Tony K. Stewart, “Syncretism,” in South Asian Folklore, eds. Peter J. Claus 
and Margaret A. Mills (New York: Routledge/Garland Publishing, 2003), 586-588. 
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the ways in which the British Raj in India affected and even devastated many internal, 
indigenous processes.45  Certainly the colonial era and its aftermath—including the 
division of South Asia into India, Pakistan, and, later, Bangladesh—are not to be ignored, 
overlooked, or under-theorized.  However, to imagine the British as the most important 
imperial power in South Asia fundamentally obscures an obvious but disregarded truism: 
the Mughal Empire was, of course, an empire.  
The British, in many ways, inherit a good deal of their property, policy, and, I 
argue, ideas about religions in South Asia from their imperial predecessors and 
counterparts, the Mughals.  The primary example at play here will be Mathurānāth’s 
Riyāz al-maẓāhib; because this text was written by a Brahmin pandita in Persian, the 
official language of the Mughal court, we see in the text’s very construction an 
overlooked aspect of British colonialism: some toleration, even acceptance and respect of 
the ruling elite, at least in customary practice.46  By commissioning a text in Persian, the 
language of South Asian authority, the British acknowledge Mughal power and rule, 
pointing toward evidence of what is an understudied narrative of colonial influence in 
India—the relationship between imperial elites.  Therefore, this work takes seriously 
what I will refer to as co-imperialism; I use this term to indicate the ways in which 
multiple ruling, political, and even religious elites participate in the discourse of 
                                                
 
45 As examples, see: Alan M. Guenther, “A Colonial Court Defines a Muslim,” in Islam in South 
Asia in Practice, ed. Barbara D. Metcalf (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 293-
304; Radhika Singha, A despotism of law: crime and justice in early colonial India (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1998); and Peter van der Veer, Imperial Encounters: Religion and 
Modernity in India and Britain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
 
46 Muhammad Tavakoli-Targhi calls the ways in which historians and theorists ignore he 
relationship between the British and indigenous elites “Orientalism’s genesis amnesia” in 
Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 
18.  He also has a chapter of the same name, pp. 18-34. 
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governmental power and control.  An understanding of co-imperialism is key to making 
sense of the development of religious identities in South Asia.  This work will trace 
Islamicate and Mughal understandings of religion and religions, and, as has been 
mentioned, hinge upon an examination of Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions, a 
text that demonstrates the complex relationship of imperial knowledge to that of local 
elites. 
While I acknowledge that any full portrait of identity would be limited in a single 
study, this particular study necessarily focuses on elite conceptions of religion, religious 
groups, and in at least one case individual identity.  I have chosen textual sources not 
merely because they allow one to trace the usage of terms over time, but also precisely 
because they encapsulate elite discourse.  I am interested here in exploring, 
understanding, and demonstrating the ways in which elite discourse comes to shape the 
knowledge about and identity of religions in South Asia.  I argue that this is not merely a 
process imposed upon South Asians from British scholars, arms of the state, or armchair 
intellectuals, but rather an involved process that has its roots within the imperial 
discourses of the Mughal Empire. 
 The Mughal Empire, as I stated above, was an empire of sorts.  It had a well-oiled 
bureaucracy that handled tax collection; patronage of the arts that included Hindu and 
Muslim ateliers; building projects that ranged from imperial homes and courtly edifices 
to sites of religious import for multiple religious traditions; translation projects; the 
adjudication of funds, leaders, and weaponry for a standing army; waqf or charity 
organizations; and sponsored intellectual pursuits like places of learning, among many 
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other aims, projects, and boards.  These imperial structures lay the foundations, in many 
regions of northern India, for British organizational programs that follow.   
This work explores the ways in which the dialogue between the British and the 
Mughals helped shape the very religious taxonomies that so greatly influence religion 
writ large and religions within South Asia.  To do so, I weave contemporary theories of 
religion, colonialism, imperialism, and postcoloniality with textual and historical 
evidence.  It is clearly the case that contemporary theoretical tools help reshape, 
rearticulate, and rethink the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods; specifically, 
these sets of scholarship have imagined and reimagined the rupture of the colonial period 
and the work that does vis-à-vis indigenous populations, institutions, and systems.  Here, 
by way of using these theoretical frameworks alongside textual exidence, I argue that 
categories once overwhelmingly assumed to be forieign to South Asia do, indeed, have 
local, normative footing that traces to Islamicate taxonomies.  As this argument unfolds 
over the next chapters, I intend to demonstrate not only the complexity of precolonial and 
early colonial relationships between power structures and the category of religion, but 
additionally the ways in which South Asians and British agents crafted definitional 
systems that continue to have meaning today. 
          
Chapter Overview 
 
 This book will trace the usage and development of the category of religion, and 
piece together a genealogy of terms that stresses Islamicate authors as well as European 
conventions.  It will culminate in the examination of a unique text, Mathurānāth’s Riyāz 
al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions.  I will argue that his work exemplifies a Persianate, 
 44 
Islamicate understanding of religion and religions, and that this work in turn contributed 
to British understandings; in so doing, I will argue that a concept analogous to universal 
religion exists in South Asia, challenging the postcolonial and post-Orientalist critiques 
of the category itself.   
 Chapter 1, “The Locative Case: Why South Asia Matters,” discusses the place 
South Asia inhabits within theories of religion, modern periodization schemas,47 and 
discourse about religious identity.  I argue here that South Asia is distinctively located 
within histories and theories of religion, as many Euro-American scholars—starting as 
early as the eighteenth century—have identified this region as a ideological landscape fit 
for understanding religion, religions, and the religious.  Further, in this chapter Islamic 
and Islamicate definitions, theories, and histories about and of South Asia will be 
discussed.  This chapter aims to demonstrate the ripe location of South Asia as a site of 
discourse about religion writ large, and Muslim understandings of religious identity and 
religious boundaries specifically. 
 Chapter 2, “Genealogy of Terms: Abu’l Fazl, the Ā'īn-i Akbarī, and the Impact of 
Islamicate Definitions,” examines the historic text, Ā'īn-i Akbarī or Institutes of Akbar as 
a starting point.  It is a text widely known and widely cited for its ideological positioning 
of Akbar as an emperor conscious of religious plurality.  Importantly, this chapter focuses 
on the ways in which Abu’l Fazl, the author of the text, imagines the Mughal Empire and 
its emperor; further, it explores the ways in which later historians, both South Asian and 
                                                
 
47 Periodization refers to the process in which history is divided, ordered, and labeled.  For 
example, the Enlightenment as a period of time with an identifiable beginning, range, and ending 
is part of the periodization of history.  I take seriously the effects of such labeling, which stems 
from Euro-American historical models, upon non-Western sites and histories throughout this 
work, but especially in chapter 1. 
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European, come to imagine this empire, its relationship to religion and religions, and its 
kings as well.  The theoretical concept of imaginaries will be vital here, and I will spend 
some time explaining that framework and how it better helps in figuring South Asia and 
its empires. 
Additionally, I will examine the imperial uses of religion and religious difference 
of the Mughal court, specifically during the time of the great and widely noted emperor 
Akbar (r. 1556-1605 CE).  This chapter will specifically address the courtly approach to 
religion and the variety of religions in South Asia, and deal directly with the genealogy of 
religion in Islamicate contexts.  This chapter sets the historical trajectory that allows for 
Mathurānāth; in turning to the texts that dominated discourse in South Asia in the early 
modern period, I will examine the context in which Mathurānāth’s proto-ethnography and 
pluralistic viewpoints come to exist.   
Chapter 3, “Garden of Religions: Dīn, Universality, and Particularity,” will deal 
directly with Mathurānāth’s Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to demonstrate the Islamicate genealogy of his approach to religion as a 
category as well as the labeling of religious identities; further, this chapter will describe 
the relationship of these categories of identification and identity to those of the British—
the colonial entity for whom the text was commissioned.  In this way, I will discuss the 
connection between imperialisms (Mughal and British) and definitions (religion).  This 
chapter builds on the terminologies and imaginaries explored in Chapter 2.  It will 
explore the terms specific to the text, as well as those that are shared with Abu’l Fazl’s.  
It aims to demonstrate the ways in which religions were mapped by Mathurānāth, and in 
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that way demonstrate two major issues: first, how Islamicate definitions work as well as 
structure religious identifications; and, second, how imperial knowledge was created.  
 The fourth chapter, “Co-Imperialisms and the Co-Constitutive Definition of 
Religion” will synthesize the previous theoretical, genealogical, and historical treatment 
of religion, Islamicate definitions, and imperial emphases.  It will argue, finally, that 
definitions of religion certainly predate British or European taxonomies, but also that 
these very definitions are part of their own empire.  By treating the Mughal Empire 
alongside the British Empire as empires, I aim to demonstrate the nature of elite 
definitional systems and their relationship to each other.  Further, I aim to demonstrate 
that these taxonomical systems were, in fact, developed with respect to long-standing, 
premodern trends, raising the issue of whether or not we can truly view “religion” as an 
entirely Western category of inquiry. 
 The fifth and final chapter, “Conclusion: Religions of Empire,” is in actuality a 
short summation of the dissertation.  It traces the smaller arguments located in each 
preceding chapter, makes explicit the connections between these arguments, and restates 
the overarching claim of the entire work as a whole.   
 Throughout this study my goal is to challenge standing historical understandings 
of the development of religion and religions in South Asia.  It is my primary purpose to 
rethink the so-called foreign nature of the very category in question by examining, in 
depth, two primary texts— Ā'īn-i Akbarī and Riyāz al-maẓāhib—that both draw upon 
and reimagine Islamicate taxonomies of religion.  By tracing the history of the location 
and discourse about the category of religion as they are used and expounded upon by 
elites, I will demonstrate that South Asia was a site where parallel and corollary 
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definitions of religion predated colonial European impositions, rule, and epistemic 
violence.  Therefore, this study suggests that religion itself was co-constitutive over a 
lengthy period of time, as well as part of a co-imperial process.  Religion, religions, and 
religious identities are constructions of elites—not only foreign imperial elites, but 
autochthonous elites as well.  
 
  
CHAPTER 1: THE LOCATIVE CASE: WHY SOUTH ASIA MATTERS 
 
 Though South Asia has long been a crossroads of a multitude of ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious groups, it still may seem an unlikely place to start a discussion about the 
multiple sources of “religion.”  Religious plurality, after all, does not necessarily make 
for intellectual plurality vis-à-vis religion, and it is the latter with which this chapter is 
primarily concerned.  The term and category of religion has a rich and varied history, and 
it is my contention that in these histories and taxonomies the place of South Asia is 
under-theorized but can serve as a place to observe the roots of “religion,” both Euro-
American and Islamicate.  As in real estate, as we will see below, for religion it’s all 
about location, location, location: specifically, the location of evidence, the location of 
definitions, and, most importantly, the location of discourse.  In this chapter, I will 
discuss South Asia as a location for multiple strands of discourse about religion as a 
category, namely those of Euro-American academic theories as well as those of 
Islamicate origins.  I argue that the location of discourse challenges the typical 
historiography of the study of religion, which places “religion” within “the specter of the 
West”48 and imagines “religion” to be foreign and imposed.  As we will see below, the 
category of “religion” has indigenous taxonomies that stand apart from those of Western 
scholarship. 
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South Asia has been the site of the study of religion, theorizations of language and 
its origins, and theorizations of the aftermath of colonialism vis-à-vis religious 
categorization.  Some of our most important figures in the formulations and foundations 
of the study of religion—theorists and developers of the term—were themselves 
Sanskritists, scholars of Indic languages and religions.  These include, as examples, F. 
Max Müller and Mircea Eliade, who are both perhaps better remembered as theorists of 
religion rather than Sanskritists.  The process of religious categorization—one that is 
often attributed to the British or, at the very least, the machinery of colonialism and 
imperialism—has itself come under scrutiny in the works of scholars like, Richard King, 
Gyanendra Pandey, and Dipesh Chakrabarty among others.  Further, W. C. Smith, Talal 
Asad and Timothy Fitzgerald have questioned the ability of “religion” to be salient in 
Islamic or Islamicate locations.  All of these authors, among others, take seriously the 
centrality of religion, of religious categorization, and South Asia or Islamic categories; 
Islamicate South Asia has proved to be formative within various lineages of the study of 
religion, both “Western” and non-Western, and it will be vital here as well. 
A question remains, though: why South Asia?  I believe the answer is rooted in 
the historical quest for origins that typified much of modern and modernist writings.  
With the “discovery” of Sanskrit as older than Hebrew, and the development of 
linguistics and philology in the nineteenth century, racial-linguistic categories turned into 
meaningful ways by which to measure contemporary issues.  Prior to this “discovery,” 
scholars assumed that Hebrew or other Semitic languages were the oldest examples of 
cogent, intelligent systems of thought; however, Indo-European languages provided a 
window in which German and English scholars could theorize an identity that was not at 
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odds with prevalent anti-Semitic49 tendencies.  More importantly, within the context of 
the search of origins, if Indo-European languages were older and if those philosophies 
were therefore more pure, an Orientalist’s link to those languages proved superiority.  In 
other words, South Asia—as the home of Sanskrit—helps build the space in which a 
linguistic-racial link between Europe (i.e. German and English speakers; Anglo-Saxons) 
and greater India is imagined.  As we will see below, F. Max Müller in many ways 
exemplifies a scholar whose work both seeks to understand and order “religion” within a 
philological framework. 
Others, however, noting the troublesome links between colonialism or 
imperialism and categorizations of religion, call these distinctions into question directly.  
This is particularly true, with respect to our purposes here, of scholars of Islam who have 
long noted the ways in which “religion” as a category smacks of a particularly Christian 
worldview.  Famously, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, an eminent scholar of Islam as well as a 
respected theorist of religion, declared that religion as a category was essentially bygone 
and useless, stating: 
The term [religion] is notoriously difficult to define.  At 
least, there has been in recent decades a bewildering variety 
of definitions; and no one of them has commanded wide 
acceptance.  In some cases of this sort, a repeated failure to 
agree, to reach any satisfying answer or even to make any 
discernible progress towards one, has turned out to mean 
that men have been asking a wrong question.  In this 
instance one might argue that the sustained inability to 
                                                
 
49 Here I do not imply anti-Jewish rhetoric, but rather a true anti-Semitism: all those peoples 
whose languages fell into this category, namely Jews and Arabs and/or Muslims depending on the 
source.  This is important insofar as linguistic definitions came to shape alongside racial 
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religions and lineages.  For example, see: Theodor Benfey and G. H. Schodde, “Semitic and Indo-
European Culture,” The Old Testament Student Vol. 4, No. 4 (Dec., 1884), 170-171.  
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clarify what the word ‘religion’ signifies, in itself suggests 
that the term ought to be dropped; that is it a distorted 
concept not really corresponding to anything definite or 
distinctive in the objective world.50 
 
Here, W. C. Smith veers toward objectivism, perhaps problematically,51 but what is far 
more on point is his insistence that the term should “be dropped” due to its lack of 
correspondence to something definitive.  Correspondence is key: the term “religion” has 
often come under scrutiny because it lacks a one-to-one relationship with the thing it 
describes.   
Timothy Fitzgerald perhaps infamously argues that religion, specifically within 
the academic discipline of religious studies, has come to reflect a “decontextualized, 
ahistorical phenomenon” which is “divorce[d] from questions of power.”52 He goes on to 
argue that religion as a field, a category of inquiry “has been exported to non-western 
countries in the context of colonialism.”53  Ultimately, he argues that faith traditions—
what we may have called “religions” in the plural previously—are better off understood, 
examined, and theorized under the larger, more appropriate umbrella of “culture.”54  In 
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objectivity, multicultural politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
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53 Ibid. 
 
54 Ibid.  This comment appears frequently.  See, as examples: pp. 10, 17, 235-251.  
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other words, Fitzgerald has no use for religion as a discipline, namely because of its 
theological or failed non-theological definitions which ignore issues of power.   
While it is indeed well established that colonial (and imperial) regimes utilized 
ethnic, religious, and racial markers to rule their new subjects, I take issue with 
Fitzgerald’s guiding idea that all religious definitions were imposed upon colonial 
subjects by European powers.  As we will see below, there are multiple taxonomies of 
religion—some Euro-American, some not, and, yes, almost all are part of power systems.  
Where my position differs greatly from that of Fitzgerald is precisely in recognizing that 
the process of religious definition, while part of power systems, does not necessarily 
mean that power may only be Western.  Given the role of South Asia as part of a 
definitional process, it seems, instead, that the location of the discourse and its actors—
colonial, imperial, and autochthonous—are of the utmost importance and have, in fact, 
played a major part in the construction of “religion.”  
This chapter addresses the space South Asia inhabits as a location of imperial 
powers as well as a location of discourse about religion.  First, I will discuss the 
genealogy of “religion” and the legacy of Western, Orientalist scholarship.  Then, I will 
trace the history of critique of Orientalism, focusing on scholars whose work stems from 
the study of non-Western traditions.  Finally, I will suggest that the category of religion 
has proved salient within the South Asian context, and that religion has developed 
discursively with input not only from the Western terminology but also from the extant, 
indigenous formulations of religion.  This last section of the chapter will parlay into 
chapter 2, “Genealogies and Imaginaries: Abu’l Fazl, the Ā'īn-i Akbarī, and the Impact of 
Islamicate Definitions,” where Islamicate sources, written before and after Mughal 
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Emperor Jalāl ud-Dīn Muhammad Akbar’s reign (1556-1605), establish indigenous, 
parallel definitions of religion, religions, and religious groups. 
“Classify and Conquer”: Multiple Taxonomies of Religion 
 
Let us take the old saying, divide et impera, and translate it 
somewhat freely by “Classify and conquer,” and I believe 
that we shall then lay hold of the old thread of Ariadne55 
which has led the students of many a science through 
darker labyrinths even than the labyrinth of the religions of 
the world.  All real science rests on classification, and only 
in the case we cannot succeed in classifying the various 
dialects of faith, shall we have to confess that a science of 
religion is really an impossibility.56 
 
F. Max Müller, the famed philologist who posited a scientific rendering of the 
study of religion, is often cited as one of the founders of the modern study of comparative 
religion.  His quest to classify, to create a science of religions and, more specifically, a 
taxonomy of religions has spawned great debate in the century since it was written.  On 
the whole, his quest has been debunked as a universalist, progressivist one that eschews 
more than it reveals.  However, the study of religion in many ways is still a field where 
scholars attempt to conjure, concoct, and remold words to better address appropriate 
definitions; in many ways, while it is doubtful we have produced a science of religion, as 
a scholarly community we are not entirely far from the essence of Müller’s project—to 
classify and conquer, to fully grasp.  The process of classification of religion, religious 
practice and religious identity is alive and well, and as will be discussed below, tends to 
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have an unequal historiographic impact with respect to Islamic and South Asian 
traditions.   
The marks of categorization, classification, and taxonomical schemes continue to 
have resonances not only in the study of Islam or South Asia, but on Muslim, Hindu, 
Sikh, Jain and Buddhist subjects.  As such, this chapter will continue to focus on the 
historical uses of “religion” in both Western academic usages and Islamic and Islamicate 
systems.  In so doing, this chapter will establish a reasonable challenge to the 
conventional wisdom that religion as a field of categorization and as a classificatory 
system is distinctively “Western,” despite its Western lineage’s long-standing and far-
reaching impact. 
It is important to state outright that this chapter is not interested in parsing 
multiple definitions of religion to find an adequate one, nor is it the purpose here to come 
up with a working definition of religion.  These conversations are, as I see it, tangential to 
the overarching purpose of both this chapter and this project.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, this book seeks to examine and theorize the role of ruling elites both in the 
creation and deployment of the category of religion as well as the effect of that 
deployment on religious identity formation.  As such, how “religion” is important here is 
precisely as a complicated, contested, and often contradictory discursive category that has 
multiple meanings over time and place.  This chapter specifically and this book writ large 
serves as a critical genealogy of the term, as it has been used by the Western academy, 
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Mughal court, and British Empire; offering my own definition would only prescribe 
something which demands description.57 
Müller himself offers little in the way of a definition for religion, and instead 
focuses his philological classifications for a systemized way to think across what we 
might today call culture.  As Tomoko Masuzawa notes, beginning in 1905 scholars of 
religion credit Müller with establishing the field of comparative religion, one part of his 
classificatory project that sought to weigh religions against one another.58  Despite his 
role as a debated and even debunked innovator—his methods and theories stand as 
dismissed, dated relics of the early study of religion—his legacy of language and its role 
in the origins of religion and religious texts is unquestioningly present.  Further, and most 
relevant here, his works center on Sanskritic, Brahmin literatures as “original,” and 
“pure,” highlighting an intellectual Orientalism rooted in locating Europeans as 
inherently superior or, in this case, inheritors of a superior system.59  What is important 
here is the understanding of an Indic system as superior, and the use of taxonomical 
systems to establish that base. 
Müller’s stance on Sanskritic writings allows for and perhaps even creates space 
for Indic languages, peoples, and cultures within the history of the world writ large, 
                                                
 
57 Pierre Bourdieu, “Habitus,” in Habitus : a sense of place, 2nd ed, Jean Hillier and Emma 
Rooksby, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). 
 
58 Tomoko Masuzawa, In Search of Dreamtime: The Quest for the Origin of Religion (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 58. 
 
59 We see this in the conversation about and development of the notion of “Aryan race.”  Müller, 
The Science of Language, pp. 220-227.  
 
 56 
despite that space being subservient to European domination, ideas or culture. 60  At the 
same time, his study of language sets the stage for later Orientalist applications to culture, 
religion, and rule.  Müller writes that Sanskrit became corrupted over time, “through a 
mixture with the languages of the various conquerors of India, the Arabic, Persian, 
Mongolic, and Turkish.”61  He posits the idea that foreign languages—and, notice, they 
are Islamicate languages—as they enter India by foreign conquerors change the region 
from original and pure to corrupted and base.  Müller sets up a scenario in which a direct 
link between Indic knowledge and European knowledge is established, as well as a 
separate parallel civilizational model—that of Islam—exists.   
A parallel and unequal lineage is an incorrect understanding of history, as will be 
discussed in greater detail below.  As this chapter seeks to trace the study of religion in 
the West, following Müller’s formative example, as well as its corollary in South Asia, it 
will be shown that the uniqueness of the study of religion in the Western academy, and its 
subsequent effects on issues of identification of religious groups, is overstated.   
One point remains clear, however: because there are multiple taxonomies of 
religion, from a variety of locations, and the location of the discourse about religion is 
similarly multifaceted, it is all the more important to interpret Müller’s original 
formulation of “classify and conquer.”  He clearly used it to indicate one’s ability to 
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“solve” religious dialects—the language of translation, translatability, and, ultimately, 
discourse itself is rooted within his statement.  Along those lines, however, we must 
interpret “religion” alongside imperial and colonial entities.  Whose classification system 
conquers whom?  Or, perhaps better asked, at what point does Müller’s statement—one 
that foregrounds the intellectual triumph rather than one of a militaristic nature—
transform to indicate the conquering of a location?  It has been held by many scholars 
that classification of religion, religions, and the religious has, indeed, led to the 
conquering of culture, people, states, and territories; moreover, many scholars have 
argued that this is a unidirectional process, where in Müller and his European ilk classify 
non-European populations as part of the colonial and imperial process of domination.  It 
is my contention, however, that Muslim empires in South Asia also utilized processes of 
taxonomies of religion as part of the imperial machine.  To classify and conquer remains 
a key element of this study, but I will expand our definition of what actors participate in 
such discursive and imperial constructions of “religion.”  
 
“Religion” in European Scholarship: An Intellectual Empire 
 
A major site of scholarship in Islamic studies as well as within theories of religion 
over the past few decades has been the nexus where lingering issues of Orientalism and 
the study of religion meet in the Western academy—an intellectual empire if ever there 
was one.  Edward Said’s classic Orientalism62 and Marshall Hodgson’s posthumously 
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published collections of essays Rethinking World History63 both levy critiques that focus 
on the problems of Islamic Studies as a category of inquiry within the larger framework 
of historical analysis and religious studies, ostensibly demonstrating the limitations of 
European, Orientalist historiographies of religion.  Further, in his well-regarded and 
widely-read article “Religion, Religions, Religious,” Jonathan Z. Smith argues that all 
studies of religion are part of an imposition of Western Christian normative ideas about 
“true” religion as opposed to “extant” religions.64  More recent work including Tomoko 
Masuzawa’s The Invention of World Religions65 continues the critique of Western 
scholarship and the development of the field of religious studies—and even the term 
“religion” itself—in an attempt to historicize our constructs of religion, religious identity, 
and religious practices.  However, despite these leaps and bounds in the theorization of 
religion and how Islam may or may not fit into this category given its complex history, it 
appears that little effort has been made to locate historical examples that directly 
challenge the stated development of religious studies and the very category of religion 
vis-à-vis non-Western and specifically Islamic sets of knowledge.66 
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Let’s start, then, with the brief, accepted history of the study of religion and its 
related taxonomies, which trace its origins to the Latin “religio,” and in that respect, any 
trace of its history, is rooted, both linguistically and historically, in a Western, European 
conversation.  It is important to both trace the history of a category and its subsequent 
critiques, but also to suggest that understanding this particular history is not enough as we 
move forward as a field.  Instead, by evaluating mechanisms in which “religion” (or, 
more precisely, words that may be translated and defined as such) in Muslim milieus in 
South Asia develop and function, we may be able to offer solutions to the problems of 
categorization, Orientalist scholarship, and the idea that “religion” must be fundamentally 
foreign, as Jonathan Z. Smith argues, to non-Christian traditions and in non-Christian 
settings.  In this way, I hope to suggest ways in which to further the ongoing conversation 
about the study of religion, as well as more fully incorporate Islam and Islamic Studies 
within this conversation. 
Religio as a term has its roots in usage as far back as the pre-Christian Roman 
Empire, where it primarily referred to ritual practice and honoring deities. Over time, 
Christians (and, to a lesser degree, Jews) who did not see themselves as those who 
practiced religion (i.e. religio) and who instead favored tradition (traditio) came to 
understand religio in terms of theistic belief. 67  This marks a shift between, among other 
possible reads, praxis and doxa; it makes it possible to imagine religio within a theistic 
context, of course, but more importantly it signals the development of religio within a 
specific Christian context.  As we move from the ancient period to that of the 
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Enlightenment, a real shift in the usage of religion takes place: using reason and 
understanding history as a progression from a dark past to a bright future shifts what was 
once a mere descriptor to a value-laden symbolic term.  Religion is theorized as perfected 
in Christianity, or even as a Christianity-infused Deism; religions, therefore, are lesser 
and less rational fashionings of a true understanding of the universe.68  
It would seem that the continued fascination with the European roots of “religion” 
on the part of scholars as a category and a topic of inquiry indicates that our collective 
understanding of the term, its history, and its usage is varied, at best.  There has been 
much theoretical and historical ado about the move from “religion” to “religions,” a shift 
that most claim marks the place in history where the imaginary fundamentally changes: 
what had been monolithic by its very definition—religion as correct religion, as 
Christianity and, more specifically, as properly conceived Protestantism—alters in the 
plural to allow for multiplicity, both within and outside of Christianity.  Now, it should 
go without saying that while this shift in terminology is groundbreaking, it in no way 
fully allows for what we might call an equal-opportunity “religion,” wherein all faiths—
mainstream and those on the margins alike—have equal weight in social imaginaries, 
terminologies, and lexicons.   
As an example, let me briefly point toward one of the founding thinkers of 
religious studies: David Hume (1711-1776).  Hume places religious traditions of a variety 
of stripes alongside each other, seemingly with two aims: first, to historicize “religion” as 
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it develops within human history and second, to compare religions.69  In these he includes 
our “heavy-hitters”: Protestant and Catholic Christianities, Judaism, and Islam, as well as 
lesser-known, and lesser-respected, pagan and polytheistic traditions.  His point herein is 
really to talk about the progression from polytheism to theism among the Enlightened, 
demonstrating a particularly 18th century, progressivist approach to history—what comes 
after what has gone before is always better, what comes after in Europe is better than 
what happens contemporarily elsewhere. He writes: 
The mind rises gradually, from inferior to superior: By 
abstracting from what is imperfect, it parts of its own frame 
from the grosser, it learns to transfer only the former, much 
elevated and reined, to its divinity.  Nothing could disturb 
this natural progress of thought, but some obvious and 
invincible argument, which might immediately lead the 
mind into the pure principles of theism, and make it 
overlap, at one bound, the vast interval which is interposed 
between the human and the divine nature.  But though I 
allow, that the order and frame of the universe, when 
accurately examined, affords such an argument; yet I can 
never think, that this consideration could have an influence 
on mankind, when they formed their first rude notions of 
religion.70 
 
Here, Hume very clearly articulates a sense of religion and even religiosity that is based 
on a rudimentary understanding of an evolutionary model, which is to say, it is 
progressivist in its claims.  The mind, he argues, moves forward, better understanding the 
universe in terms of a theistic world, but this process exists and speaks to how the notion 
of religion came to be formed. 
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Hume is remembered for and credited with creating a sense that religion is both 
natural and progressive, but above all else, part of history and its development, in the 
plural.  He traces the development of polytheism, citing that “all nations” with 
polytheistic practices do so as a base way to understand nature; he lists religions that stem 
from the Americas, Australia, Asia and India to make his point that all nations, though 
they are incorrect, have some sense of religion.71  Eventually, of course, humanity 
develops, through rationality, theism, and religion from the plural religions.  In this way, 
we see Hume’s need and want to explain religion in terms of location, history, and 
progress; not coincidentally, these very categories of evaluation come to scar, mar, and 
mystify the myriad religions that do not neatly align as Western, theistic or rational. 
Hume’s formative work of the mid-eighteenth century obviously predates and 
thus informs many scholars and writings that follow.  The evolutionary model that 
defines Enlightenment engagement with religious categories and classifications—one that 
is simultaneously laden with Christian vocabulary and sensibilities but demands even the 
questioning of Christian doctrine—is, as I have mentioned, most obviously stated within 
Hume, but we should not imagine he is singular in his pronouncements.  Jonathan Z. 
Smith, one of the foremost contemporary scholars of religion and the history of the field 
of religious studies, has written at length and with great depth on the issues of how 
religion developed alongside Enlightenment notions of progress, exclusivity, pluralism, 
and history.  Müller himself seems to draw upon Mendelian ideas of categorization if not 
Darwinian ideas of evolution for his science of religion.  As such, it will be fruitful to 
examine the history vis-à-vis his analysis; in this way, we might ascertain both the 
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historical landscape of religious taxonomies and usages, and also the contemporary 
theorizations of those usages by one of the major thinkers on this very subject. 
Smith deals directly with issues of taxonomy of religion, locating the problems of 
definition within the very basic problems of translation itself—as all definitions are, of 
course, translations and “to translate is to traduce.”72  The issue of religion—of 
religions—is precisely that the historical links between religio and today’s usage are 
mired in a history of defining, of translating.  World religions, classically held under the 
umbrella of Great Traditions (Buddhism, Chinese Religion, Christianity, Judaism, 
Hinduism, Islam and Japanese Religion), according to Smith, are placed alongside and 
often against an “artificial” category of all the ritualistic and theological leftovers that are 
not Great (religions of antiquity, indigenous religions, new religious movements).73  But, 
of course, even the category of “Great” traditions has been developed and constructed 
over time to inform our current usage, where “world religion” more or less implies a 
universality, a global domain, and other religions are understood to be local, ethnically or 
nationally demarcated.  To understand the history of religion is to understand, in other 
words, the competition between what is understood to have wide appeal and what is 
understood to be small potatoes by contrast.  This distinction, and one that J. Z. Smith 
masterfully explains, will come directly into question later on in chapter 3, “The Garden 
of Religions: Dīn, Universality, and Particularity,” where I discuss Mathurānāth’s text.  
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Jonathan Z. Smith is important here is largely because of his extensive 
engagement with the very history of religion as it appears in our field alongside his stated 
purpose of taking to task the very terms of religion, a project in which Müller’s stamp is 
visible.  Taking on thinkers like Hume and Mircea Eliade, Smith attempts, in many of his 
articles, to deconstruct the edifices of religion: arguing against Hume among others, he 
problematizes the idea of religion as “natural.”  He takes to task the idea that any of the 
multiple (and often competing) definitions for religion could have ever been universal or 
a given; moreover, Smith directly challenges Hume’s progressivist ideology as it relates 
to religion, stating: “’Religion’ fails the minimal requirements for innateness.”74  Arguing 
directly with Eliade, he discredits the positioning of phenomenological experience as 
evidence (part and parcel of Eliade’s classic The Sacred and the Profane75).  Here, Smith 
almost categorically rejects the understandings of the term “religion” by demonstrating 
its previous uses to be logically flawed. 
Instead, he famously in “Religion, Religions, Religious,” states that there is no 
such thing as native religion—that all definitions of religion are imposed, precisely 
because religion is imagined by Europeans and projected onto “native” populations.  He 
writes: 
“Religion” is not a native term; it is a term created by 
scholars for their intellectual purposes and therefore is 
theirs to define.  It is a second-order, generic concept that 
plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon 
that a concept such as “language” plays in linguistics or 
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“culture” plays in anthropology.  There can be no 
disciplined study of religion without such a horizon.76 
 
In short, the term—and the field that stems from it—is dangerously close to hollowness, a 
discipline without discipline.  More important for my purposes here is the fact that this 
hollow term cannot be native—it is an imposed, concocted idea and ideology.77 
If religion is in fact a foreign term, then we can place categorizations of religion, 
religions, and religious identities within a framework of an (intellectual) empire.  That is 
to say, if conquering armies and conquering scholars imposed the category, then Müller’s 
“conquer and classify” process was an important part of empire-building.  Smith’s 
argument supports this read; in fact, it seems that he is committed to an understanding of 
“religion” as necessarily part of empire, expansion, and domination of Europeans and 
Euro-American systems over and above all others.  Likewise, Müller outwardly theorizes 
and calls for a classification system that allows for the mastery of material—and of 
subjects.  Beyond his academic work, Müller stands as a primary source: he spent a 
majority of his academic career at Oxford University, working on his Sanskrit translation 
of the Ṛg Veda during the formalization of British rule over the Indian Subcontinent; he 
is a part of the creation of knowledge systems about South Asia without ever having been 
there.  In other words, Müller, a theorist of religion as well as a Sanskritist—a South 
Asianist—postulates a system that produces an intellectual regime.  Smith’s assertion that 
all religious markers are foreign thus fits well within the traditional historiography of 
British imperial and colonial rule in India: via the creation or exploitation of previously 
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vague religious definitions, the British were able to define and divide along religious 
lines. 
This historiography is well established, and has its roots in British colonial 
imagination.  In his (in)famous work, The Indian Musulmans: Are they bound in 
conscience to rebel against the Queen?, W. W. Hunter formulates a particularly caustic 
evaluation of Indian Muslims based upon an understanding that violent Muslims could 
not possibly get along with or compete as ideal subjects with docile Hindus.78  Even 
earlier, British officers of the Houses of Parliament and Commons requested the presence 
of East India Company officials, for the purpose of questioning them on all matters India; 
tellingly, in 1813, members of the House of Lords continued to keep their questions 
pointed on issues of divisions between the religious groups and their need for morality—
something the British could supply in spades to the natives, of course.  To this, Warren 
Hastings, who was to become the first Governor-General of India, said:  
Great pains have been taken to inculcate into the public 
mind and opinion that the native Indians are in a state of 
complete moral turpitude, and live in constant and 
unrestrained commission of every vice and crime that can 
disgrace human nature.  I affirm, by the oath that I have 
taken, that this description of them is untrue, and wholly 
unfounded.79  
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Hastings, surprisingly, challenges the British understanding of the Indian population, and 
even seems to condemn the Londoners’ influence over the public perception of India.  
What is important, though, is not Hastings’ defense, but rather the supposition he argues 
against: he is forced to contend with the overarching, pervasive conceptualization that 
Indians are being rescued from their own dark existence with thanks to British influence.  
 British merchants and officers of the East India Company had numerous 
understandings of the religions of India, and the yearly hearings held at the Houses of 
Lords and Commons between 1759 and 1856 are an incredible and under-utilized 
resource.80  Later, after the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, which demarcates the formal end to 
the Mughal Empire as well as the shift from British control under the East India 
Company to British rule under the crown, officials necessarily took new interest in 
questions of the (proper) identities of its subjects.  While my study focuses on the early 
nineteenth century, so as to theorize religious identity before formalized imperial rule of 
the British but still during formalized imperial rule of the Mughals, most works on the 
British Raj focus on the Raj—the Kingdom, the Rule—itself.   
More relevant here, however, are the contemporary scholars who have sought to 
rethink and perhaps more properly conceptualize British influence in South Asia.  
Because the British constructed their narrative in terms of civilizational missions, 
traditional scholarship tended not to posit the problems of British rule, focusing instead 
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on obvious gains South Asia benefited from under the crown.  This is, of course, the very 
basic outline of Orientalism: scholars exoticize, eroticize, demonize and exploit the 
“Orient,” the East, all the while lauding Occidental, Western moral and logical 
advancements that occurred under colonial or imperial rules.  In the past twenty or thirty 
years, much work has focused on fixing the overstated positive influence of the British 
(and of other colonial powers in other contexts).81  In South Asia, much of this 
scholarship stands to demonstrate the manufactured nature of Indian cultures.  David 
Lorenzen famously asked, “Who Invented Hinduism?” suggesting that the myriad 
practices, language groups, mythologies and influences all rolled up into one “world” 
religion stems from British (and Brahmin) concepts, rather than some indigenous, 
popular self-understanding.82  As will be discussed below, the scholastic critique of 
British Orientalism as well as academic Orientalism has been a vital theoretical and 
historiographic shift; and, to put it simply, this field of inquiry stands to support J. Z. 
Smith’s assertion that “religion” as a category has been a foreign imposition, often 
imposed due to the foreign ruling elite’s insistence. 
Smith’s assertion rings true in many ways, and on its surface elegantly sums up a 
lengthy historical period vis-à-vis religious difference: the definitional category, deployed 
by foreigners, must itself be foreign.  This alien category, which in many cases comes to 
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singularly define a ruled population, can be called into question on the basis of its history 
within Christian circles and scholarship as well as part of the colonial-imperial armories.  
However, despite its elegance, Smith’s assertion is actually rather limited.  As a self-
proclaimed philologist from childhood,83 Smith, in his own scholastic quest to 
appropriately situate the study of religion and its taxonomies, focuses on languages most 
closely associated with the Western academy: Latin, Greek, and English.  He references 
the incompatibility of these languages with those from other regions and religious 
traditions, rightfully claiming that the lack of focus on the region-specific terminologies 
creates a system wherein “religion” is imposed.84  This implies, however, that the concept 
of religion or, more importantly, religions in the plural, regardless of its home language 
or terms, is also a Western construct.  While the concept of religion, as Müller so cleverly 
stated, was used to classify and conquer, the idea that “religion” is singularly Western is 
certainly not the case, as we will soon see below. 
 
“Religion” cannot be Universal: Challenges to Orientalist Usages of 
“Religion” 
 
J. Z. Smith’s assertion is correct, to a certain degree: religion is a term that strives 
to be more anthropological than theological, where its characteristics are observed rather 
than intuited.  And it has, since its first usages in the plural in the seventeenth century and 
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its increasing usage in the plural in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, reflected its 
own history of the singular, nominative noun.  That is to say: the history of religions 
necessarily reflects the history of religion and, more accurately, The Religion—
Christianity.  Scholars and critics of this history like Marshall Hodgson point out the 
problems of the relationship of the study of Islam within a framework that understands 
Christianity as normative.  He contends that Islam is often considered as a global-yet-
regional entity with little local variation, which is to say Islam is characterized as Arab, in 
all its iterations by scholars.  We see this sort of argument play out in the insistence that 
Arabic, because of its connection to the Qur’an, is the most important language for all 
Muslims; clearly, Arabic has great import for most Muslims, but in terms of scholarship, 
it is clear that Arabic, spoken by roughly one-fifth of all Muslims worldwide, cannot be 
the only defining cultural or historical marker for Islam.  Hodgson argues, well before 
Edward Said’s classic Orientalism,85 that in order to understand Islam, one must be 
willing and able to see Islam differently in different places, paying attention to language, 
ritual, and time.86   
Furthermore, in Rethinking World History, essays published posthumously, he has 
a series of writings related to Europe as part of global history, and then subsequently 
describes Islam in the same way.87  In this collection, Hodgson aims to fracture the idea 
that Europe sits at the center of the universe, somehow controlling it, dictating the entire 
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world’s past, present and future.  He argues that special and temporally based 
relationships between and among European and Muslim people, nation-states, and 
ideologies have shaped and continue to shape not only “Muslim-majority” areas, but 
global histories.  If we extrapolate and apply these arguments, we can problematize the 
idea that religion is native to only Europe, created by and for Europeans, as part of a 
discourse of colonialism and imperialism.  In fact, in applying Hodgson here, we should 
rightfully examine how and why “religion” as a category—instead of other equally viable 
categories like “economy” or “citizenship” or gender—came to permeate Orientalist 
scholarship, as well as determine how those categories came to be employed with such 
success.  
Others within Islamic Studies have sought to push the category of religion—and 
those who use it—to include more honestly and accurately non-Western religions.  
Notably and as briefly touched upon above, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, in his famous The 
Meaning and End of Religion takes seriously the Latin-roots of religion, the Orientalism 
that typified the beginnings of the study of Islam, and concludes that religion is not and 
cannot be universal.88  Talal Asad’s commentary on the work starts by praising Smith’s 
anti-essentialist methodology and approach, but ultimately concludes that he clings to 
another set of essentialist understandings about religion, ones that obfuscate important 
issues for comparative studies.89  Asad argues that Smith’s reliance on ideas of 
reification—the process by which religions are made into “an objective systematic 
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entity”90—assume static religions, an assumption disavowed by contemporary scholars.91  
In any case, here, Asad’s commentary on W. C. Smith is both a worthwhile critique of 
the “modern classic,” as well as one way to position the term “religion” moving forward.  
Asad wants the term to reflect its modern usage and modern historical relevance along 
side its modern “Siamese twin,” secularism.92  In this way, he argues, we are able to 
understand the term, its deployment within the discipline of religious studies, and 
importantly, within the work the term does outside academic circles. 
Asad’s critique in mind, it is important to realize the ways in which the term has 
been deployed historically, especially vis-à-vis Orientalist scholarship and colonial and 
imperial rule.  The political aspects here are, without question, linked to religion’s 
“Siamese twin” secularism, but importantly as well linked to (invasive) power systems.  
As we think through whether or not “religion” is always foreign especially within 
colonial and postcolonial contexts, it is worth mentioning Edward Said directly.  He 
brings to bear what he sees as the real issue of religion as category and its ties to 
colonialism and imperialism; namely, the ways in which the powerful European’s gaze 
has more to do with the gazer than the people being gazed upon.  In other words, what 
Orientalist scholarship did and its legacy continues to do is create a situation wherein the 
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European is both a subject and an object of his own definitions of other; the European, 
therefore, cannot be subtracted from his definition of the Other.93  If Said claims that the 
European’s Other cannot fully be said to exist apart from the European, we might be able 
to say that the opposite is true as well: the Other has inscribed upon him or her the 
European’s understanding.  We have seen, over time and across regional areas, this very 
phenomenon play out: indigenous definitions of self, governance, language, culture and 
so forth mix with, assimilate, reject, and become influenced by the ruling colonial or 
imperial definitions.94   
Perhaps more useful however is to think through the very historiography that 
comes to determine the study of religion itself.  As I outlined above, traditional histories 
of religion start with the root word, religio and its progression from a singular to a plural, 
its application from narrow and communally based to broad and universally accepted.  
However, such a definitional scheme seems to take serious liberties with the ways 
language actually functions: are we to assume that because a word has a root, a history of 
its own that the words essence is that root, that history?  Daniel Dubuisson eloquently 
speaks to the fallacy of logic hidden within the rote repetition of the etymology of 
“religion”: 
                                                
 
93 Muhammad Tavakoli-Targhi calls the phenomena of the presence of definer within the 
definition of Other  “Orientalism’s genesis amnesia” in Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, 
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This manner of proceeding, so habitual as no longer to 
cause surprise, is naïve and often drive by ulterior motives 
that have very little to do with science.  On the one hand, 
this is so because it tends to minimize of cancel out the role 
of history (with its continuous modifications or shifts), 
while seeking to preserve an essential (timeless?) tie 
between the current, living acceptance of the word and its 
hypothetical first reception, raised to the status of original, 
founding datum.95 
 
Two issues strike out as relevant: first, Dubuisson uses the term “science” to describe the 
etymology of “religion,” which is a clear signal of the imprint of Müller; second, the very 
etymology taken for granted habitually is for Dubuisson itself a formulation, a 
construction of history.  The idea that religion, despite its grounded, Western ideological 
history, is a moving, dynamic category on its own is an idea with great cache to the 
project at hand.   
 In terms of South Asian historiography, the role of religion is often over-
determined, or at the very least, “religion” comes to mean anything remotely related to 
visible and invisible aspects of life: praxis and doxa, for sure, but also societal 
organization, inter-group relationships, and the construction of classes, races and genders.  
This is especially the case in Orientalist scholarship.96  In the case of South Asia, where 
                                                
 
95 Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology, 
trans. William Sayers (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 22. 
 
96 Here, Orientalist scholars may be truly of the genre, that is, officers of the East India Company 
or scholars affiliated with universities who benefited from the seizure of manuscripts, art, 
dictionaries, etc., from the Company, Crown or other endeavor (be they British, German or 
French).  I also take Orientalist scholars of South Asia to include the generations after the British 
Raj who are obviously influenced by the precepts laid out by those who came before.  See: Ignac 
Goldhizer, Muslim Studies (Muhammedanische Studien), edited by S.M. Stern, translated from 
the German by C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967); Stanley Wolpert, A 
New History of India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Devahuti, ed., Bias in Indian 
Historiography (Delhi: D. K. Publications, 1980); Peter Heehs, “Shades of Orientalism: 
Paradoxes and Problems in Indian Historiography,” in Colonialism, Modernity, and Religious 
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so many religions co-exist, there has been a tradition of truly vexed scholars, unable to 
place particular individuals, groups and even whole communities into a religious category 
that made clear, bounded sense.  Many scholars came to rely on ideas of “hybrid” or 
“shared” religions that were necessarily less authentic than the parent traditions from 
which they stemmed. 
 It is clear that notions of shared, hybrid, or “middle way” religions originated 
within Orientalist scholarship, especially where Muslim practices that looked heterodox, 
and had a distinctively South Asian flair, came to be scrutinized or lauded, depending on 
the author.  For example, one Orientalist asserted that the cult of Sufism “steer[ed] a mid 
course between the pantheism of India on the one hand and the deism of the Corán on the 
other.”97  Ideas of shared, syncretic, or hybrid religions came to inform ideas about the 
religions of South Asia, specifically in the service of the Orientalist search for origins and 
authenticity.  While this had a large effect on how Indic traditions came to be understood, 
in today’s scholarship “hybrid” often refers to much more than practices that appear to 
have Islamic and Hindu resonances.  Homi Bhabha made famous the idea and the state of 
“hybridity,” focusing on a cultural idea and identity.  He does not focus on “hybrid” 
religions per se, but rather hybridized subjects who were simultaneously of the native 
arena and of the empire at hand.  Bhabha contends that hybridity fundamentally altered 
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power relationships during colonialism, as it shifted identities in ways that hit upon the 
anxieties of colonial actors.98 
However, while Bhabha’s theory made quite a lot of waves initially and maintains 
some of its import in arenas like cultural studies, Islamic studies scholars like Carl Ernst, 
Tony Stewart, and Nile Green have focused on debunking the idea of hybridity and 
syncretism, as they are two key terms that preserve the idea of stable religions in the 
plural.  In order for varieties of religions to exist within spectra—those strange gray areas 
that may include, in a contemporary American context, practicing Jews who attend Yoga 
classes to meditate on OM—scholars have long assumed that two or more “identifiable” 
religions have commingled to create this plurality.  Ernst suggests that this is patently not 
the case, and that this sense of pluralism really just highlights the problem of the 
understanding of “religions.”  He argues that having variety that stems from two or more 
traditions assumes, problematically, that those “original” traditions were static and 
identifiable in the first place.99  To take as an example traditions in South Asia that look, 
simultaneously, rather Muslim and rather Hindu at once—certain Sufi practices, like 
qawwali comes to mind—are certainly influenced by mainline, simplistic understandings 
of those “parent” traditions; but to assume that Islam is definitively about Five Pillars and 
Hinduism is about deities assumes that the definitions concocted as part of the European 
study of religion are accurate, a priori, and most importantly consistent over time.   
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Ernst’s work is helpful in thinking about the inner-workings of the machine of Orientalist 
scholarship; the big-picture issues Hodgson and Said take care of well, but here, we are 
able to see the long-lasting and hard-to-remove legacies of such a categorization.  Not 
only does Smith’s sense that religion is foreign play well here, but it also seems to fully 
highlight the ways in which the definitions of religion come to bear upon later, 
supposedly more advanced, conceptions of related religious phenomena. 
Ernst’s work however, more useful than merely pointing out the rippled effects of 
Orientalist scholarship upon South Asian or Islamic religions.  Smith’s contention that 
the very category of religion is foreign is our starting point, and as I merely alluded to 
above, not necessarily accurate when examining the historical record.  It is clear that 
indigenous definitional, taxonomical systems for religious practice and religious groups 
did exist, and were used by scholars and kings alike.  Ernst’s work on debunking the 
notions of syncretism stem, in some ways, from his other work on Muslim readings of 
Hindu texts, specifically insofar as Muslims come to investigate, interrogate, and utilize 
what scholars—and even some Muslims—may label properly as “Hindu.”100  
Furthermore, elsewhere he investigates the ways in which yogic practices carry markers 
of Islamic influence.101 The Muslim authors in question in “Muslim Studies of 
Hinduism?” plainly see themselves as different from their Hindu interlocutors, and seek 
to both navigate and fully comprehend religious difference; this seems a clear historical 
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example of Islamic thinkers engaged in the study of comparative religion, to borrow 
terminology from the Western academy.  Both of these articles demonstrate fluidity 
between seemingly cogent religious traditions, but more importantly they both 
demonstrate an indigenous usage of what we have been calling “religion;” this reflects 
Dubuisson’s position that the term has shifted, gained and lost multiple meanings over 
time, despite its Latin etymology.   
Although religion as a category clearly stems from a Western history and 
academy, and its deployment has been linked to geo-political power structures, its 
corollaries elsewhere have not yet been discussed here, nor have they been given the full 
attention I contend they rightfully deserve.  Issues of translation are often cited when 
parallels are drawn between disparate terms, and certainly those issues warrant 
attention—but only to a degree.  It is clear that “religion,” with its multiple meanings 
across time and place, has not itself been static; “religion” as a category, a descriptive 
term, and a discourse continues to shift rapidly.  In this way, we are always in a process 
of translation, moving between meanings, reapplying and redefining those meanings as 
situations present themselves.  If we are translating between and among English usages, I 
see little difference in carefully and with as much accuracy as can be ascertained 
discussing correlative terms from other languages.  After all, the very process by which 
the study of religion in non-Western contexts comes to represent, in many respects, the 
history of colonialism and imperialism in the two-thirds world is the same process by 
which the category opens up, questions itself, and rethinks its (supposed) one-
dimensional subject.  The colonial experience may have reified religions individually, but 
religion as a field became infinitely wider.  The question before us is, then: is religious 
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difference the only reason “religion” becomes a salient category, or are there other issues 
to think about as well? 
 
Islamicate Sources: another Taxonomy, other Empires 
 
Let us begin this section by stating, frankly, that a corollary understanding of 
religion, as a category of identification, classification and study, existed in the precolonial 
Islamicate literary tradition.  As stated above, W. C. Smith understands that while there is 
not a correspondence between “religion” and that which it describes, there is indeed a 
correlation between the signifier and signified.  He writes that “the Arabic language has, 
and has had since the appearance of Islam and indeed from shortly before, a term and 
concept that seem to be quite closely equivalent to the Western ‘religion.’  Indeed this 
word—namely, dīn—is used in all the various senses of its Western counterpart.102  Even 
one of the first scholars who called for the rethinking and possible dismissal of the term 
“religion” acknowledged, in the very same book, that Islam had already had a analogous, 
useful term and, second, that this made Islam distinctive within the traditional 
historiography of “religion” and “religious studies.”  In short, it seems that Smith’s 
disavowal of “religion” stems from both its lack of precision as well as the mere fact that 
other traditions had indigenous, parallel terminologies; why impose a foreign, imperfect 
definition when a perfectly serviceable—and “native”103—definition already exists? 
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103 I use “native” here purposefully in order to highlight some of the tensions presented by 
insisting a tradition has its own definitions—representing a closed language or system rather than 
one in conversation with others.  While I do contend that there are Islamicate definitions, it is 
important to be clear that these draw upon Hodgson’s original meaning for the term: related to the 
rule and presence of Muslims, but addressing cultural, linguistic, and regional variants.  As 
 80 
Further, as important as it is to state bluntly that there existed an understanding of 
religion and the religious in the precolonial Islamicate context, it should go without 
saying that there exists a postcolonial, South Asian (both Hindu and Muslim) 
understanding of religion as a category of identification, classification, and study.  In 
short, there exist a range of terms (in Persian, Sanskrit, Hindi-Urdu, and Arabic104), 
definitions, and usages that both predate and postdate the colonial and imperial 
encounter; the uses and terms themselves indicate he South Asian cultural milieu had and 
continues to have ways to classify religions in spite of colonial interventions into local 
history.   
As will be directly discussed in the next chapter, there exists a series of texts from 
within the Islamicate traditions, both within and outside of South Asia, that takes 
seriously religious groups and boundaries and set forth to establish and explain related 
categories.  For now, it is relevant to discuss the existence of these texts and their effect 
upon the current discussion: how, and if, religion can be a term, a category that continues 
to have use in arenas other than Western traditions.  Texts by Muslims that both created 
and comprised a scholarly tradition that deal directly with the idea of religion as a 
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104 These terms vary, and will be discussed as they appear in primary source texts rather than as a 
definitive history, which is fruitless—an issue brought up in the introduction.  In the next chapter, 
full treatment will be given to the specific, formative texts and their terminologies.  For now, 
however, suffice it to say that these terms include, but are not limited to: dīn (and adyan), 
maẓhab (and maẓahib), and, most interestingly, genitive constructions (i.e. “those of the Hindu 
or Indian path,” panth-i Hind, in Riyāz al-maẓāhib, 8.).  
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category of identification, as well as a means by which individuals navigated space, date 
as far back as the late eleventh century.  Specifically, I refer to Abu al-Ma`ali’s work, 
entitled Bayan al-adyan or The Account of the Religions (c. 1092 CE), which described 
the religions (adyan) that existed, their basic tenets and the people who followed those 
traditions.105  Here, we see a sense of religion that does not necessarily refer to theology, 
but rather to identity, group identity and, most importantly, the language through which a 
scholar should express those differences; in other words, Abu al-Ma`ali is not a 
theologian writing about differences but rather a scholar interested in studying subjects 
who happen to be religious.  This distinction seems to reflect quite obviously the shift 
that is so well examined within Western scholastic circles. 
 Another Islamicate example of a taxonomical system for religion is Muhammad 
ibn `Abd al-Karīm Shahrastānī (d. 1153), whose famous text Kitab al–Milal wa’l-Nihal 
(c. 1125 CE) or The Book of Religious Sects and Creeds in many ways sets a high bar for 
this genre of literature.106  The text is theological in nature but is also comprised of 
reports and information drawn from multiple sources that are classical, contemporary and 
includes at least one report from a ninth century Muslim traveler.107  Shahrastānī’s work 
is notable both in terms of what he says as well as how he says it: the work is neither a 
polemic against nor a scathing critique of Indian religions.  Instead, Shahrastānī quite 
generously compares the religions of India (`ārā’ al-hind; lit., “views of Hind”) to the 
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next-best group to Muslims, the Sabians.  The people of Hind—i.e. who we might today 
call both Hindus and Buddhists—are treated as a viable, worthy (though not correct) and 
cogent group of religious Others.  While the twelfth century text conforms to scholastic 
norms and expectations of its period, it accomplishes a written, well-read and well-cited 
record of “religion” as a category of inquiry, part of what an Islamic scholar might need 
or want to know.  Further, it allows another avenue into thinking about South Asia’s 
location vis-à-vis religion, religious definition, and the intellectual or imperial uses of 
such categories. 
Another work, the Ā'īn-i Akbarī or The Institutes of Akbar, which is the last 
volume of the last book within the larger Persian work Akbarnāma or The Book of Akbar, 
also speaks to local taxonomies of religion.108  The Akbarnāma was written by Abu’l 
Fazl, Akbar’s renown courtly scribe, and it focuses on the events of Akbar’s life, his 
reign, issues in his lands, as well as the people who live there; in the Ā'īn-i Akbarī, Abu’l 
Fazl discusses not only the different religious groups but—and this will be of utmost 
importance—also Akbar’s official courtly policies surrounding different religions and 
religious groups.  Because Akbar has a policy toward religious groups, and bases much of 
his policies on the religious definitions present within Islamicate literature, his reign 
might be thought of as one that has many of the features we typically associate with other 
imperial models, i.e. Europe’s colonies and empires. 
The Ā'īn-i Akbarī, the Institutes of Akbar, penned by Abu’l Fazl, Akbar’s courtly 
scribe, serves as a primary textual source here.  The work is the last book of the much 
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larger Akbarnāma, and focuses primarily on issues of the nation: topography, geography, 
states and regions, learned societies, the make-up of the populace.  Importantly, the issue 
of “religion” is a governmental concern in the Ā'īn-i Akbarī —as important aspect of 
Hindustani life, as a way by which to understand the populace, and as a fundamental data 
set important to the kingdom.  The work is, in short, a governmental document denoting 
and accounting for all aspects of the empire.  Religions of Hindus and Muslims are 
accounted for, and despite Abu’l Fazl’s clear underlying tone that identifies him with 
Islam and as a Muslim, the accounts are surprisingly even-handed for a sixteenth century 
text, and it borders more on a proto-ethnography rather than a polemic treatise.   
Abu’l Fazl writes: “It is only by meeting on a common platform of study that 
different religions can be correctly understood and their true worth appreciated.  This 
book will promote that aim.”109  While the language of “true worth” fits well within early 
modern writings—like Kant and Hume, for example—this is the only marker that 
suggests this is not a mere study of religion for religion’s sake.  Given the location of this 
quote, and the section that follows on what we may call religious demographics today, I 
suggest that Abu’l Fazl cannot be read to assert opinions, but rather, imperial 
understandings of its subjects, as well as imperial pronouncements of positions.  If this 
claim holds water, it suggests that the British Empire was not the first empire of South 
Asia to hold a courtly position on its subject’s religion, nor was it the first to 
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systematically categorize on the basis of religion, as some scholars have stated.110  These 
particular issues will be discussed in the next chapter more fully. 
Thinking about Akbar as a king who utilized knowledge about religious groups in 
order to govern is not just an exercise in hypothesis.  Akbar is largely understood as one 
of the four major kings of the Mughal Empire in South Asia, which at its height 
incorporated almost all of the modern nation-states of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and 
significant portions of southwest China, and southeastern Afghanistan, and was in power 
from 1520 CE under Babur till (officially) 1857 CE.  This was a kingdom ruled by 
Muslims, with varying interpretations of Islam as well as varying levels of piety, if we 
are ever able to measure such a thing.  The Mughal Empire immediately succeeded the 
Delhi Sultanates, which were another series of short-lived Muslim dynasties that 
established power in the Subcontinent starting in about 1220 CE.  So, all told, there are 
roughly 600 years of Muslim kings ruling over a non-Muslim majority: in short, South 
Asia, and especially the centralized, organized Mughal Empire, is a prime ground to 
examine how “religion” functioned as an identity marker, and as a category for inquiry, 
legislation, and maintenance. 
Further, there is substantial historiographic precedent for thinking through the 
Mughal Empire, and Akbar’s rule especially, as an imperial project more similar in 
nature to those of the modern (i.e. post-Enlightenment) era than different.  In fact, Akbar 
is often regarded as a modern ruler in the early modern period.  His policies are often 
considered open, tolerant, and almost secular—despite his being born and dying a 
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Muslim many scholars, Western and Islamic alike, have attempted to prove that his 
Muslim identity was in name only, and not in practice.111  Why might this be the case?  
Well, for starters, a Muslim king passing egalitarian legislation, if I might call it that, in 
the sixteenth century simply breaks with a conventional bigotry that assumes two things: 
first, basic presentist and progressivist biases demand that we be suspicious of claims that 
something so early could reflect things that Europe did not have until later; second, no 
Muslim king has ever been both a “true” Muslim and a tolerant, moderate ruler.  Akbar, 
then, cannot be a true Muslim king if we accept that his policies were open or tolerant. 
One of these policies is the famed Dīn i-ilahi, or Divine Religion, which was a 
collection of world religions’ best features, and the ethical system inaugurated by Akbar 
in 1581 CE.  Amartya Sen notably called him a “liberal,” citing his codification of 
religious pluralism in the Mughal domains as well ahead of its time.  Sen, like others, 
tribute Akbar for citing Islam as the rationale for pluralism.112  There are many studies on 
Akbar—he is a polarizing figure it would seem—and most of them focus on his religious 
policies and proclivities.  For our purposes here, let me draw our attention to his 
understanding of din or religion, for two distinct reasons: first, it is often said that with 
Hume and Kant pluralizing religion to religions, we first see on the world stage an 
acknowledgement that other faith traditions have validity and meaning (as opposed to 
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merely being heretical innovations or legacies), and this novelty in history simply is not 
novel to Muslims in South Asia; second, Akbar’s sense of religion demonstrates both a 
knowledge of other traditions as well as a desire to amalgamate multiple religions into 
one, true religion—a trend that reflects, quite nicely, the early trends in Enlightenment 
thinking. 
To reiterate, many argue about Akbar’s inherent Muslimness, citing his desire to 
blend traditions into one as a power grab, first and foremost, and religious in name only.  
I am not attempting to argue that his personal belief system should or could stand in as 
some sort of example of real religion, of pluralism at its finest, or as blasphemy.  I merely 
wish to demonstrate that his understanding of religion in the sixteenth century relies on 
the presence of multiple religions; religion as a form of denoting progress of a society; 
and as a unifying entity when done well.  Akbar, throughout his reign but especially after 
1581, relied on religious terminology, leaders, and scholars to employ new political 
devices.  One such device, was indeed the dīn i-ilahi, the official—even if its rate of 
participation indicates that it failed—ethical system of the Court, and which was 
instantiated by Sufis and qadis (judges), Brahmin Hindus, learned Jains, and some 
Christians—both Indian converts and Portuguese missionaries.  Akbar commissioned the 
greatest number of Sanskrit to Persian translations of any Mughal Emperor, with the 
intent to understand and realize those worthy Hindu teachings as well as understand his 
populace.   
The nexus of post-Orientalist, postcolonial research has continued to focus on the 
violence, problems, and misreading that the category “religion,” with its European and 
Eurocentric history, enacts on non-Western, non-Christian traditions.  J. Z. Smith, 
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Edward Said, Marshall Hodgson, and Timothy Fitzgerald among others have cited that 
the problem with the term is that it is placed upon a new culture or tradition, and that 
tradition has to then be forced into what must necessarily be a narrow definition.  What I 
have suggested is that Muslims have produced, created, revised, and understood 
“religion” as a category in a way that parallels Western usages, well before the colonial 
encounters of the seventeenth century onward.  In this way, Islamicate traditions, with a 
preexisting understanding of religion, cannot be said to merely have had an outside force 
imposed upon them with no vocabulary by which to understand; while the actual word 
“religion” may have been a foreign imposition, the translated concept was not.  Akbar, 
reigning in the sixteenth century, had himself demonstrated an understanding of Islam, 
and, more importantly, of religions (in the plural) that closely reflects some of the issues 
that category poses today: inherit progressivism, the problem of plurality, an impetus to 
find an original tradition, and a labeling of the Other with practices like quota systems, 
rigid legalized boundaries, and taxation.   
My point has been to shed some light on these issues, as well as suggest the 
following: how is it that we continue to think about religion and religions as conceived of 
and understood via Western definitions, when perfectly serviceable—and potentially 
related—definitions exist in the historical record firmly within non-Western non-
Christian traditions?  If Islam is so far outside the pale of “religio,” of that original root 
word, perhaps we can find inroads for it via Akbar, his religious ideas, and the 
mechanisms through which he investigates, legally and scholastically, the variety of 
religious experience in South Asia in the pre-colonial period.  After all, if the supposed 
greatest king of one of the greatest world empires utilized religion as a means by which to 
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identity, classify, and rule his kingdom, it is important to investigate the ways Akbar may 
have classified and conquered, to borrow from F. Max Müller once more.  In Chapter 2: 
“Genealogies and Imaginaries: Abu’l Fazl, the Ā'īn-i Akbarī, and the Impact of Islamicate 
Definitions,” I will trace the Islamicate terminologies and taxonomies of religion as they 
appeared in some of the texts mentioned above—the very texts that Abu’l Fazl drew upon 
and whose ideas came to permeate South Asian scholarship.  As we have seen, South 
Asia was, has been, and continues to be a major site of the discourse and dialogical 
process of definition with respect to religion, and as such it is time to move to Indic 
sources to flesh out the understandings of “religion” within that arena. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: GENEALOGIES AND IMAGINARIES: ABU’L FAZL, THE 
Ā'ĪN-I AKBARĪ, AND THE IMPACT OF ISLAMICATE DEFINITIONS 
 
As I discussed in the first chapter, South Asia’s role as a site of discourse about 
religion—and about legitimate religions—has greatly influenced the study of religion, the 
historiography of South Asia, and modern tellings and retellings of South Asian 
narratives.  The discourse is often shaped genealogically, that is, as traceable to an origin 
(or set of origins).  We located the process of genealogy within the modern impetus to 
categorize and classify, and in these regards spent some time thinking about F. Max 
Müller’s scientific views of religion and of Sanskrit language and Indic cultures.  Related 
to genealogy is the process of imagination: the tracing of roots often has as its goal the 
locating of potentially real connections that affect one’s imagined, created community, 
nation, culture or, importantly, culturally other.  This chapter will take seriously the role 
of imagined communities and how they help frame a conversation about Mughal rule, the 
famous Mughal emperor Akbar, and the courtly author Abu’l Fazl’s work about this 
emperor.  The purpose of this chapter is three-fold: first, it describes the Mughal era and 
especially that of Akbar, arguing that the empire existed within multiple historical 
imaginaries; second, it examines how Abu’l Fazl’s Ā'īn-i Akbarī or Institutes of Akbar 
draws upon Islamic histories and terminologies, locating it within a lineage of what I will 
refer to as scholarly legacies; and third it suggests that this text—popular and influential 
in its own time, the colonial period, and beyond—comes to influence Orientalist and 
Indic understandings of “religion.” 
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By way of introduction, however, I will begin with a brief outlining of what 
imaginaries are, and why they are a particularly useful theoretical tool here.  Imaginaries 
refer to, quite simply, the ways in which people envision their existence, writ large—
interactions, identities, value systems, norms and modes, and notions that regulate 
normative behavior.  The social imaginary serves to represent the way people perceive 
their world, and, importantly, seek to craft their world in light of these perceptions; the 
historical imaginary serves, likewise, to represent the way people—in their own time and 
as chroniclers—perceived their world and constructed its genealogy.  Charles Taylor, 
following Benedict Anderson’s classic work on the subject,113 remarks that social 
imaginaries refer to ideas that are “carried in images, stories and legends,” are “widely 
held,” and manufacture legitimacy.114   
It is worth mentioning upfront that Anderson’s work highlights the use of social 
imaginaries to create national identities; in using this theoretical framework, I do not 
intend to claim that the Mughal Period in South Asia was also a budding nation-state, nor 
do I claim its courtly authors attempted to forge a national identity.  Even if the term 
“imaginary” began as a way to explain nationalisms, the related terms—social and 
historical imaginary—provide a useful frame for thinking about Mughal history, 
Orientalist understandings of Mughals, and identity formation in South Asia.  In my read 
of Anderson, Taylor, and others,115 “imaginary” functions to give language to commonly 
                                                
 
113 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983). 
 
114 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 23. 
 
115 See especially Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial 
Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and 
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held conceptions about self, region, community, and—yes—nation, but the notion relies 
on the process of production: how these entities hang together coherently relies on 
manufactured, maintained, and promulgated legitimacy.  Certainly the Mughal Empire 
was not a nation-state.  But Abu’l Fazl’s writings about the empire and its emperor 
demonstrate a clear sense of identity, community, and region in a way that I believe 
“imaginary” helps us understand.  Similarly, as we will see below, as Orientalist scholars 
investigated Abu’l Fazl and other Muslim scholars, the Orientalist imaginary became 
shaped by these writings.  Put differently, the very history of the Mughal Period as 
understood both by Mughals and by later British and German historians relies on 
imaginaries, or the ways in which people envision their existence and the existence of 
others. 
In other words, as I will use the terms, the social and historical imaginary may not 
represent what is actual but rather what has come to be actualized.  I use the terms to 
indicate the process by which social and historical facts come to be produced, interpreted, 
and maintained; similarly, I use the terms to describe multiple ways in which historical 
and social pasts have been used by later scholars.  Drawing upon scholars like Daud 
Ali116 and Narayana Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyan,117 I argue that the development of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Textures of Time: Writing 
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116 Daud Ali, “Introduction,” in Invoking the Past: The Uses of History in South Asia, ed. Daud 
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117 Narayana Rao et al., Textures of Time. 
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history and imaginations of history are related to conceptualizations of an historical 
consciousness.   
I also contend, however, that the imaginaries at work in South Asia are both 
necessarily South Asian (i.e. autochthonous) as well as colonial and even European.  This 
is because the historical imaginary must necessarily interact with and reflect the various 
histories of South Asia.  I accept, wholesale, the keen arguments made by critics of 
colonialism and Orientalism that state South Asian conceptions of past are not reducible 
to European modes, and I agree that establishing definitions that are self-generated and 
localized will ultimately yield the most fruitful examinations of South Asian history, 
culture, and conceptions of time.  However, I also maintain that multiple imaginaries 
from and about South Asia mediate political, social, and religious actions, and that these 
imaginaries are generated by South Asians and Europeans alike—among others.  For 
these reasons, this chapter will examine a distinctive case of the precolonial 
conceptualization of history, empire, and religion as well as a colonial and Orientalist 
model. 
Orientalism itself must be addressed, as it is wound up in ideas of imaginaries.  
What the Orient was, or even where it was, was rarely actual but through processes of 
study, exploitation, colonialism, and imperialism, became actualized in the imagination 
of the West.  In other words: the Orient as actual—as a geographic location, as an 
historical entity, as an identity marker—has long been critiqued on the basis of its 
undefined, hazy, and often ahistorical, dislocated borders, boundaries, and even centers.  
For example: for whom and in what periods are the Near, Middle and Far Easts 
directionally east?  Is the Orient everything geographically from Turkey to Japan?  Does 
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it refer to different places in different times, and, if so, which cultures do we mean by 
“Oriental”?  In this way, the Orient is not actual: it is not a readily defined, clear-cut 
singular or set of geographic areas, languages, religions, cultural norms, elite histories, 
and so forth; the Orient, as many have pointed out, was created by Europeans who 
envisioned the East largely based on constructed differences.118  But I contend the 
Orient’s realness—its actualized life—exists within historical and social imaginaries.   
This is not merely an issue of gaze, to borrow Edward Said’s famous phrase; the 
imaginary incorporates but is not limited to the act of seeing and interpreting an Other, 
which necessarily happens in the mind (or imagination) of the viewer and may not reflect 
any real image.119  The imaginary is manufactured both externally and internally, as a 
viewer describes what she views but first has to comprehend and articulate that visage.  
This is accomplished by distant viewers, authors, participants and thinkers (foreign and 
local) and intimate viewers, authors, thinkers and participants (foreign or local).  What I 
mean to indicate here is that gaze cannot be limited to some stereotypical image of a 
nineteenth century Orientalist: an historian’s armchair, a dictionary, manuscripts, a smug 
sense of true understanding, and experience in the field limited at best.  While this is 
often the case—Müller, though an Indologist, famously never visited India—actors and 
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participants in the historical imagination of our location can, were, and continue to be 
South Asian themselves.  For our purposes, these actors include Mughals, British 
officials, and contemporarily Indian, Pakistani and Euro-American academics influenced 
by Orientalist works, as we will discuss more fully below.   
Avrind-Pal Mandair’s work is directly relevant here, and deals with the idea of 
“religion” in South Asia specifically.  Mandair uses the language of “specter” to refer to 
those entities typically known, however glibly, as “the West” and “the Rest.”  In so 
doing, he both recognizes the ways in which these units are unified, but also the 
mechanisms through which they have been and continue to be constructed.  He argues 
that the “specter of the West” 
has been, and continues to be, produced every time Indians 
retrieve for themselves a mode of identification through 
which they see themselves, and are seen by others, as 
members of a particular “world religion” (Hinduism or 
Sikhism), for in doing so they must rely on a comparative 
imaginary and inadvertently help to solidify that specter 
that calls itself the West.120 
 
Mandair here claims that the imaginary operative within contemporary Indian life is that 
of a comparative nature: to see oneself, and to be seen by others, as primarily belonging 
to a given religion indicates a way in which the West’s influence, which itself values and, 
by some arguments, created those very categories necessarily participates in reifying 
those categories and, in turn, their creator(s).  Mandair does not claim that “religion” 
itself is untranslatable from Euro-American conventions; in fact, he claims just the 
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opposite, and argues that religion is constantly translated everywhere.121  What he argues, 
however, is that the global imaginary of “religion” and the entities—or specters, to use 
his term—that imaginary supports has cache, history, and influence within Western 
contexts.  By examining the work of Abu’l Fazl, we can ascertain a precolonial, early 
modern era imaginary in which “religion” features heavily and holds great influence in 
areas of identity, government, and self-conceptualization.  Further, Orientalists reading 
Abu’l Fazl’s influential work are in turn shaped by his articulation of this religious 
imaginary.  
For Orientalists, the Mughal period and Akbar in particular prove to factor 
heavily in their imagination of India, Muslims, and their South Asian subjects.  But, 
likewise, for Mughals themselves, a genealogical and Islamic understanding of their 
lineage shapes their self-imagining; in the case of Akbar, what is actual rarely reflects 
what has been actualized in terms of his influence, persona, and legacy.  The idea of the 
social and historical imaginary—the imagination of the past and its communities—helps 
us have a firmer grip on the multiple narratives surrounding Akbar, and importantly, the 
major document about his reign.  In the next section, I discuss the Mughal era and 
especially the period of Akbar, arguing that the empire exists within multiple historical 
imaginaries, all of which are important to the development of religious identities. 
 
The Mughals in History and Historical Imaginaries  
 
The Mughal Empire, formally begun in 1526 CE by Babur, typically represents 
the height of Indo-Islamic presence, rule, and influence in South Asia.  Quite a lot of 
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attention has been paid the Mughals: their architecture, which includes the famed Taj 
Mahal, has been studied and commented on at length by scholars,122 travelers,123 and 
ruling authorities;124 Indo-Persian culture is seen as only theirs in creation and 
influence;125 and their militaristic campaigns and legal rule as an empire are well-
documented and studied.126  Mughal kings—much like India itself, as discussed in 
chapter 1—inhabit a particular place within both global and local imaginaries of South 
Asia.  Our English word “mogul” perhaps best exemplifies a postcolonial, Euro-
American conception of the empire: its root traces directly to Mughal, and is most often 
used in the sense of an important or powerful person, an autocrat.127  Of course, European 
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127 Oxford English Dictionary, “mogul.”  This sense of “mogul” first appears in J. Quarles Divine 
Meditations upon several subjects. Whereunto is annexed God's Love and Man's Unworthinesse 
(London:1655) i. 46.  What is important to note here is that the term comes into use during the 
 97 
visions of Mughals were not limited to marvels at their opulence, wealth, or rule, and we 
will examine what constituted typical Orientalist understandings and preoccupations 
below.  Locally, Mughals still inhabit an imaginary in which South Asia was formed—or 
destroyed: South Asian historians, commentators, and textbooks often oscillate between 
Mughal rule symbolizing the height of Indian cultural productivity and grandeur and, on 
the other side of the pendulum swing, the low point in which foreign invaders took 
control and profit from exploiting and, by some accounts, eliminating local culture.  The 
legacy of the Mughal Empire is oft debated, but what is certain is that their rule, 
patronage of the arts, and imperial organization remains wildly important in the historical 
imagination of South Asia.   
A dyad of influence—inception and destruction—often permeates 
historiographies of the Mughal period as well as commonly held notions of the era.  As 
mentioned briefly above, Mughal rule is often typified as the rule of foreign invaders, 
whose ideas and religion were fundamentally antithetical to Indic value and religious 
systems.128  On the flip side, Mughal architecture is touted as the height of style, royal 
sponsorship, and an immaculate blending of Indic and Persian aesthetics into a Indo-
Islamicate or Indo-Persian genre.  The Mughals come to be seen, therefore, as a major, 
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patently visible influence on Indic history but are not always seen as a fully integrated, 
fully local, truly indigenous government.   
The reasons for this are numerous, but more often than not relate to Orientalist 
scholarship and, later, the creation of the nation-states of India and Pakistan.  British 
historians often used documents from the courts of the Mughals to piece together 
histories,129 but did so through a lens that can only be qualified as racist at best: Muslims 
are described prodigiously as barbaric, warlike, and feebleminded, and their rule, 
subsequently, is seen as problematic and ghastly from its inception.130  After 
Partition/Independence in 1948, religious nationalism on both sides of the newly created 
borders seemed to be invested in historical imaginaries that prove their new homelands to 
be legitimate; these histories are teleological in nature, but absolutely rampant.  One 
author notes that after Partition/Independence, a  
fresh wave of communalism has swept over the Indian 
history-writing.  Pakistani historians have justified the birth 
and establishment of Pakistan as a natural and logical 
culmination of earlier events…The Indian historians have 
made it a non-Muslim affair.  In some irresponsible and 
politicised historical writings, it was argued that India 
became free after a lapse of a thousand years.131 
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Despite the obvious and well-documented history of Muslims in South Asia, their Delhi 
Sultanate antecedents, and a wide range of important artifacts that symbolize India, 
Mughals as Muslims inhabit a place in historiography akin to a double-edged sword: they 
epitomize South Asia as well as its demise at the hands of outsiders at once. 
 However, one king’s influence and role is distinct: Jalāl ud-Dīn Muhammad 
Akbar (r. 1556-1605 CE) exists within local and global imaginaries in a way that 
exemplifies the confused, sometimes contradictory position of Mughals. Scholars of India 
such as the economist and social critic Amartya Sen characterize Akbar's reign as the 
"height" of Mughal rule and the emperor himself as "liberal" inasmuch as he is believed 
to reflect neoliberal values in a premodern ruler.132  Akbar is thought of as exhibiting a 
modern, liberal worldview largely because of the way his views on religion and religious 
difference are perceived.  It is a commonly held view that Akbar favored “tolerance,”133 
inclusivity, and open dialogues between representatives of multiple faith traditions.   
There is ample evidence to support this conception: Akbar’s famed though ill-
fated dīn i-ilahi or Divine Faith was an ethical, purposefully syncretic system he 
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attempted to implement in his court.  It drew upon multiple religious traditions and 
theological interpretations, including Islam, Hindu traditions, Buddhism, and some 
Christian (largely Catholic) notions.  The system was, by all definitions, a practical 
failure: few outside of Akbar’s closest advisors joined or pledged allegiance to the dīn i-
ilahi, and those who chose to engage with its principles were usually critics or 
denouncers.  However, despite its obvious failings, the dīn i-ilahi is remembered and 
cited widely, and is a wildly popular reference contemporarily to Akbar’s open, liberal 
demeanor and policies.134   
Akbar’s unprecedented translation program is the more prudent example, though.  
He commissioned the translation of scores of Sanskrit plays, philosophical, and religious 
texts (including the major Hindu epics, Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana) into Persian.135  
Further, ateliers sponsored by the Mughal line often depicted Hindu religious imagery—
from the epics, regional tales, and trans-regional deities.  The Indo-Persian miniatures 
and illuminated manuscripts have come to typify the Mughal era and South Asian painted 
art, and their multifaceted, multireligious subjects can be traced in many ways to Akbar’s 
fascination with and insistence upon integrating his empire with its location.136 
                                                
 
134 Iqtidar Alam Khan, “The Nobility under Akbar and the Development of His Religious Policy, 
1560-80,” The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, No. 1/2 (Apr., 
1968), 29-36. 
 
135 M. Athar Ali, “Translations of Sanskrit Works at Akbar's Court,” Social Scientist Vol. 20, No. 
9/10 (Sep. - Oct., 1992), pp. 38-45. 
  
136 John Seyller writes extensively on these issues.  See his works: Workshop and Patron in 
Mughal India: The Freer Ramayana and Other Manuscripts Illustrated for ‘Abd al-Rahim 
(Zürich and Washington, DC: Artibus Asiae Publishers and Museum Rietberg, in association with 
the Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, 1999), Pearls of the Parrot of India: The 
Walters Art Museum Khamsa of Amir Khusraw of Delhi (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2002), and The Adventures of Hamza: Painting and storytelling in Mughal India (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2002). 
 101 
Akbar also envisioned his role as king and emperor in what appears to be a novel 
way: part of the way he positioned himself was as a king who conformed to lofty, 
religiously imbued ideals of universal rule.  Abu’l Fazl writes of his kingship as one 
whose aim was to “establish peace with all (sulh-i-kull137) and if he does not think all 
classes of men and all factions of religion (dīn) with a single eye of favor, he will not be 
fit for the exalted office.”138 Within this framework, largely influenced by Abu’l Fazl 
himself,139 Akbar passed a number of laws that would make his empire appear open, 
pluralistic, and modern; these include the abolition of the jizya tax (c. 1580 CE) and the 
eventual admittance of previously persecuted Shi`i groups to perform namaz (ritual 
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prayers) in congregational mosques.140  Further, many label Akbar as “secular,” given 
Akbar’s push to systematize the empire and Abu’l Fazl’s great lengths to bolster the 
attention that systemization received.141   
While there is ample evidence that Akbar held views that have been construed—
albeit ahistorically—as liberal or modern, there is also a good deal of evidence to the 
contrary.  As such, not all scholars, remembrances, or constructed imaginations of Akbar 
can be so resoundingly located within a liberal positivistic view; some consider his 
actions to have been religiously motivated, “intolerant,” and even Machiavellian.142  
Many criticize the historical imaginary in which Akbar resides—this image of one who 
was liberal, modern, secular—making clear that his role as leader of a massive empire 
and its armies necessarily focused on the acquisition and implementation of power.  
These authors often cite the growth of the empire under his rule, his use of traditional 
networks through which to maintain and form power alliances (marriages with regional 
elites, courtly and military appointments, control of information, and local interventions), 
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and the use of military technologies against local rulers and their armies and unarmed 
peasantry alike.143   
Folktales serve as a different mechanism to view Akbar within the historic 
imaginary and demonstrate its imprint, lasting framework, and commonly held attitudes.  
Perhaps surprising to a contemporary reader, many classic folktales in northern India—
the seat of Mughal power and influence—feature Akbar.  This is quite unlike the myriad 
Jacks, Jills, and bewitched grandmothers that feature prominently in Euro-American 
folktales, but the appearance of Akbar in cautionary and moralistic fables is worth 
touching upon.  In these legends, Akbar is most often depicted alongside his servant 
Birbal.  Birbal was one of the nav ratnas or “nine gems,” Akbar’s famed group of courtly 
advisors and assistants; he served Akbar as wazīr-i a`zam or the grand vizier.  In these 
popular stories, the king, who is unlettered, is very foolish compared to his dear assistant, 
and makes rash decisions for immediate gain, always failing to see the long-term 
effects.144 These stories are fables—meant to demonstrate lessons in amusing ways—but 
the king here is not the wise, knowing, purposeful thinker Abu’l Fazl would have him 
remembered; instead, he is a bumbling, old, illiterate man, reliant upon the quick-witted 
and loving Birbal.   
Birbal is not merely a faithful servant of an important king in an important 
empire; he is, in these folktales, the guide, intellect, and moral center of the Mughal 
court.  As such, Akbar comes to be the perpetual fool—this is, it should be noted, not the 
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wise fool that is a theme common across many Abrahamic traditions and has particular 
cachet in Sufi circles.145  Akbar in these stories is merely foolish, silly, and incompetent, 
and utterly reliant on Birbal; it is Birbal in these stories who is the humble hero, allowing 
the King to save face in front of his court and subjects.  Importantly, Birbal was born a 
Brahmin, and despite the historic—the actual—record of his unorthodox religious ideas, 
in these stories he is clearly portrayed as the Muslim king’s Hindu advisor.146  These 
folktales exemplify an historical imaginary in which Hindu and Muslim roles are 
examined, and ultimately serve to stand as examples of Hindu power over and above 
Muslim rule.  Birbal is the smart, humble, fast-thinking man-behind-the-man who has the 
real power; Akbar is the bumbling, slow-witted, arrogant king unable to rule without his 
advisor.  Muslim rule as intelligent, forward-thinking cannot exist within these paradigms 
and any “modernness” can therefore be attributed not to Akbar, but his Hindu vizier. 
Even if folktales and fables attempt to portray Akbar as one who did not earn the 
credit he has been given, it is clear that the role of Akbar’s court—if not Akbar himself—
inhabits a special, pivotal role within Indian historical imaginaries.  Whatever the 
particular vantage point on Akbar, the importance of his empire, his influence, and his 
role has not come into question; he is a major figure within the historical imagination of 
South Asia.  His legacy—seen within physical structures, the patronage of arts and 
                                                
 
145 Fools often serve as those who outwardly break rules, transgress social norms, speak out of 
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artisans, and, to some, seen as the height of pre-colonial Indic power—is one that greatly 
enamored his courtly scribe, Abu’l Fazl, as well as British colonial agents and 
Orientalists, and continues to cast its shadow on contemporary India.  He, like the empire 
he helped define, exists within multiple historical imaginaries, be they the purposeful 
imagining of his court (as is the case for Abu’l Fazl), British Orientalist visions, or 
contemporary South Asian uses.147  In the Mughal and Persianate tradition, Akbar 
bestowed upon his subjects and history a well-kept series of documents, writings, and 
records.  Important to this study in particular is Abu’l Fazl’s Akbarnāma, specifically the 
last three books which are titled Ā'īn-i Akbarī or The Institutes of Akbar.   
Ā'īn-i Akbarī: Mughal Genealogies 
 
Abu al-Fazl ibn Mubārak, widely known as Abu’l Fazl and sometimes referred to 
as Abu’l Fazl-i-`Allami,148 was the preeminent courtly scribe of Akbar, serving the 
emperor beginning in 1575 CE until his death in 1602 CE.  He writes a short chapter on 
his biography at the very end of the Ā'īn-i Akbarī, claiming that he had intended to write a 
                                                
 
147 Though it is beyond the scope of this project, South Asian textbook representations of the 
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separate volume dedicated to his own story to flesh out his personal history—and by 
extension the history he relates in the full Akbarnāma.149  Abu’l Fazl places himself 
within a noble lineage of scholars as well as devout and learned shaykhs.150  He spends a 
great deal of time discussing his father, Shaykh Mubārak Nāgori.  Interestingly, Abu’l 
Fazl devotes, by my estimate, nearly a full third of the chapter to his father’s educational 
and intellectual merits, stating that he “received a high diploma” at Ahmadābād, in 
contemporary Gujarat, in fields of law from many of the legal schools, including what we 
might term the four major legal schools or madhhabs—Māliki, Shāfi’i, Hanafi, and 
Hanbali—as well as Imamiyah, a Shi`i madhhab, in addition to a wide range of Sufi 
texts.151  The section continues, and Abu’l Fazl describes his wanderings with his father 
and brother, the famed poet Fayzi, until the trio is able to be presented to Akbar as 
scholars worthy of court positions and the emperor’s trust as learned and properly devout 
men.  Abu’l Fazl is one engrossed with his genealogy and the genealogy of his emperor. 
His autobiographical information, laden with family lore and sentimental accounts 
of his father in particular, may not be entirely trustworthy; however, his self-positioning 
as an inheritor of both an intellectual and religious prowess does weigh on the issues of 
this book.  Abu’l Fazl imagines himself as part of an Islamic lineage not merely of 
Muslims but of Muslim scholars.  Likewise, he envisions Akbar necessarily as part of the 
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glorious, religiously sanctioned lineage of rulers; this is, perhaps, to be expected based on 
contemporaneous, Persianate and Islamicate understandings of kingship.  What is 
interesting, however, is Abu’l Fazl’s intense devotion to Akbar as a Mughal and 
exceptionally qualified king, whose rule becomes demonstrative of high-order ideals like 
sulh-i-kull (universal reconciliation).152    
Furthermore, and perhaps more convincingly, Abu’l Fazl purposefully and with 
great dexterity refers to Akbar in the Akbarnāma as part of religious worldviews.  Akbar 
is described in ways that reflect a cosmogonic persona—or one whose existence is 
primary.  Peter Hardy comments that “Abul Fazl in effect depicts Akbar as in this world 
of human experience but not of this world of human experience.”153  Abu’l Fazl’s read of 
Akbar in this way allows him to position the emperor as part of a valid Islamic reading of 
kingship; Abu’l Fazl eventually concludes, in his opening remarks, that “there is no 
greater sign or more honourable element of essence (gauhar) [which] has been displayed 
to man than the precious existence of kings of exalted dignity.”154  In other words, Abu’l 
Fazl’s Akbar—in some ways an imagined, exalted king—holds double importance: he is, 
at once, the ruler of the mundane, delimited Hindustan, and also the earthly proof of and 
guide for proper worship, rule, and authority.155  This is especially evident in the markers 
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Abu’l Fazl uses to describe Akbar.  Abu’l Fazl describes the emperor as one who is filled 
with light (furugh); one who has holy (qudsi) goals for himself and the kingdom; and one 
who has access (mahram) to God.156  Put rather simply, Abu’l Fazl presents Akbar as the 
insān-i kāmil (perfected person). 
In traditional philosophic writings, insān-i kāmil represents the true personhood of 
an individual, most often contrasted against the material form of the person; this is the 
view held by Ibn Arabi, who draws and elaborates upon other Sufi ideas about the 
perfected personhood vis-à-vis embodied materiality of the self.157  Other uses of the term 
traditionally include the perfected person—Muhammad.  Still other connections between 
insān-i kāmil and oft-cited Islamic sources include the link between the perfected person 
and the First Intellect of Arabic/Islamic philosophy.158  Further, in his noted work, 
Religious and Intellectual History of the Muslims in Akbar’s Reign, S. A. A. Rizvi notes 
that Abu’l Fazl “supported the theory that Akbar was an Insan-i Kamil.”159  That Abu’l 
Fazl chooses to use such a loaded, specific, religiously rooted term in describing Akbar 
demonstrates not only his erudition but also the degree to which his personal feelings 
                                                
 
156 Abu’l Fazl, Akbarnāma, ed. Agha Ahmad `Ali and `Abd al-Rahim, vol. 1 (Calcutta: 1877), 4-
6. 
 
157 I am no expert on Ibn Arabi or his usage of insān-i kāmil; and both are, admittedly, tangential 
topics to this project.  For further reference, see: John T. Little, “Al-Insan al-Kamil: the perfect 
man according to Ibn al-‘Arabi.” Muslim World 77.1 (1987): 43-54; Stephen Hirtenstein, “Ibn al-
ʿArabī” Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Lindsay Jones. Vol. 6. 2nd ed.  (Detroit: Macmillan 
Reference USA, 2005), 4255-4260. 
 
158 One translator of the Akbarnāma makes this connection, as does Peter Hardy.  See: Hardy in 
Islam in India, 117; and Henry Beveridge, trans., The Akbar Nama of Abu’l Fazl, Vol 1 (Calcutta: 
Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1898), 15 (footnote 3). 
 
159 Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Religion and Intellectual History of the Muslims in Akbar’s Reign 
with special reference to Abu’l Fazl (1556-1605) (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers 
Pvt. Ltd., 1975) 190. 
 109 
about Akbar and kingship generally come to imbue the whole of the Akbarnāma and its 
extended appendix, and subject of our serious attention below, the Ā'īn-i Akbarī.   
Abu’l Fazl’s strongly worded text stands to exemplify three things: first, the use 
of Islamic norms and notions within the courtly writings; second, the degree to which 
Abu’l Fazl’s personal interpretation of these norms and notion come to affect the reading 
of Akbar; and third, the historical imaginary these uses suggest, maintain and create. 
It is worth mentioning some basic features of the Ā'īn-i Akbarī. It is, first and 
foremost, an appendix to the Akbarnāma, and in this regard it is rather distinctive.  To my 
knowledge, there are scant, if any, preceding examples of such a massive, lengthy, and 
very much tangential appendix in Indo-Persian or Persianate literature.  The Akbarnāma 
itself is a narrative written in grandiloquent, bombastic prose, which becomes a stylistic 
form for authors who follow Abu’l Fazl.  The Akbarnāma is a narrative account of the 
life, court, and thought of the Mughal emperor, though it varies from the other kingly 
accounts that precede Akbar, namely the Baburnāma (an autobiography composed in 
Turkish) and Humayun Nāma (which is pithy by comparison).  These two works recount 
the courts of Babur (r. 1526 – 1530) and Humayun (r. 1530 – 1540, 1555 – 1556) 
respectively.  The Ā'īn-i Akbarī  is not written in such terms; rather, it is exceptionally 
descriptive, does not follow a narrative form, and reads as a compilation of factual data.  
In fact, many contemporary authors that cite the Ā'īn-i Akbarī are historians and social 
scientists who plumb the text for its data more so than its content.160   
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The Ā'īn-i Akbarī is, in its contemporary form, divided into five sections.  Abu’l 
Fazl certainly considered the entirety of the work—the Akbarnāma and the Ā'īn-i 
Akbarī—one cogent, fluid masterpiece.  But, in its modern editions, translations, and 
standardized prints in a variety of languages (including English, Persian, and Urdu), it has 
been divided into volumes, books, and sections.  For the sake of clarity, and to reflect not 
the manuscripts, of which there are few, but the relatively recent publications from which 
I am drawing my own readings, I will use the now-standard and widely available volume, 
book, and section model.  
The first section discusses the divine source of the Emperor’s royalty, which 
follows the form, function and style of the preceding Akbarnāma well.  It also deals with 
the management of the imperial household, the treasury, and the process of minting 
money.  The second section gives regulations for the manṣabdārī system or Empire’s 
military.  The third discusses the Empire’s civil administration, especially the local, 
provincial, and central revenue systems.  It is this section that has been used by many 
economists and historians in understanding the financial workings of the Mughal Empire. 
This important section also talks about the revenue programs according to various crops 
and regions of North India; it is highly detailed, describing, in some places, the annual 
expected harvests of different types of rice and the annual rice consumption of a family, 
for example.161  The fourth section—which is of particular interest to this project—gives 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
161 Elaborate charts accompany written analysis with reference to harvests.  Abu’l Fazl, ed. 
Blochmann, 334-345. 
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a geographic, religious and, if I might use the term, ethnographic description of Mughal 
India.  Importantly, it is in this section that Abu’l Fazl treats Hindu philosophy and Hindu 
social organization at some length.  Last, the fifth section contains various sayings of 
Akbar as collected by Abu’l Fazl; it is, in some ways, reminiscent of Sufi malfuzat or 
utterances of the master, perhaps further locating Abu’l Fazl within various Islamic and 
Islamicate literary traditions. 
I will spend most of my analysis on the fourth and fifth sections.  The fourth for 
somewhat obvious reasons: this is where Abu’l Fazl lists, interrogates, and evaluates 
Hindu and Indic norms of religion, philosophy, and praxis; this is where I believe he most 
readily demonstrates what we would recognize as an academic impetus to classify, 
categorize, and interpret religion and religions. J. Z. Smith’s pairing of “religion” and 
“religions,” stemming from larger Western genealogies of the term and discipline, is 
particularly useful here to indicate that Abu’l Fazl is not some modern author, interested 
in demonstrating the modes by which other actors identify their religions—instead he 
understands Islam as the religion, and acknowledges Hindu traditions within that 
framework.162  This functions in a way that is analogous to the more theorized ways in 
which Christianity stands in for “the religion” and a diversity of traditions, “religions.”  It 
also reflects, therefore, the ways in which Abu’l Fazl imagines Islam vis-à-vis power 
structures (the Mughal Empire), “true religion” (Islam), and demographic realities (non-
Muslim majority as subjects).   
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I also focus on this fourth chapter because therein Abu’l Fazl demonstrates what I 
have been referring to as an historical imaginary: his lists, his interpretations, his 
assertions all speak to an idealized, perfected and imagined Mughal India under his 
beloved ruler, Akbar.  This is most evident in the fifth section of the chapter, where Abu’l 
Fazl lists collections of Akbar’s speeches and sayings.  Herein, Abu’l Fazl creates the 
image from which an overwhelming majority of later conceptualizations of the Mughal 
Empire stem.  He asserts the image of Akbar’s idealism as real, and does so 
convincingly; that Akbar is remembered as modern, “tolerant,” pluralist or even 
enlightened necessarily reflects the ways in which Abu’l Fazl posited him to his 
contemporaries, future Mughal courts, and British colonial and imperial agents.  This 
affects not only scholarly opinions about the great emperor, but also popular 
remembrances and collective religious imaginaries.  His story is depicted in film, 
literature, and even comic books,163 but what is more important here are the ways in 
which his imagined legacy has become an emblem for governmental, educational, and 
historical projects.164 
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The fourth section of the appendix is particularly fascinating, given our temporal 
location in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and the abovementioned dyad 
that surrounds understandings of the Mughals writ large and Akbar specifically.  That is 
to reiterate that Mughals and Akbar are at once invading, conquering, spoiling marauders 
and also liberal, modern, forward-thinking just rulers.  Abu’l Fazl’s ethnography—to 
borrow a much later term—of Hindus, as well as his bent toward comparative study of 
religions reads in a way that appears modern.  He is dedicated to accuracy, to fairness, to 
intellectual engagement; he even claims to teach himself Sanskrit in order to read primary 
source texts for himself!  In other words, Abu’l Fazl sounds quite like an engaged student 
of religion rather than a courtly author, paid to demonstrate the Empire’s glory, in this 
fourth section. 
Abu’l Fazl introduces this section by asserting, presumably to other Muslim 
readers, “the author’s purpose in writing this account is to show that the religion of 
Hindustan [i.e. Hinduism] has true and sublime conceptions of God.”165  Abu’l Fazl 
expresses his desires to talk about his “native land” and his commitment to facts rather 
than ignorant assumptions.  After these brief remarks, he continues what can be called a 
preface by discussing quarrels between different religions in Hindustan.166  Much like F. 
Max Müller nearly two hundred years later, Abu’l Fazl links religion, religious 
difference, and inter-religious tensions to differences in languages.  He claims that his 
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book, written in the language of the court and seemingly, therefore, a lingua franca, 
attempts to reconcile perceived differences between religions that are only actually 
misunderstandings.167  In short, Abu’l Fazl here delineates three major issues: first, that 
he views Hindus as rightful, reasonable devotees of God; second, that his writing is 
erudite, learned, and descriptive; and last, that he believes his work, composed in the 
language of empire, will make intelligible various positions of differing religions in a 
lingua franca. 
After the introductory remarks, Abu’l Fazl discusses—again—the issues of crops, 
harvests, natural features, and seasons.  In this way, the larger thematics in the Āin-i 
Akbarī are evident in the section preface as well; Abu’l Fazl’s lengthy appendix often 
centers on the intricate particularities of Hindustan and, importantly, its economic 
bounties.  This is, for our purposes here however, far less central than the succeeding 
segments that directly address religion.  Abu’l Fazl lists the issues of the caste system, 
parsing the Brahmin traditions from those of lower castes—not unlike the theories and 
methodologies employed today.168  He talks at great length about Hindu cosmology, 
utilizing Sanskrit philosophical and theological terms;169 he demonstrates a true 
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168 See, for example, ideas about Sanskritization, the process by which Brahmanical practices—
rooted in Sanskrit—come to affect the lower castes in works like: B. R. Ambedkar, Castes in 
India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development (Indian Antiquary, Vol. XLI, May 1917); M. 
N. Srinivas, Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India (London: Oxford University 
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and Power in Premodern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). 
 
169 In the version of the text from which I am drawing, a compiled edited volume, these words 
appear transliterated in Persian rather than in Devanagari script.  I have not seen or worked with a 
manuscript of the text, but from all of the commentaries, I believe that he transliterated these 
terms from the Devanagari to Perso-Arabic script; or, it is possible he utilized oral sources based 
on Sanskrit texts.  In any event, the proper vowels (e.g. long ā or the use of aleph  in the Perso-
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familiarity with traditional Brahmin, Sanskrit sources including Manusmṛti or the Laws 
of Manu, as they are commonly known in English, the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, and astrological 
and yogic texts.170 
In the next section, Abu’l Fazl describes the philosophical schools, careful to list 
nine schools, their founders, and their precepts.  For example, he goes on at length about 
Patāñjala, the philosopher most well known today for his texts on yoga.  Here again he 
utilizes key terms from Sanskrit, including ātman (soul or self), brahman (transcendent 
reality), and karman (action).  While he is certainly not the first Muslim or the first 
Mughal courtly author to discuss Sanskritic terms, philosophies, or religious texts,171 
Abu’l Fazl’s systematic approach to these sets him apart.  Abu’l Fazl sets forth clear 
understandings of each philosopher’s contribution, and summarizes each typically with 
two or three lines, normally stating whether or not this path could lead to liberation.172  
Interestingly, Abu’l Fazl devotes a section to Jaina thought, and it is within this section 
that he treats Buddhism; I cannot account for this ordering or categorization fully, but 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
Arabic script) indicate Abu’l Fazl’s familiarity with Sanskrit.  An example is mahādeva, the 
Sanskrit term that literally means “great God,” which Abu’l Fazl takes to refer to the Supreme 
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170 Abu’l Fazl, Book IV, 15-28. 
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Mughal courts.  His own grandson, Dara Shikoh, famously translated the Bhagavadgita.  These 
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172 Abu’l Fazl, Bibliotecha Indica, 89-96. 
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suggest that it relates to Abu’l Fazl’s prioritization of the philosophical sciences,173 a 
subject upon which both Jaina and Hindu philosophical systems expound.   
This fourth section of the Āin’i Akbarī also includes a lengthy description of what 
we might call ritual foci and practice.  Abu’l Fazl enumerates the ten avatars or 
incarnations of Vishnu; he lists rites of purification and those items that will make one’s 
body impure; discusses proper dress; lists proper eating habits and prohibited foods; and 
writes about ceremonial rites.174  He goes on in this manner, further listing holy 
pilgrimage locations and pilgrimage rituals like circumambulation; marriage rituals 
which included proper jewelry and adornments for both men and women; annual festivals 
per the seasonal year; and death ceremonies.  All of these lengthy, detailed descriptions 
demonstrate two major issues: first, that Abu’l Fazl took seriously the rich textual, 
Sanskritic traditions of northern India; and second, that Abu’l Fazl was also interested in 
the ritual practices of Hindus, Jains, and, to a lesser extent, Buddhists.  In so doing, Abu’l 
Fazl draws upon older understandings of the region,175 and also maps as well as creates 
the religious landscape of Hindustan. 
Although the Āin’i Akbarī departs from the Akbarnāma in terms of its prose style, 
and is most readily characterized by its descriptive language, Abu’l Fazl does not merely 
list various issues present in the Mughal Empire to no avail, with no direct purpose.  As I 
mentioned earlier, it is only in recent editions of the text that we divide the work into 
volumes, books, sections, and subheadings.  Abu’l Fazl, at various locations in the 
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appendix, draws upon the religious language he set forth in the main part of the text.  He 
overtly implies that Akbar’s standing as a guide (rahnamuni) and his role as insān-i kāmil 
(perfected person) may also affect those members of his empire who do not fall under the 
umbrella of Islam.176  Namely, these groups include the renunciant traditions of South 
Asia, including Muslim Sufis and ascetics (qalandars) as well as sannyasis, yogis (jogis, 
in Persian), and others.177  In this way, as per Islamic and Islamicate norms, Abu’l Fazl 
makes Akbar more than just the perfected person, as he construes Akbar as a padshah, a 
master of kings, a King of kings.178  This is to say that Abu’l Fazl postulates Akbar as a 
symbol of religious significance as well as an invaluable emperor within purposefully 
Muslim schemas; furthermore, he also insinuates that Akbar’s religious significance 
extends to all his subjects.  
Abu’l Fazl’s employment and deployment of religiously significant terms is key.  
He purposefully utilizes phrases, terms, and concepts in such a way that is both novel and 
established.  One of the chief examples of this, as mentioned fleetingly above, is sulh-i 
kull or universal concord.  As Akbar’s chief courtly author and ideologue, Abu’l Fazl 
played an enormous role in shaping the official voice of the Mughal Empire in the late 
sixteenth century.  Sulh-i kull stood to be one of the foremost ideas of this voice: 
universal reconciliation was the intellectual, cultural, and even commercial hallmark of 
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the Mughal Empire, but the term and concept was not itself new.  Sulh-i kull has long 
reach within Islamicate and Persianate writings179 Abu’l Fazl, however, pushes the idea 
that universal concord, as a specific characteristic of Akbar’s reign and of the Mughal 
Empire writ large, signals a new, modern understanding of a classically Islamic, Persian, 
even Turko-Mongol idea.  Abu’l Fazl and the emperor he reflected and represented 
therefore purposefully herald Mughal rule as novel—even modernist in the sense of 
purposefully, meaningfully committed to the new—while drawing upon a rich, 
multifaceted genealogy.180 
Abu’l Fazl and Akbar were firmly invested ideologically in the dynamism of the 
court.  By drawing upon multiple facets of their rich backgrounds—Islamicate, Persian, 
Turko-Mongol, Indic, and, via philosophical traditions, Greco-Hellenic—Abu’l Fazl 
clearly believed such dynamism would both safeguard the empire and demonstrate its 
superiority.  Sulh-i kull particularly demonstrates this imperial predilection.  The way that 
Abu’l Fazl uses this term marks a purposeful shifting of a classic idea to one of 
immediate imperial and cultural import.  Akbar’s court is often noted for its idealism, 
with good reason; Abu’l Fazl pushed an agenda of ideals throughout the Āin’i Akbarī and 
the larger corpus of the Akbarnāma.  Along these lines, sulh-i kull or universal concord 
was used to demonstrate and normalize an atmosphere of religious tolerance, a valuation 
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of scholarly endeavor about religion or religions, a set of rationalistic policies about the 
bureaucracy, and a sense of imperial or regional pride stemming from toleration for the 
cultural diversity of South Asia itself.  Abu’l Fazl reinterprets the term to indicate the 
preferred, valued, and notable structure of Mughal governance broadly and under Akbar 
specifically. 
Abu’l Fazl writes extensively on rulers and rulership within the larger Akbarnāma 
and the appendix Āin’i Akbarī.  He very clearly understands kingships and kingdoms 
within Islamic frameworks; his emperor, Akbar, and those that follow should, by his 
account, personify lofty ideals: they should be honorable, just, pious, and paternalistic.  
More importantly here, however, are the ways in which Abu’l Fazl understands the role 
of the ruler as unequivocally linked to the ideation of the empire.  In the case of the 
Mughals, this entails leading from the position of a demographic minority, as Muslims 
never came to outnumber Hindus in the subcontinent.  The Mughals, like the Delhi 
Sultanates before them, are in many ways distinctive among Muslim empires: they have 
to navigate their authority in terms of minority issues.  Along these lines, Abu’l Fazl is, 
throughout the texts in question, firmly absorbed within rhetoric of tolerance, cultural 
diversity, and just ruling over non-Muslims.  He writes that it is the function of the king 
to “induct universal concord (sulh-i kull) and if he does not regard all classes of men and 
all sects of religion favorably, he will not be fit for the exalted position.”181  Therefore, as 
one scholar notes, “it is [the king’s] function to ensure that religious differences among 
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people do not lead to mutual antipathy.”182  Further, it can be inferred that Abu’l Fazl 
argues for an emperor that is absolutely powerful not in the terms of one religion but 
because he is, quite simply, sovereign—that he rules indicates that his rule is absolute.183 
Most scholars of Akbar tend to cite—and to my eyes, over-cite—the famed and 
failed dīn-i-ilahi or Divine Religion.  This was Akbar’s experiment in syncretic 
philosophically-spirited religion: the dīn-i-ilahi was an ethical system that drew upon 
mainline Sunni Islam as well as Sufi precepts, Hindu traditions, Buddhist traditions, Jaina 
traditions, and, though to an admittedly lesser extent, Jesuit understandings of 
Catholicism.  Akbar supposedly wanted this system to become popular, but there is scant 
evidence that anyone actually participated within dīn-i-ilahi outside his closest advisors.  
Much ado has been made about the ways in which we remember Akbar as religiously 
tolerant or even pluralistic vis-à-vis this ethical system; and equal ado has been made to 
explain the historic insignificance of this very system.  What has escaped many scholastic 
explications of Akbar and his court is Abu’l Fazl’s insistence upon sulh-i kull (universal 
concord).   
I argue that this concept is demonstrative of the type of reality Abu’l Fazl hoped 
to portray; therefore, it reflects a major historical imaginary, wherein Abu’l Fazl draws 
upon particular histories and genealogies to create a new interpretation that claims a long 
history.  Further, this imaginary—wherein Akbar is progressive, and the Mughal period is 
characterized by a stress on widespread harmony—is concretely shaped not, I contend, by 
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the ill-fated dīn-i-ilahi but rather within Abu’l Fazl’s Āin’i Akbarī.  It is religiously 
located within a long Persianate tradition, but interpreted through the dual lenses of Abu’l 
Fazl’s religiosity alongside a South Asian religious milieu.  For Abu’l Fazl, this is of 
paramount importance: as I mentioned above, Akbar’s very legitimacy relies upon the 
fact that he is dedicated to sulh-i kull; his legitimacy is necessarily Indic as well as 
Islamic. 
We see particular references to Islamic ideas and concepts outside of sulh-i kull.  
The idea of religion or dīn is important within Abu’l Fazl’s Ā’in-i Akbarī, as well.  Dīn as 
an understanding of religion will be a central theme for Mathurānāth, to whom we will 
return in the next chapter.  Here, however, Abu’l Fazl’s use and understanding of dīn is 
relevant—and in the next chapter, we will investigate how his use relates to that of 
Mathurānāth.  As discussed above, Abu’l Fazl devotes a majority of the fourth section of 
the Ā’in-i Akbarī to the religions of Hindustan.  Herein, he often uses the word “dīn” to 
mean “religion,” but, as will be more fully discussed in the next chapter, it is also evident 
that he uses the term to refer to multiple religions as well.184  He very clearly understands 
Hindu traditions as essential not only to the empire but also to the process of salvation or 
liberation; he uses terminologies that reflect Sufi cosmologies, and that purposefully find 
meaning and value within certain Hindu practices, like yoga.185  
Abu’l Fazl writes with empire in mind.  In fact, it should go without saying that 
the Akbarnāma in its entirety is a document of empire, perhaps even of state: it was 
commissioned by the emperor; penned by his leading court author; documented the life 
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of the ruler and the history of the empire; and, in the appendix Ā’in-i Akbarī, delineated 
demographics of the empire.  Some scholars have suggested that many of Abu’l Fazl’s 
assertions are inaccurate, that they are far too bombastic to be taken as anything but 
hyperbolic; they are necessarily strongly worded accounts in order to glorify his perfected 
person (insān-i kamīl) Akbar and his universally peaceful (sulh-i kull) empire.  To return 
to the language I used above, these scholars would argue that much of Abu’l Fazl’s 
articulations are, in fact, not actual.  However, as we will see in the following section, 
much of Abu’l Fazl’s assertions about religion and religions, about Akbar’s religiously 
imbued reign, and about the sovereignty of a tolerant empire become actualized in later 
reads of the empire, especially from the perspective of some Orientalists. 
 
 
 
Ā'īn-i Akbarī & its Afterlife: Lasting Legacies of Abu’l Fazl’s Text 
  
Akbar, his rule, and his persona hold a special place in the imaginary of South 
Asia widely and Mughal rule particularly.  One commentator, Richard Garbe, wrote:  
At the first glance it looks as if the Emperor Akbar had 
developed his entire character from himself and by his own 
efforts in total independence of all influences which in 
other cases are thought to determine the character and 
nature of a man. A Mohammedan, a Mongol, a descendant 
of the monster Timur, the son of a weak incapable father, 
born in exile, called when but a lad to the government of a 
disintegrated and almost annihilated realm in the India of 
the sixteenth century,—which means in an age of perfidy, 
treachery, avarice, and self seeking,—Akbar appears before 
us as a noble man, susceptible to all grand and beautiful 
impressions, conscientious, unprejudiced, and energetic, 
who knew how to bring peace and order out of the 
confusion of the times, who through out his reign desired 
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the furtherance of his subjects' and not of his own interest, 
who while increasing the privileges of the Mohammedans, 
not only also declared equality of rights for the Hindus but 
even actualized that equality, who in every conceivable 
way sought to conciliate his subjects so widely at variance 
with each other in race, customs, and religion, and who 
finally when the narrow dogmas of his religion no longer 
satisfied him, attained to a purified faith in God, which was 
independent of all formulated religions.186 
 
For Garbe, a German Orientalist,187 Akbar fulfills a romantic visage of the modern, 
erudite man who, by only his own gifted, special, and noble characteristics, could lead as 
a shining light in the premodern period.   
Garbe sees Akbar as one who actualized the equality across his empire, defeated 
the “narrow dogmas” of Islam, and perfected his faith independently—that is, apart from 
and without reference to other dogmatic religions.  Garbe here, one must deduce, 
references Akbar’s ethical system, the Divine Faith or dīn-i-ilahi.  As I mentioned in the 
previous section, this was, historically, an absolute flop: some have argued that no more 
than six people proclaimed their adherence to the system.188  In any case, however, Akbar 
never disavowed Islam, and was by many accounts a fairly devoted man; certainly, as we 
just saw, Abu’l Fazl considered him perfected in his faith.189  Garbe’s idealization of 
Akbar certainly denotes an imaginary that deems Islam backward, incompatible with 
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civilization or civility.  This imaginary deems freethinking, deistic religion pure, and 
equality paramount.  In other words, Garbe’s Akbar epitomizes a modern liberal 
paradigm in which the enlightened ruler breaks the shackles of oppressive religion (or 
perhaps the oppressive religion, Islam) to embrace egalitarian, just principles. 
The West knows Akbar largely due to Abu’l Fazl’s courtly writings, and it is this 
body of literature that helped Akbar grab the imagination of many Orientalist authors and 
scholars.  As part of the processes of colonialism, Orientalism, and imperialism, many 
Mughal-era documents and manuscripts became the focus of British, French, and German 
inquiry; the well-detailed records of the Mughal courts held a particular interest to many 
early researchers of a variety of national origins as well as British East India Company 
officials.  It should be no surprise, then, that Abu’l Fazl’s widely known and very lengthy 
Akbarnāma held special attention.  The Ā’in-i Akbarī, in its descriptive, statistical, nearly 
ethnographic form, has figured heavily in Orientalist scholarship: Abu’l Fazl may have 
written bombastically in the main text of the work, but his true utility to later generations 
is in the appendix and is, no doubt, his heavy-handed data collection—a modern and 
imperial fixation.  Therefore, many authors and translators, like Garbe,190 believed that 
Abu’l Fazl personally stood out as a scholar and as a documenter—unlike other, lesser 
volumes written by other, lesser authors (and, notably, for other, lesser kings).  
Much of Orientalist scholarship dismisses indigenous forms of knowledge in 
favor of its own, presumably external and objective, understandings of the given area, 
language, culture, religion, and so forth.  Richard King, on the topic of mysticism, points 
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out that this relationship deals with the public, external, rational, male sets of knowledge 
whereas private, internal, irrational/emotional and female sets of knowledge cannot be 
trusted; this latter set of characteristics most often describe the Orient.191  While there is 
some recognition of the multiple types of Orientalists and Orientalisms—namely, those 
who are phobic and those who are philic—the issues of objectivity reign supreme.192  
Muslims, Hindus, and other dominated groups were routinely held suspicious 
interlocutors and rarely trusted to fully understand their own tradition, and it is without 
question that British, German, and French scholars considered South Asian self-authored 
histories dubious.  Many scholars from the Persian or Indo-Persian literary traditions 
wrote in the style of praise, where long, flowery tributes to patrons were preceded by 
praises to God, Muhammad and other luminous figures (both Muslim and non-Muslim).  
These purportedly irrational, subjective writings were discredited outright.  Abu’l Fazl 
was different according to some, however.   
For example, Blochmann, a well-known translator, stated that the Āīn’i Akbarī is 
indispensable to understanding the Muslim Mughal Empire, claiming that “it is not 
merely the varied information of the A’in that renders the book so valuable, but also the 
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trustworthiness of the author himself,” citing Abu’l Fazl’s highest position in the empire 
and his relationship to Akbar.193  He continues: 
[Abu’l Fazl’s] love of truth and his correctness of 
information are apparent on every page of the book, which 
he wished to leave to future ages as a memorial of the Great 
Emperor [Akbar] and as a guide for inquiring minds; and 
his wishes for the stability of the throne and the welfare of 
the people, his principles of toleration, his noble sentiments 
on the rights of man, the total absence of personal 
grievances and of expressions of ill-will towards 
encompassing enemies, show that the expanse of his large 
heart stretched to the clear offing of sterling wisdom.194 
 
Surely the nineteenth century prose of our translator reads as hyperbolic to us as the Indo-
Persian style must have seemed to him; however, what is evident in this introduction is 
that Abu’l Fazl was considered to be a scholar of the utmost integrity and values—an 
extraordinary and unexpected combination.  I believe that this attitude toward Abu’l Fazl 
helped place Akbar’s court front and center within Orientalist scholarship and helped 
construct an historical imaginary of South Asia for European Orientalist scholars. 
  Of course, the underlying British interest in Mughal rule—especially that of the 
famed Akbar—speaks to their primary role as an empire.  Before British scholars studied 
India, Sanskrit, Hindu traditions, and other South Asian languages and traditions for the 
sake of studying them, the British Empire hired scholars—and in some cases turned East 
India Company employees into scholars—for the express purposes of rule.  The Mughals 
were an empire with all of the machinery of empire: taxes and efficient tax collection; 
standing armies; imperial, militaristic expansion; official languages of court; courtly 
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interest in and sponsorship of arts, literature, and scholarly pursuits; and grandiose 
wealth, with formidable imprints of capital dotted throughout the kingdom.  To inherit or 
conquer such an empire meant to inherit such systems.  The British, as they had done 
elsewhere, aimed to exploit the extant infrastructure for their individual colonizers, the 
colonizing project writ large, and imperial officials ranging from Company workers to 
the Queen herself.   
As a part of the process of learning about the infrastructures of Mughal Empire, 
Akbar and Abu’l Fazl’s detailed Ā’in-i Akbarī must have figured prominently.  The value 
placed upon Akbar’s rule and his courtly scribe’s description thereof is explained nicely 
here: 
In the A’in, therefore, we have a picture of Akbar’s 
government in its several departments, and of its relations 
to the different ranks and mixed races of his subjects.  
Whilst in most Muhammadan histories we hear of the 
endless turmoil of war and dynastical changes, and are only 
reminded of the existence of a people when authors make a 
passing allusion to famines and similar calamities, we have 
in the A’in the governed classes brought to the foreground: 
men live and move before us, and the great questions of the 
time, axioms then believed in, and principles then followed, 
phantoms then chased after, ideas then prevailing, and 
successes then obtained, are placed before our eyes in 
truthful, and therefore vivid, colours.195 
  
Blochmann contends that Abu’l Fazl has accomplished two primary items: first, he has 
provided an accurate depiction of the empire; and, second, he has done so in a manner 
that manages to divulge the character of the people who lived in that time.  In other 
words, he has accomplished a history that imagines subjects as part of that history—that 
is to say, he has taken a humanistic approach.  We should be careful to understand that 
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humanism, as an ideology, is not something that would have existed in South Asia in the 
late sixteenth century; it was a relatively new movement in Europe at the same time.  
More prominently, one of the primary similarities we see in Orientalist work and in 
colonial or imperial writings is the idea that “natives”—past or present, and likely future 
as well—would be incapable of such high-order, progressive, and modern conceptions.  I 
contend that Akbar’s court and his scribe, Abu’l Fazl, are interpreted by Blochmann and 
other Orientalists as distinct and valuable precisely because they do not appear 
premodern, savage, or, frankly and most importantly, Muslim. 
 Blochmann views Abu’l Fazl as wholly different from his Muslim, South Asian 
context(s).  Abu’l Fazl, despite some Persian qualities in his writing, has managed to 
escape his own culture and therefore can be a trustworthy interlocutor, a viable historian, 
and one who provides dependable accounts of Akbar and the Mughals.  Abu’l Fazl plays 
into the Orientalist imaginary by way of negative definition: he is precisely not like his 
counterparts; he is the exception that proves the rule.  Blochmann, Garbe, and their 
contemporaries do not claim that because Abu’l Fazl is a gifted, honest historian of a 
truly notable king that their opinions about Muslims, Mughals and Indians must be 
mistaken.  Rather, they bolster Abu’l Fazl’s accomplishments as evidence that he and his 
king, Akbar, must necessarily be strange aberrations.  Accomplishments aside, Abu’l 
Fazl stands to reify an Orientalist historical imaginary that posits rationality, positivism, 
and egalitarianism as modern, European constructs precisely because he appears so very 
different.  
 Orientalist opinions about Abu’l Fazl may seem an unwarranted divergence from 
our present study.  They are not.  As the British move from collecting data, translating 
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texts, and buying and planting tea to full, expansive, imperial rule of India, the very 
historical imagination of the Mughals come to bear on their policies, procedures, and 
systems.  The colonial and imperial ramifications of understanding the Mughal Empire 
have been the subject of some scholarly debates, many of which focus on the distinction 
between European modes of history and those of their various subjects.  Relevant to my 
purposes here are those case studies which think critically about the mechanisms of 
history and historicity within South Asian or Islamic locations.  One author writes that  
Historical learning and reflection as a necessary step 
towards aristocratic respectability was widely pursued in 
medieval India, where divergent ideas of human nature and 
divine ordinance had come together in the making of an 
Indo-Persianate polity and culture initiated during the 
period of the Sultanate and later exemplified by the Mughal 
regime in India which lasted for well over three hundred 
years.196 
 
I take seriously the fact that Abu’l Fazl considers history and historicity his primary 
concerns; he may mediate these objectives within language that suits his early modern 
period—like using Islamic ideas to support his claims about kingship—but overall his is 
a work concerned with authenticity, import, and the future.  Therefore, I find it to be of 
little surprise that his work, and especially his data-filled appendix, remains vitally 
interesting to modern and contemporary scholars.  In fact, it is fundamentally important 
that his goals and his emperor are taken on and recognized by European scholars, even if 
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their understandings of time, history, and empire were themselves different in meaningful 
and irreconcilable ways.197 
Within the famous 1919 The Oxford History of India, Vincent Smith demonstrates 
the sort of Orientalist imaginary I had mentioned above.  That is, he articulates a 
teleological history of India, wherein the “natural” India was represented by a Hindu-
dominated past; this natural condition was violently changed when the subcontinent was 
usurped by foreign Muslims; and, finally, British imperial conquests serve to both 
liberate Hindus from Muslim clutches as well as bring true civility to the subcontinent.  
This is, of course, part and parcel of the wider Orientalist, colonialist, and imperialist 
models that govern the modern, post-Enlightenment age of empires, and cannot be said to 
have all its roots within Indic or Islamicate writings.  That said, there is ample room for 
connections to be made by the exceptional Akbar; if he is consistently exonerated from 
his genealogy and honored for his forward-mindedness within an otherwise perilously 
harsh, Eurocentric teleology, it is fruitful to explore how and why he is seen as 
incomparable.   
Vincent Smith’s work supposedly takes the reader from “prehistory” in the 
ancient past all the way until 1911, approximately a half-century after the British 
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formally came to rule India.  He mentions Akbar in a free-standing lengthy chapter under 
the heading “The Mughul Empire.”  Akbar is the first king in any period or region 
covered within the Oxford History of India to receive his own treatment; only four 
Mughal kings of all the other kings and dynasties—including that of Queen Victoria—are 
given their own sections and treatment in this manner.198  Noticeably, Akbar’s section is 
the longest given to any king, and within it, Smith first outlines the basics of his coming 
into power; this is told in fairly distant language, where the boundaries of the empire’s 
territory and his coming to the throne are recounted plainly.  But then the tone shifts.  
Smith describes Akbar personally, citing Akbar’s ambitions,199 religious predilections,200 
and relationships to his sons, courtiers, and, interestingly, the Jesuits of his court.201  
When mentioning these personal details, he makes frequent reference to “his [Akbar’s] 
biographer,” who is, of course, Abu’l Fazl.202  What is most fascinating about Smith’s 
account is that he includes a section for Akbar entitled “Akbar’s personal qualities.”203  
Herein, he seems to extemporize on Akbar’s character in way that is unseen elsewhere.  
He writes:  
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[h]e honestly desired to do justice, and did it to the best of 
his ability in the stern fashion of his times, taking 
precautions against the too hasty execution of his 
sentences. … Intellectually, he was a man of boundless 
curiosity, and endowed with extraordinary versatility of 
mind.204  
  
Smith’s otherwise descriptive, distant tone seems in these examples to have been 
betrayed by an affinity for the man. 
Moreover, Abu’l Fazl’s conceptions of sulh-i kull (universal concord) figure 
within Smith’s tome.  He explains the concept to the reader, and then, once again, 
extemporizes in a way unmatched elsewhere in the lengthy work.  He writes: 
The avowed principle of both Abu-l Fazl and Akbar was 
universal toleration (sulh-i kull).  During the latter half of 
the reign that principle was fully applied in favour of 
Hindus, Christians, Jains and Parsis, who enjoyed full 
liberty both of conscience and of public worship.205 
 
Smith seems to write here with more emphasis and vigor than elsewhere.  What is most 
interesting, however, is that in order to cast Akbar as especially intelligent, just, and 
forward-thinking, he strips Akbar of his religion.  According to Smith, Akbar “was never 
thoroughly orthodox,”206 and had an affinity for Sufism—which, importantly, does not 
fall within the broader religious category of Islam.  It is, instead, a mystic tradition and 
that alone; Akbar’s status as a “mystic for all his life” who even “saw visions which 
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seemed to bring him into direct communion with the Unknown God” are not evaluated in 
terms of Islam, but are left simply as monotheistic, mystic affinities.207  
 The outright refusal or tacit elision of Sufi traditions as Islamic traditions is, of 
course, not limited to Smith.  Many have made and some still maintain this claim.  
However, Smith, because he cites Abu’l Fazl throughout his work, must contend with 
Abu’l Fazl’s assertions of Akbar’s religion; in other words, he actively and purposefully 
construes Abu’l Fazl, too, as not Muslim but rather only Sufi.  In this way, Smith stands 
to demonstrate the ways in which Abu’l Fazl’s portrayal of Akbar lends credence to a 
British historical imaginary wherein Akbar’s appearance as modern or enlightened 
demands his status as a Muslim be rethought.  Smith very nicely demonstrates in The 
Oxford History of India as well as in his other major work Akbar, the Great Mogul, 
1542–1605 that he sees Akbar as from his many contexts—Muslim, Mughal, Indic, 
Persian—but not really of them.   
Smith implicitly, if tacitly, suggests that Akbar has qualities of a modern author or 
reader when he writes that Akbar had “a special taste for endless debates on the merits of 
rival religions, which he examined from a strangely detached point of view.”208  Smith 
here accomplishes two things: first, he demonstrates that Akbar’s detachment from the 
often-ferocious debates between religious “rivals” suggests Akbar is not a member of any 
of these sects; and second, Akbar’s ability to maintain distance is “strange” precisely 
because any objectivism in light of his social, political, and cultural locations is 
unfathomable. 
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 Orientalists like Smith may utilize Abu’l Fazl and Akbar to their own devices, but 
it is clear that these two figures factor heavily within the British meaning-making about 
India.  As Garbe noted, Akbar was truly distinctive: there were none other like him, he 
was unequivocally masterful as a leader who overcame his own obstacles—notably, his 
dual Muslim and Mongol lineages—to succeed in leading a progressive blip within 
India’s history.  For Blochmann, our knowledge about Akbar, who was supposedly 
illiterate, itself relies on the steady, trustworthy voice of Abu’l Fazl; while Blochmann, as 
a translator of Abu’l Fazl’s primary works, has obvious personal stakes in this debate, it 
is nevertheless the case that he repeatedly defends and champions the courtly author.  
Abu’l Fazl’s writings are the way by which later generations come to know Akbar at 
all—be they Muslim, Hindu, Mughal, Indian, Pakistani, British, American, or anyone 
else, for that matter.  He is not the only biographer of the emperor; `Abd-ul-Qadir 
Bada'uni was not only an infamous rival of Abu’l Fazl, but an equally infamous critic of 
Abu’l Fazl’s beloved emperor Akbar.  It is Abu’l Fazl’s text, however, that gains political 
and imperial cache to the extent that it is the major source—and in some cases, like that 
of Smith, the only source—that an author cites.  The Ā’in-i Akbarī and the longer 
Akbarnāma are invaluable parts of a British, Orientalist imaginary of South Asia; this 
imaginary guided their rule of India, their rationalizations for rule, and even claims that 
they were to restore the just, egalitarian era of Akbar to the subcontinent.   
Conclusion 
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Abu’l Fazl’s work—informed by Islamic philosophy, Sufism, and other Mughal 
courtly documents209—has great influence on other Indic and Indo-Persian writings.  In 
other words, Abu’l Fazl was not merely paramount to European scholars, but rather his 
work helped shape the very image of the Mughal Empire from the inside out. 
 For one, Abu’l Fazl’s Akbarnāma, while part of a tradition of books about kings 
and kingly rule, shaped those that followed: the Jahangirnāmā (or Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri), an 
autobiography rather than an account, made certain to list in great detail the inner 
workings of the state apparatus, something was previously only done within the account 
of Akbar’s life and times.210  The Akbarnāma itself has a long tradition in India and South 
Asia: it has been translated from Persian into English, of course, but also Hindi, Urdu, 
and, in one abridged version, Sanskrit.211  Moreover, the work accomplished by Abu’l 
Fazl within the whole of the Akbarnāma and within the appendix Ā’in-i Akbarī sets the 
stage for future, similar works that document religions, religious groups, and religious 
names.  In the next chapter, we will explore one such text.  For the purposes of this 
chapter, it has been important to underscore that the ways in which Abu’l Fazl shaped the 
very ability for Akbar to be remembered is what, I have argued, makes this text both 
distinctive fascinating for indigenous histories as well as those of Europeans. 
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 As mentioned above, Abu’l Fazl’s Akbarnāma in its entirety affected not only the 
courtly documents that followed but also the ways in which Akbar’s court and even the 
Mughal Empire came to be imagined.  Abu’l Fazl utilized key ideas from Islamic, Indic, 
Persianate, and even Turko-Mongol and Greco-Hellenic sources in such a way that firmly 
rooted the Mughal Empire and its emperors within antique, celebrated lineages; 
simultaneously, though, he shaped these ideas to purposefully accentuate Mughal ideals.  
One such example was sulh-i kull or universal concord, a guiding ideal of Abu’l Fazl and 
Akbar, and one that still informs the ways in which historians and average folks alike 
look upon his reign.  Akbar is, of course, remembered as just, tolerant, pluralist, 
syncretically minded, and even modern.  Many of these assertions cite the openness it 
required to have enacted policies rooted in achieving “universal reconciliation” between 
the myriad religions, traditions, and sects present in South Asia.  Abu’l Fazl imagined the 
Mughal Empire—and that of Akbar specifically—in terms of sulh-i kull, which was in 
and of itself a novel concept to apply to an entire reign.  In so doing, he fundamentally 
altered the ways in which we are able to recount the actual history of Akbar. 
 Orientalists were quick to label Akbar’s reign as one of the most important in all 
South Asian history.  As evidenced by Smith’s decoupling the era and military pursuits 
from the king; when he describes Akbar in the famous Oxford History of India, Akbar 
gets the longest, most thorough treatment, and is the first king of any era to be listed on 
his own.  Importantly, Smith cites Abu’l Fazl repeatedly in the body of the text, and even 
lists his work first in his closing paragraph, subtitled “Authorities.”212  Further, Smith 
himself writes another full-length volume on Akbar, and therein again sings his praises; 
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however, as mentioned previously, he noticeably and purposefully strips Akbar of his 
Muslim identity in order to explain his seeming progressiveness.213   
 The recollections of Akbar—the histories, legends, and pop culture references—
all speak to an historical imaginary crafted and envisioned in large part by Akbar’s 
biographer, Abu’l Fazl.  Even if Akbar’s commitment to pluralist, open, just ideals is 
overstated, the historicity of such claims has, in many ways, become irrelevant: the ways 
in which Akbar is remembered, recalled, and, indeed, imagined all come to shape later 
ideas about what South Asia was, is, and should be.   
In the next chapter, I will more fully discuss Mathurānāth, the Brahmin pandita 
presented in the introduction, and his proto-ethnographic work Riyāz al-maẓāhib or 
Garden of Religions.  As one who wrote for both the Mughal and British Empires, and as 
one describing the multitude of religions present in Varanasi, India, he will provide a case 
study of depictions of plurality rooted within Islamicate and Persianate terminologies.  
His work articulates not only a description of Varanasi in the early nineteenth century, 
when the city was in flux between Mughal elites and British colonial regents, but also its 
own distinct imaginary.  Like Abu’l Fazl and others before him, Mathurānāth envisions 
India as a place of religion and religions—universal ethics and aesthetics overlaying 
particularities of praxis stated in an inimitably Indic, Islamicate, Persianate vernacular.
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 CHAPTER 3: THE GARDEN OF RELIGIONS: DĪN, UNIVERSALITY, AND 
PARTICULARITY 
 
The introduction to this work began by highlighting 1813 as a pivotal year.  It was 
a year that held significance because, in it, a work entitled Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden 
of Religions was produced.  On its face, this may not seem all that significant: Garden of 
Religions is not—nor ever was, seemingly—some temporal and cultural equivalent of a 
New York Times bestseller.  It was rather a work that I both interpret and present here as 
paradigmatic: sponsored by the British, solicited by an East India Company officer, 
written in Persian with Sanskrit marginalia by a Brahmin who had previously been 
employed by the Mughal court, Garden of Religions materially demonstrates the fluid, 
permeable, and reflexive nature of north Indian boundaries in the nineteenth century.   
The question of boundaries is central to this chapter and, indeed, this work—and 
it is a major reason that 1813 can symbolically represent the nineteenth century politics of 
power, identity, and history.  In the early nineteenth century, the Mughal Empire had 
waned from its geographic and economic prowess of previous centuries; its once-
centralized imperial structure had become more disparate, more distant; and its peripheral 
fiefdoms increasingly acted as individual, lone actors, quite apart from the Mughal reign.  
At the same time, colonial actors—mostly British, though French and Dutch were active 
as well—bought, administered, and inhabited more land; they set up stronger, more 
centralized executive offices; and they capitalized upon the seeming decline of Mughal 
power.  1813, as a pivotal year, is our backdrop; it highlights, foregrounds, and 
underscores the questions of imperial as well as religious belonging. 
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1813 is pivotal not merely because it is the year in which Mathurānāth, Garden of 
Religion’s author, finished the text.  It is also the year in which the British Parliament 
passed the Charter Act.  This Act ended the East India Company’s legitimate, legal 
monopoly over trade in India, and is widely understood as “a significant event in the 
emergence of British commitment to free trade.”214  It is also a moment where global 
history helps us process the opening of trade routes: weary and financially strapped from 
war in the New World—what we Americans call the War of 1812—Britain’s concern 
was to create new markets in its foreign lands, rather than merely understand foreign 
territories as locations for the harvesting of raw materials, including labor.215  In other 
words, 1813 is both the year in which an East India Company official commissioned a 
manuscript on the religions of Benares as well as the year in which the East India 
Company formally loses its monopolization rights; the Company and its primary 
strongholds—including Benares—were in flux, and reflect with British global economic, 
military, and governmental concerns. 
1813 was not merely a year of far-reaching changes in British policies and 
financial self-understanding.  It was also a year in which Mughal kings and kingship were 
still reeling from the dynastic battles, divisions of property and landholdings, and the 
financial and physical encroachment of the British.  What had just a century—even a 
half-century, depending on the historian216—before been a very centralized authority 
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structure was now decentralized, disenfranchised, and in some places authoritative in title 
and symbol only.  After Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707, d. 1707), the vast majority of 
successors to the throne failed to hold power for much longer than a decade, with the 
notable exception of Muhammad Shah (r. 1720-1748).  The eighteenth century saw many 
contestations over power, territory, and, of course, succession: Nadir Shah (d. 1747) from 
Persia and Ahmed Shah Abdali (d. 1773) from Afghanistan led repeated raids on Delhi, 
the Mughal seat of power; Marathas, Nawabs, and Nizams—major groups of elites both 
affiliated with and dissenters of the Mughal central authority—began to voice local 
authority over their princely states; and, as has been mentioned, the colonial presence 
grew in both size and scope.217   
As I have discussed above, I do not necessarily subscribe to a model of history 
that privileges the rise and fall of empires; instead, I take both the formal reign of any 
empire alongside the influences, sources, and legacies of it.  In other words, while the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries mark a period of great flux in the power 
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dynamics, institutions, and formal heads of state, it is remarkably limiting to claim that 
the Mughal Empire ends or falls in 1857, the most traditional end date for the empire.  
Certainly this is not to say that the Mughal Empire continues without Mughals, or 
without individuals identifying as Mughal; this is also not to imply or wrongly suggest by 
extrapolation that all histories are continuously ongoing somehow.  I merely wish to 
indicate that the Mughal Empire’s lasting effects cannot be contained neatly within the 
dates its kings formally controlled armies, land, and imperial establishments.  This 
approach to history is vital both as a theoretical framework, but also as an aspect of data 
collection.  Should we privilege the fall of the Mughals—should we take seriously any of 
the various expiration dates given for their collapse—it would be very difficult indeed to 
recognize the networks of power, influence, prosperity, and administration that remain at 
work well after the genealogy of kings no longer claim thrones. 
It is vital, in fact, to maintain what Finbarr Flood so importantly—and with a 
certain poetry—calls “‘routes not roots’ and ‘networks not territories’” as a 
historiographic approach.218  Flood stresses the importance of interconnectivity between 
the routes that ideas, philosophies, and cultures follow, as opposed to stable, static 
genealogies, lineages, or familial roots in the charting of histories.  Further, he pushes his 
reader to rethink the bounded nature of any given territory as necessarily contiguous, and 
instead focus on networks between and among locations.  This approach is useful and 
fitting in the context of the early nineteenth century because it allows for an 
understanding of Mughal, British, and South Asia—as well as the expanded oceanic and 
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colonial networks—that is necessarily reflexive, conversant, and fluid.219  Therefore, it is 
by pursuing routes and networks that one is able to more fully flesh out the contours of 
cultural, linguistic, religious, and material exchanges, transits, and connections.  In other 
words, Flood’s conceptualization of history in terms of routes and networks is especially 
helpful in avoiding language of rise and fall.  
In turn, avoiding this language helps me avoid an historical model in which 
Islamicate institutions, ideas, legacies, and practices inevitably cease with the advent of 
British authority and control.  As stated above, the colonial period is often read as a 
discrete era in Indic history, one that is utterly dissociated from that which preceded it.  
This model only makes sense in two historical narratives: first, one that imagines the fall 
of the Mughals entirely; and second, one that imagines the British period as extremely 
revolutionary (as in histories that stress modernization and industrialization) or awfully 
foreign (as in histories that credit or blame the British for contemporary realities, issues, 
and hardships).220  Neither of these models tells a rich story, however, between the 
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disruptions and continuities between eras, empires, or communities.  I avoid the language 
of the fall of the Mughal Empire precisely because it obscures continuities between 
Mughal rule and British rule, Mughal elites and British elites, global trends, imperial 
institutions, and—importantly—cultural, religious, and linguistic identities. 
The language of rise and fall clearly overstates the role of ruler in the lives of the 
ruled, but, I argue, also simultaneously understates the role of courtly practices, customs, 
and sensibilities in both elite and non-elite circles.  Specifically, the language of 
Islamicate—the term I borrow from Hodgson and defined above as that which is 
influenced by Muslim actors but is not necessarily religiously “Islamic”221—works nicely 
to underscore the problems with current historical narratives of South Asia.  If we accept 
Hodgson’s definition at its broadest, then the influence of a court ruled by Muslims can 
extend well beyond the rule of Muslims in India.  When the British both inherit and take 
vast swaths of South Asia for their empire, they may have been able to depose the kings, 
queens, and princes, but they certainly did not—and could not—topple all of the cultural, 
religious, linguistic norms.  In this way, Mughal influence—Islamicate and Persianate 
influence—can be said to have continued well into another dynastic era. 
This chapter explores the work Riyāz al-maẓāhib or Garden of Religions as but 
one example of the myriad ways in which the early nineteenth century was a time of 
disruption but also continuity.  I am necessarily more interested in continuities than in 
ruptures given the previous academic stress on the latter.222  The Garden of Religions was 
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produced as part of the process of change and connection between, arguably, the two 
most important dynastic periods in South Asia.  Sponsored by the British but written by a 
former Mughal official, it retains the Mughal courtly language, style, and terminologies. 
Flood calls this process of mutual affectation and reflexivity “transculturation,” 
borrowing the term from Fernando Ortiz,223 stating that it “denotes a complex process of 
transformation unfolding through extended contact between cultures,” and that 
transculturation “has gained currency as a term that emphasized the multidirectional 
nature of exchange.”224  As I will argue below, Mathurānāth translates the city of 
Benares’ religion, religions, and religious identities not just from a local Hindi dialect 
into Persian and Sanskrit for English speakers, but also in so doing translates religion, 
religions, and religious identities themselves.225 
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This chapter explores Garden of Religions as a part of multiple historical 
narratives about religion, religions, and religious identity.  Below, I will discuss how the 
Garden of Religions both nicely demonstrates the construction of religious identities and 
knowledge about religions as well as the ways in which it does so within a lineage of 
Islamicate thought.  Mathurānāth is both author and marshal; he crafts inimitable ideas 
about religion as well as positions ideas that come well before his time within his 
contemporary context.  I will also explore the ways in which Mathurānāth exemplifies—
perhaps personifies—the very concept of Islamicate.  As a Brahmin pandita, fluent in the 
languages of social and religious elites—that is, in Persian and Sanskrit—Mathurānāth 
represents the possibilities inherit in elite culture that do not overstate the role of religion 
or religious difference.  Last, this chapter delves deeply into the ways in which 
Mathurānāth articulates J. Z. Smith’s articulation of the categories of religion, religions, 
and religious—the framework with which I have approached these issues in the South 
Asian context.  In short, I will spend time offering short translations and interpretations of 
Mathurānāth’s categories, terms, and understandings of his world, the religions in it, and 
how those do (and occasionally do not) reflect that which came before.  I borrow, below, 
Smith’s key terms for the thematic structure of this chapter. 
 
A Few Notes on the Manuscript 
 
Before more fully delving into the thematic issues and particular examples Riyāz 
al-maẓāhib highlights, a few words are warranted on the basic structure, content, and 
flow of Mathurānāth’s work itself.  It is a manuscript, and the version from which I will 
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draw selections and information is housed at the British Library.226  Based upon a number 
of manuscript catalogs, I have located only this version and two others; additionally, one 
summary of the text also exists.  One complete manuscript is currently housed at the Raza 
Library in Rampur, India, and another, as well as the summary, at the British Library.227   
To offer a few words on the material nature of the work, physically the 
manuscript from which I am working is not very large; it is approximately five inches by 
seven inches in size (with the text written in approximately four inches by six inches of 
each page), and is comprised of 167 leaves or 334 pages.228  The first fifty-six pages of 
                                                
 
226 Mathurānāth, Riyāz al-maẓāhib. British Library: MS I. O. 3404, 1813. Microform, UNC 
Library, 1-5324, pos 1. Persian. 
 
227 I must credit Carl Ernst for what truly were his serendipitous catalogue finds.  The reference to 
the catalogue listing is: Fihrist-i Makhtutat-i Farsi, Rampur Raza Library (in Persian), ed. 
Imtiyaz `Ali `Arshi et al., introduction by Shayista Khan (Patna: Khudabakhsh Oriental Public 
Library, 1995), p. 43: MS no. 1167 mawjudat, shumar 294H.  NB: While this is listed in the 
library’s catalogue in print and online, numerous attempts while I was in India to visit the library 
and work with the text were met with answers of “the book you are searching for is not here,” 
personal email communications dated 21 May 2011, 12 June 2011, and 7 July 2011.  The second 
is: Riyaz-i al-mazdhib, British Library Add.24035.  This version contains thirty-nine miniatures.  
Despite spending nearly two full work days with a librarian at the British Library, we were each 
unable to locate this second text—one imagines due to the misspelling of both Mathurānāth 
(“Mathsuranath”) and the title (Riyaz-i al-mazdhib).  The abridgement, Kunh-i zat-i majma`-i 
sifat, which is credited to Mathurānāth, also located as a microform at Harvard University: 
Lamont Microforms, Film M 987.  Future research—and the monograph manuscript that will 
come from this dissertation—will hopefully address both of these other manuscripts as well as the 
abridgement. 
 
228 NB: While I have traveled to the British Library and worked with the original manuscript 
(British Library, India Office Collection, MS 3404), I am working directly from a microform of 
the original (UNC Davis Microform 1-5324 pos. 1).  The microform was scanned incorrectly: it 
has been scanned as if it opened like an English-language book, rather than a Persian or Arabic 
work, which is to say it is bound on the wrong side.  Further, there are pages missing, duplicate 
pages, and minor stains in the original have been magnified in the scan, making some pages 
unreadable.  This has created a very convoluted numbering system in the digital copy.  
Furthermore, in the manuscript itself there are penciled in numbers, but these include all bound 
pages, from the blank front pages to the blank end pages.  These penciled in numbers also appear 
on the scanned copy, of course.  Thus, where I number pages for citations, for the sake of clarity I 
have ignored the page numbers written onto the microform digitally.  Instead, I simply begin with 
page 1 as the first page of Mathurānāth’s written text and count forward to avoid any confusion, 
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the work have precisely twelve lines of text each; pages that follow in the text have 
exactly seven.229  The version I interrogate is not illustrated, and is written largely in 
black ink, with some terms, marks, and occasionally whole sentences in red ink; this is 
the autographed copy of the work.  These physical variances within the text will be 
discussed below where important, however it is my contention that in most places there is 
no particular pattern or reason red ink appears as opposed to black ink with one notable 
exception.230   
Mathurānāth’s manuscript follows a number of conventions found in other 
similarly dated Persian manuscripts from South Asia.  He utilizes a catchword—the first 
word from the following page—at the bottom of most leaves to ensure proper binding.  
He writes in the Nasta‘liq script, a hallmark of Indo-Persian manuscripts.  Mathurānāth’s 
text features a colophon, which is a statement about the work’s publication as well as an 
author’s imprint found at the end of a manuscript.231  Further, overlines (lines above the 
text, rather than below it as an underline) appear frequently in both red and black ink.  I 
mention these conventions not only to list features of the singular manuscript—and its 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
contradictory numbers between the digital and penciled versions, and omissions, mis-numberings, 
and missing or repeating pages (of which there are four).  The numbering system I use, therefore, 
is mine, and does not correspond exactly to that available in either the microform or manuscript.  
All errors are mine. 
 
229 Page 56 is marked by another iteration of bismi-llāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm, and therefore acts as 
a new starting point, complete with new page formatting (to borrow a computer-age mode of 
thinking).  This shift will be discussed in great detail below. 
 
230 For example, on some pages Mathurānāth records dates in red, and on others he does not.  The 
exception is in his overlinings: these marks in red nearly always appear at the first mention of a 
new religious group or leader, in addition to a number of other places. 
 
231 Mathurānāth, 335. 
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microform—from which I draw data below in an attempt to make real its physicality to 
the reader, but moreover to demonstrate that Mathurānāth followed established, 
recognizable standards of manuscript writing.  That he follows such standards serves to 
further elucidate his entrenchment within Islamicate systems, institutions, and customs 
writ large.  It also stands as evidence that these conventions were themselves navigated—
perhaps even translated—by and with Mathurānāth’s sponsors, the British.  In fact, one 
illustrative example of the way in which Mathurānāth’s speaks to multiple audiences, 
styles, and histories is his use of dates: while only mentioned once, Mathurānāth lists, 
using Persian digits, the year in which he was commissioned to write the text as 1812, the 
calendar year using the Gregorian dating system.232  Later, on the same page, he also 
includes the hijri date for the commission, 1226.  This indicates, once again, the ways in 
which this text was certainly intended for a British readership but still follows Islamicate 
stylistic norms. 
It is important to note, of course, that Persian is not the only language in 
Mathurānāth’s Garden of Religions.  Sanskrit also features heavily in the early part of the 
work, most often as marginalia.  To be clear, however, the marginalia is not always 
relegated to the physical margins—on a number of occasions, Mathurānāth writes in 
Sanskrit in between the Persian lines, using what could be equated to an editor’s caret.  
This is particularly the case within the first fifty-six pages; 233 in what I am calling the 
second part of the work, Sanskrit appears far less frequently, and when it does, it is in the 
                                                
 
232 Ibid., 4. 
 
233 As examples: Mathurānāth, 3, 6-11. 
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physical margins.234  Here, too, Mathurānāth follows convention, and where his Sanskrit 
appears, it appears as marginalia: whether or not these words, phrases, and even short 
sentences appear in the actual margins, they do not supercede the main Persian text—
there is never a doubt whether or not this is a Persian manuscript as Persian text and 
Persianate conventions are primary.  In other multilingual Persianate works, the 
secondary language appears similarly. 
As illustration, much of the Sanskrit marginalia restates proper names, especially 
place names.  It is reasonable to assume that this is a practical insertion: because Persian 
characters and language do not necessary allow for all of the vowels (and consonants, for 
that matter) to precisely convey the local pronunciation of a given person, place or thing, 
Mathurānāth, like others, both transliterates the noun and then inserts the Sanskrit. As 
Mathurānāth describes his focus on Hindu groups and practices at the very start of the 
text, he lists areas and princely states wherein those groups may be found.  He both 
transliterates the place name and includes, in Devanagari script, the term.  For example, 
he writes: “in the territories of Maharastra and Karnatika…” and below the Persian, 
transliterated place names, writes in Devanagari script, “Maharaṣṭra,” and 
“Karnaṭaka.”235 Given the messiness of the transliteration, it can be assumed that 
Mathurānāth merely wishes to be clear, and therefore explicates the proper nouns with a 
language system that articulates each vowel and the precise consonants.236 
                                                
 
234 Mathurānāth, 78, 97, 135, 188. 
 
235 Ibid., 5. 
 
236Both Persian and Sanskrit have multiple consonants that, in English, we would render with 
one; this, of course, is the purpose of diacritical marks in English, and can be demonstrated by the 
difference in “d,” “ḍ,” and “ḏ.”  These differences are not merely cosmetic or arbitrary, but 
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Apart from the physical and stylistic attributes, overall the manuscript is, in many 
ways, much like an early ethnographic, descriptive text: Mathurānāth spends a good deal 
of the work simply listing what he sees around him, especially in terms of the ways in 
which people of Hindustan generally and Benares specifically were grouped religiously.  
This will be discussed in much greater detail below, but as a structural, content point, it is 
worthwhile to note that many of his descriptions—indeed, his categorizations—are very 
closely aligned to those that we have seen previously in Abu’l Fazl’s Ā’īn-i Akbarī .  
Similarly, the very order of the text is quite like that of Abu’l Fazl as well.  The Ā’īn-i 
Akbarī , as was discussed at length in the last chapter, has a lengthy preface, even though 
it is in actuality an appendix to the already lengthy text, Akbarnama.  Mathurānāth’s 
Riyāz al-maẓāhib also has a lengthy preface—the first fifty-six pages of his work serve 
this very function.   
As a general rule, Mathurānāth does not subtitle what we might call sections of 
the work.  He does mark shifts in focus, however.  Along those lines, what I would term 
the major subheadings for Riyāz al-maẓāhib include references to the types of religions 
(maẓāhib).  Among these, Mathurānāth includes: religions of Hindustan (maẓāhib-i 
Hind); religions of the Sikhs (maẓāhib-i nihang);237 Sufis (ahli ḥāl, lit., the people of 
ecstasy); and ascetics (sadhū).  It is interesting that Mathurānāth differentiates between 
religions of Hindustan and Sikh traditions, as contemporary scholars—let alone 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
typically related to pronunciation (especially in Sanskrit) and occasionally etymology (as in 
Persian words originally from Arabic). 
237 Nihang typically refers to an armed Sikh order, but it is the term that Mathurānāth uses before 
he begins to list Sikh gurus, including, prominently, Nanak and Gobind Singh.  See pp. 83-90. 
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contemporary South Asians—typically list Sikh traditions under the umbrella of South 
Asian religions.  I take Mathurānāth to understand the religions of Hindustan to center 
around broadly Hindu practices, as is evidenced by the luminaries he mentions in those 
sections, including Ramanuja238 and Vallabhāchārya.239  
That being said, this project focuses on but one of the manuscripts, as I have 
mentioned above.  The other known two—one in Rampur and one at the British 
Library—are illustrated editions; the illustrations of the edition at Rampur have been 
cataloged, and indeed may offer a general sense of the text’s construction, order, and 
focus.  In future study, I intend to examine the other manuscripts, and more fully 
explicate the relationship between the textual manuscript in question here and those that 
were illustrated.  The Rampur illustrated manuscript contains thirty-six watercolors, 
composed in the Company style.240  These watercolors were added at the insistence of H. 
H. Wilson for his work, “Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus”—which will be 
discussed in the next chapter—and can therefore be assumed to have been added in later 
editions of the manuscript, possibly written and commissioned between 1813 (the year of 
the original manuscript’s publication) and 1828 (the year of Wilson’s first publication).241 
                                                
 
238 Mathurānāth, 78. 
 
239 Ibid. 
 
240 On Company style, see: Victoria and Albert Museum, Mildred Archer, and Graham Parlett. 
Company Paintings: Indian Paintings of the British Period (London: The Museum, 1992); Yale 
Center for British Art, and Morna O'Neill. Company Culture: British Artists and the East India 
Company 1770-1830 (New Haven: Yale Center for British Art, 2003). 
 
241 W.H. Siddiqi, Catalogue of the exhibition of paintings of Rampur Raza Library : held at India 
International Centre, New Delhi on 6th-12th October, 2006 in collaboration with IIC (Rampur : 
Rampur Raza Library, 2007), 119. 
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Simply to illustrate the types of figures, themes, and groups Mathurānāth portrays, 
I will briefly both list and discuss the depictions found within the Rampur manuscript.  
They tend to follow, broadly speaking, two major trends: images of major historical 
religious figures and images of contemporary religious figures.  In the first category, a 
number of very prominent, recognizable figures appear.  For example, Rāmānuja, the 
eleventh century Vedantic philosopher, is specifically mentioned in the text, and is the 
first illustration within the Rampur manuscript.242  Similarly, Vallabhāchārya, fifteenth 
century Vedantic philosopher, also has his imagined likeness appear within the early 
parts of the Rampur edition.   
While both of these figures are prominent Vedantists, they are not necessarily part 
of the same interpretive tradition; where Mathurānāth’s taxonomies and explications 
shine, in fact, is in illuminating the differences between orders, sects, and traditions.  
Rāmānuja is widely understood as the main proponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita, or qualified non-
dualism; this school of thought understands Brahman (the supreme, underlying essence) 
as singular, but evident in its multiplicity.  Typically, we can compare this school to 
qualified monism.  Practically, however, it tends to indicate a belief in one supreme 
essence that is evident in the form of a particular diety, typically Vishnu..  
Vallabhāchārya, on the other hand, is remembered as a major figure within the 
development of advaita or non-dualist philosophy; he therefore imagined no other reality 
beyond Brahman, and thus no difference between the supreme essence and other other 
entity.  In both cases, the men come to be deeply tied to the schools of thought they 
helped create and propigate; though different—and even rival—schools of thought, both 
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men are undoubtedly influential within the development of Hindu practice, theology, and 
philosophy. 
But philosophers are not the only historic religious figures that Mathurānāth 
outlines in the text in question here, nor are they the only personalities chosen for 
illustration in the Rampur manuscript.  Religious luminaries like Kabir, the fifteenth 
century poet, appear early on in both works as well.  Kabir’s poetry is most often 
described as iconoclastic and anti-religious; he routinely demands that his readers and 
listeners move beyond limited, specific, and privatized forms of God—calling, by name, 
upon Muslims and Hindus to rid themselves of sectarian names and practices. 
The other category of figures included both in the text and in illustration are those 
of local, contemporary import.  This is not to say that they are less important than the 
historic figures; indeed, if Mathurānāth found them worthy of mentioning in the same 
text, it stands to reason that they were envisioned by him in a similar light: vital, 
symbolic of a given trend or group, or popular.  In the Rampur manuscript, a number of 
these local figures are illustrated, including: Vāmī, Kaḍalingī, and Rukhad, each of 
which dons attire that marks their particular ascetic lineage and caste.243  Interestingly, at 
least one figure is locally important and historically influential.  Mathurānāth describes 
Ramānanda, and Wilson presumably asks that his illustration is included.  Ramānanda 
was based in Benares in the early fifteenth century, and is widely considered a leading 
figure in the bhakti or devotional movement that swept north Indian religious practice in 
the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries.  Unlike Rāmānuja and Vallabhāchārya, 
Ramānanda was specifically committed to one particular deity, Vishnu, above all others 
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and at the insistence of his preeminence; in other words, he was a Benares-based 
Vaishnava, much like we assume Mathurānāth to be.  Unlike some other historic figures, 
Ramānanda wrote in Hindi instead of Sanskrit, demonstrating one of the trends of the 
bhakti movement—the prioritization of vernacular expression—as well as the ways in 
which he was both historically influential and locally revered. 
The illustrated manuscript will be a source of great information when I am able to 
expand the current project to include it.  While I do have access to the catalog of thirty-
six illustrations that span historic and local religious figures of note, it should be 
mentioned that in the textual manuscript, Mathurānāth does not call or subtitle these 
pages as such.  This is to say that these categories appear to be at play, but are not 
explicitly stated by our author.  Likewise, there is no indication in his work that he has 
purposefully written an introduction as opposed or in contrast to the body of the work.  
Rather, these are distinctions and labels I use to make intelligible the format, structure, 
and content of the work.  The first section, comprised of these fifty-six pages, explains 
the sponsorship of the work, the city in which it was produced, and the unique contours 
of religion in Hindustan broadly and within that city.  Specific points and general themes 
of the content of the text will be explored in depth below, but for now it is important 
merely to note that Mathurānāth, like Abu’l Fazl before him, writes what might rightfully 
be termed a preface or an introduction to his exploration of categories.  This appears to be 
supported, as well, by the appearance of illustrations in the Rampur manuscript: the 
illustrated manuscript found in Rampur does not contain any illustrations before the 
thirty-first page, which might correspond to the fifty-six page “preface” I have indicated. 
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As I mention these categories of religion, it is time to make note of a few general 
trends employed by Mathurānāth.  Based upon his work’s title, it is clear that he is 
concerned with religion and the divisions within religions.  Using the academic and 
theoretical language of imaginaries developed in chapter 2, I argue that Mathurānāth’s 
work imagines Benares as his titular garden of religions; he takes great pains to describe, 
with a lot of detail, the rich, multi-religious landscape of the city.  For him, it seems, both 
Hindustan on the whole and Benares in particular are not merely places wherein 
individuals practice religion.  Instead, Benares is a site of perfected, contested, and 
convoluted religious identities, all of which speak to the idea of universal religion, both in 
favor of such a conception and against it.244 
Throughout the Garden of Religions, Mathurānāth typically oscillates between 
two ideas: first, that religion is something universally held as important and possessed by 
all individuals; and, second, that most individuals follow a religion or religious leader.  
This last point is fairly complex, and, again, will be given a detailed, full treatment below 
by way of textual examples.  For the purpose of a broad overview, it is sufficient to 
mention that Mathurānāth lists Islam and Christianity as the only major religions that we 
would recognize; while he himself is a Brahmin, he only very rarely uses the term 
“Hindu.”  Of course, the term “Hinduism,” a grammatical construction based on Greek 
and Latin forms is not present within the Persian and Sanskrit work.245  Instead, when 
                                                
 
244 I should note that the first noun of the title, riyaz, is actually the plural of rauẓat.  All 
manuscript categories, however, translate the title as “garden” singular.  Steingass follows this, 
and notes that “rauẓat” is the singular, but riyaz is the “p[lural], often used as s[ingular].” 
 
245 Scholars have debated whether or not the British invented Hinduism, as has been discussed in 
earlier chapters.  I am uninterested in that question in this work, but merely point out that 
Mathurānāth does not use the term “ Hinduism,” as it is a necessarily foreign term.  Instead, he 
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referring to groups we may very well recognize as Hindu, he uses caste and jāti 
distinctions (e.g. Brahmin, chamar)246, or, equally often, he refers to a swami, guru, pir or 
other religious elder as a leader of a “religion” and, therefore, his followers as members 
of that elder’s group.  It is clear that at many points, Mathurānāth’s sense of what or who 
someone was or to what group someone belonged likely differed radically from how that 
agent may have described himself; further, by no means should we take his description as 
a complete or even robust understanding of early nineteenth century Benares.247    
Despite what looks like other early modern attempts at what we might call an 
early demography and even in light of its proto-ethnographic style, the Garden of 
Religions does not boast a scientifically precise structure; his work resembles many that 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
seldom uses “Hindu,” but more frequently refers to those individuals we might today recognize as 
Hindus by their caste affiliations. 
 
246 Caste (varṇa) typically refers to the four (or five) tier system of brāhmaṇaħ (Brahmins or 
priests), kṣatriya (warriors or kings), vaiśya (merchants), śūdra (laborers or artisans) and/or 
untouchables.  Some argue that the śūdra caste contains within it untouchables, others that 
untouchables are necessarily outside the caste system entirely (hence their untouchability).  Jātis 
or jāts are the myriad communities that make up a particular caste, and can be centered around 
traditional job (e.g. a chamar was a leather tanner), language (a dialect of Hindi as compared to 
another, say), or even particular religious belief (as in the case of Sri Vaisṇavas).  It is estimated 
that the jāti system can allow for hundreds of affiliations in any one location, and that the 
valuation of a given jāti can change from region to region.  For example, one might find fishers to 
be highly valued along the coast, but greatly devalued inland.  A monograph on the subject is: Bal 
Kishan Dabas, The Political and Social History of the Jats (Delhi: Sanjay Prakashan, 2001). 
 
247 Certainly early 19th century Benares included women, both in and out of the public sphere.  
However, Mathurānāth entirely references only the practices, appearances, and categorizations of 
men.  I do not wish to indicate that women, women’s practices, and women’s religious identities 
were irrelevant, but in the context of this work—and, alas, among many of this period—the 
primary source material simply does not lend itself to interpretations or understandings of 
women’s roles.  Further, as will be discussed in depth below, Mathurānāth is labeling people from 
afar; his categorical choices are interesting and the focus of this book, but they are not to be taken 
to be based upon agential self-reporting in any manner.  
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come from the early modern and modern periods, but it is not a formal treatise on the 
religions of India, meant to be read with such an eye.  He is, of course, sponsored by the 
British but not necessarily of that system.  Much as Mathurānāth follows many formal 
Persianate writing styles and forms, his work also begins in a way that reflects his 
Mughal, Islamicate acculturation.  His manuscript begins with the classic formulation and 
invocation “bismi-llāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm,” which is typically rendered as “in the name 
of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.”248  And, where his text shifts from twelve lines 
to seven—where he finishes the first major section and moves to the second—he 
reiterates the phrase “bismi-llāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm.”249  On the surface, we might not 
expect such a formulation given the author (a Brahmin priest) and sponsor (the British 
East India Company), but if we understand this work as produced within the networks of 
Mughal, Islamicate elite, such an opening invocation can be seen as anything from 
culturally relevant to linguistically appropriate to appropriation to cultural norm; the fact 
that Hindu authors commonly praised God and the Prophet Muhammad becomes fully 
understandable as a part of these networks.  
That Mathurānāth uses the bismillāh, the Arabic-cum-Persian praise of God, is 
notable beyond its mere existence.  As a Brahmin pandita, Mathurānāth surely would 
have known Sanskritic invocations that may have better lined up with his particular 
religious identity or personal predilections. He neither includes a Sanskrit invocation 
outright instead of the Arabic prayer, nor does he include a Sanskrit invocation anywhere 
within the work, even in places of less prominence than an introduction or in locations 
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that might be contextually apt, like where he lists Hindu temples.  However, that he does 
not include a Sanskrit invocation within a primarily Persian-language and Persianate text 
is not altogether surprising.  Additionally, given that Garden of Religions was sponsored 
by and written for the express and singular use of the British, it even stands to reason that 
Mathurānāth could have dropped the Muslim prayer altogether as neither party, 
presumably, had much invested in such a devotional pronouncement.  But Mathurānāth 
does include the bismillāh twice, both times using it as a marker of a new section of his 
work.  His choice to include such a hallmark of Muslim manuscripts even though he 
himself was not Muslim and neither were the sponsors of this text robustly expresses the 
depth to which Islamicate norms and mores dictate proper composition, comportment, 
and even inform the very modes of thinking at work in the text itself. 
Mathurānāth’s work continues in a way that also reflects those works that predate 
his own: he thanks and praises his sponsor, Robert John Glyn, and the East India 
Company, and then goes on to praise what I understand to be local elites of Benares, 
including, primarily, the title “nawab.”250  In other words, he thanks both the formal 
sponsor and economic powerhouse by name (Glyn) and office (East India Company) as 
well as the cultural and historical ruling elite (the nawab).251  In its first few pages, 
                                                
 
250 “Robert John Glyn” is the English spelling, of course. Mathurānāth has transliterated this 
name into Persian characters; rendering the English name in transliterated text here seems 
uncalled for and clunky, at best.  Nawab is typically rendered historically and linguistically as a 
Muslim ruling prince; it is sometimes also seen written in northern India as nabob.  Nawab comes 
from the Arabic singular na’ib or viceroy, governor. 
 
251 In a few other places, Mathurānāth also references individuals with the honorific title “niẓām.” 
Typically, this was a title bestowed by a higher-ranking noble, most often a vizier, to a lower one, 
and it formalized a connection to and some leadership in the ruling elite system.  In its South 
Asian usage, this title is most often associated with niẓāmat states in southern India, especially 
that of Hyderabad, but the title is found in other Islamicate areas like the Ottoman Empire. 
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Mathurānāth’s composition both reflects and acknowledges the conflated, overlapping 
sense of rule present in early nineteenth century north India writ large, and Benares in 
particular. 
The manuscript serves as an example of Persianate, Islamicate texts because it 
draws upon the style, form, terminologies, and general worldview of those texts that 
precede it.  Further, it serves as an example of the flux in the early nineteenth century 
politics, power dynamics, and religious identity. Mathurānāth utilizes taxonomies of 
religious sects fully present in Abu’l Fazl’s seminal Ā’īn-i Akbarī , and he presents them 
to his British sponsor factually; in other words, Mathurānāth’s exposition on religion, 
religions, and religious affiliations draws upon extant systems of taxonomy and 
repackages them for a new imperial sponsor.  To paint in broad strokes—and maintain 
the titular metaphor—the Garden of Religions is Mathurānāth’s depiction of the 
flowering, survival, and harvest of the religious crop of Benares.   
Having spelled out some of the physical, textual, and technical aspects of his 
work, I will use J. Z. Smith’s formulation “religion, religions, religious” to guide the 
interpretation of the work.  Without question, J. Z. Smith’s work is seminal, but that does 
not make it beyond reproach.  Without fully embracing all of the text’s problems—as 
have been discussed extensively above—I do support his formulation of religion, 
religions, and religious as a clever, helpful, and important use of vocabulary as 
theoretical construction.  Smith articulates religion as universal; religions as the myriad 
attempts at religion; and religious as the focus upon the universal.252  I expand his 
                                                
 
252 J. Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” in Mark C. Taylor, ed., Critical Terms for 
Religious Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 281. 
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adjectival “religious” to “religious identity,” arguing that the social, group dynamic as 
well as the categorization of belonging is as important as the individualized practice.   
Mathurānāth, interestingly enough, utilizes similar conceptualizations, though in a 
manner that nearly unravels Smith’s ultimate conclusion.  Smith argues that 
“Religion” is not a native category.  It is not a first person 
term of self-characterization.  It is a category imposed from 
the outside on some aspect of native culture.  It is the other, 
in these instances colonialists, who are solely responsible 
for the content of the term.253 
 
Smith thus contends that religion is necessarily always foreign given its largely Christian, 
definitely European formulation and deployment elsewhere in the world.  But I will 
demonstrate below that Mathurānāth cites, employs, and advocates corollary 
understandings of  “religion,” especially as universal; particular religions; and 
taxonomies of religious groups.  Even if the word “religion” is neither Persian nor 
Sanskrit, the idea and even ideology it represents is no more foreign to South Asia than 
Mathurānāth himself. 
 
Religion 
 
 Some fifty years ago, Wilfred Cantwell Smith wrote the The Meaning and End of 
Religion.254  In it, he articulates a strong critique of the study of religion, and the ways in 
which it had, to date, been studied.  Specifically, he takes to task the very term “religion” 
and the ways in which scholars have asked fundamental questions about it, writing 
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254 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the Religious 
Traditions of Mankind (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962). 
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[r]ather than addressing ourselves to the problem ‘What is 
the nature of religion?’, I suggest that an understanding of 
the variegated and evolving religious situation of mankind 
can proceed, and indeed perhaps proceed only, if that 
question in that form be set aside or dropped, as inapt.255 
 
W. C. Smith finds it plainly wrong to ask questions about the nature of religion writ large 
and specific religions—these questions are “inapt.”  He continues on, very bluntly 
arguing that 
[n]either religion in general nor any one of the religions, I 
will contend, is in itself an intelligible entity, a valid object 
of inquiry, or of concern either for the scholar or the man of 
faith.256 
 
There can be no mistaking his language here: W. C. Smith does not consider religion to 
be fully knowable, and he doubts rather strongly the ability for the concept and construct 
of “religion” to be a delimited, delineated subject of study. 
 While I have already discussed arguments about religion as a category in previous 
chapters, and have even contended with critiques of W. C. Smith himself,257 it is 
nevertheless important to reiterate the strength of Smith’s argument as it continues to 
have reverberations today.  Smith rightfully points to the myriad definitions, scopes, and 
disciplines that contend with—or claim to contend with—religion, and he notes that few 
scholars have come up with a meaningful definition of their subject; indeed, ultimately, 
Smith argues that no one definition of religion is possible.258  This line of reasoning is 
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remarkably similar to that of Timothy Fitzgerald and Russell McCutcheon, among 
others.259  Importantly, however, W. C. Smith does not merely disregard “religion” as a 
category because of the ways in which scholars have studied it; he is, in many ways, 
equally interested and frustrated by the conceptualization and reality of a man of faith’s 
perception, use, and misuse of the term as well.   
In the abovementioned quote, Smith condemns both scholar and faithful person 
for his assumption that the category of religion writ large or any specific religion may be 
understood in its entirety.  For contemporary critics, the person of faith—and I should 
hope those scholars would include women in their pronouns and schemas—does not 
factor into the equation at all.  Fitzgerald and McCutcheon are primarily and perhaps 
solely interested in the discipline of religious studies as it creates, constructs, and moves 
definitions of its object(s) of inquiry.  Nowhere in their evaluation of the field do the 
other usages of the term—that of the laity, the uninitiated non-academics, if I may—
come into play.   
In some critiques of the field of religion, especially in the case of Islam, scholars 
do in fact demand for a rethinking of the subject.  Some of these works, however, posit 
scholarly opinions alongside insider appeals for change.  Famous, perhaps, is the work of 
Fazlur Rahman, who sought to describe the phenomena of modernity and modernism 
within Muslim practice and thought, but simultaneously posited what was “appropriate” 
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or “good” religion.260  Mohammad Arkoun has bluntly called for the reinstitution of 
ijtihad or interpretation, linking the legacies of Orientalism to stagnant processes within 
Muslim thought.  The problems of such a position are manifold, but suffice it to say here 
that Arkoun takes seriously the negative, lasting impact of Euro-American systemization 
of religion that necessarily excluded and derided Islam, but finds a solution to the 
problem in thinking and rethinking Islam.  He writes that his paper 
argues for a new ijtihad for Muslim as well as non- Muslim 
scholars to initiate a process of new thinking on Islam with 
tools such as history of thought rather than political events 
or fixed parameters; to make unthinkable notions—a 
historical rather than a religious postulate—thinkable; and 
to relate secularism, religion, and culture to contemporary 
challenges rather than substituting one for the other.261 
 
Arkoun therefore argues that the way around the problem of “religion” and the epistemic 
violence it does to Islam as a category, faith, and identity marker for both groups and 
individuals is for Muslims and non-Muslims alike to “modernize” how they imagine 
Islam.   
 The poles presented as ways by which to deal with the problem of “religion” as a 
category vis-à-vis Islam in particular are fairly unhelpful.  On the one hand, scholars like 
Fitzgerald, McCutcheon and, though to a lesser degree, W. C. Smith call for the term and 
the category, field of inquiry, and discipline it stands for to go the way of the dinosaur.  
Scholars like Rahman and Arkoun, on the other, want to dismantle the Orientalist 
methodologies inherent in the study of religion by way of reforming, changing, 
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modernizing, or rethinking Islam from the inside out.  The former group’s desire to 
dismantle the category ignores the ways in which actual practitioners utilize and value the 
term “religion;” the latter group’s emphasis on reform strikes an inharmonious tone 
between studying subjects and changing a subject’s tune altogether.   
W. C. Smith, though, provides a middle ground later on in his work.  As 
evidenced in the abovementioned quote, he takes seriously and in many places within The 
Meaning and End of Religion locates the practitioner as central, thereby giving voice to 
those who find meaning in “religion” and those—like himself—who find the category 
problematic.  It is the intertwined relationship of religion to academic and “man of faith” 
that is most viable for this study given the particular nature of our genealogy of 
interlocutors.  Mathurānāth, as the interlocutor in focus here, reflects a middle ground 
within the critiques of “religion:” he uses a corollary term “dīn” in various ways, 
providing another parallel between Euro-American debates about “religion” and the 
discourse in and about South Asian religion/s; and he thinks and rethinks religion and 
religions as he describes Benares.  He makes claims, as we will see shortly, about 
universality, particularity, and even identity that do not lend themselves to readings of 
“religion” as either foreign or imposed, but certainly as multifaceted, complex, and 
contested. 
While most contemporary critics of religion or of Smith focus on the introductory, 
theoretical aspects of The Meaning and End of Religion, I take his work in the same book 
on Islam to be of equal significance.  Throughout the work, and especially in the fourth 
chapter,262 Smith takes great pains to mark Islam as necessarily different from other 
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religions as well as remarkably similar in other ways.  The purpose herein seems to be to 
examine the limits of universality, while also noting the “non-Western” understandings of 
the same concept apart from the colonial experience/encounter.  He spends a good deal 
of time linking religious terminologies to proof texts, largely in an attempt to root 
Muslim understandings of their own religion and its relationship to other religions from 
the time of its origins.  He notes that “Islam” is itself a word mentioned in the Qur’an, 
making it a religion engaged in a process, immediately upon inception, of self-naming.263  
This line of reasoning stems from Smith’s focus on the wobbly nature of religion 
precisely because of the frequency with which outsiders name insiders, as is the case with 
Jews, Christians, and Hindus.  He argues that Muslims, because they are engaged in self-
labeling from the start, have a more delimited sense of religion and religious identity. 
 More importantly, though, his specific focus on Islam in The Meaning and End of 
Religion highlights a corollary to the term “religion,” and it is this term—and argument—
that holds the most importance for the present work. Despite some fifty years having 
passed, Smith’s work remains the most comprehensive, focused study of the term “dīn” 
and its relationship to the term “religion,” as well as the study of religion in the Euro-
American academy.  Smith notes that not only does the Qur’an name religion for 
Muslims and in terms of propriety and singularity,264 but the way in which the Qur’an 
names religion is both overarching and vernacular—and, above all else, it has a word for 
religion.    
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Dīn or “religion” in both Arabic and Persian is the term in question.  Smith writes 
that dīn 
is used in all the various sense of its Western counterpart.  
It carries the sense of personal religion: the classical 
dictionaries give wara`, ‘piety’ as an equivalent, a word 
that never has a systematic or a community meaning and 
that cannot have a plural. It carries also, however, the sense 
of a particular religious system, one ‘religion’ as distinct 
from another.  In this sense it has a plural (adyan).  This 
plural is not in the Qur’an, but is traditional.  Furthermore, 
the word in its systematic sense can be used both ideally 
and objectively, of one’s own religion and of other 
people’s, the true religion and false ones.265 
 
Smith articulates dīn as traditionally singular, referring to both the true religion (in this 
case, of course, Islam) and other, “false” ones.  What is most important, however, is that 
Smith understands and rightfully points out that dīn functions in very similar ways as 
does “religion.”  Despite its publication fifty years ago, Smith’s chapter about “religion” 
and Islam, and its particular focus on the term “dīn” remains one of the only meaningful, 
complete, and robust interrogations of the subject.  This is important not only because 
Smith demonstrates a corollary term and provides a linguistic and cultural pathway to 
investigate corresponding ideas between supposedly Western and non-Western ideas.  In 
the particular context of this book, Smith’s study of religion and of dīn is vital because 
dīn is, in fact, the term Mathurānāth uses most frequently when he refers to religion. 
  Mathurānāth uses the word dīn approximately forty-five times in the entirety of 
Riyāz al-maẓāhib.266  Even though this is a numerical approximation, there is no other 
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term that appears as often; the term maẓhab (the singular of the titular maẓāhib) takes 
second place for number of appearances with approximately thirty, including both the 
singular or the plural variations of the term.  As Smith points out, dīn is both singular and 
universal as well as emblematic of one (true) religion among many (presumably false 
ones).  The former is the sense of the term Mathurānāth most often uses, and the use of 
dīn as universal certainly begs our attention.     
While Garden of Religions is by no means a treatise on universal religion, 
Mathurānāth curiously invokes universality in a number peripheral ways that indicate it is 
a underlying idea within his work.  For example, he writes:  
In Benares, all men are pious [pārsā], and all upright 
[āzāda-dil] men have religion [dīn].267 
 
His use of broad inclusive terms like “all” is interesting given his own background, that 
of his present and former patrons, and the subject of his work.  He does not, for example, 
paint only Christians or only monotheists as “upright men” who “have religion” in light 
of his British sponsors; similarly, he also does not articulate a preference for Islam or 
Muslims as properly upright given his history with the Mughal Empire and direct 
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invocation of Allah in two places in the work.  Instead, he seems to imagine “good” men 
as men with religion.   
It seems we could read this in two ways: first, good men are religious, pious men; 
and second, religion is a quality of personhood—that is, because they are men, they have 
religion.  In either scenario, dīn functions here as a universal concept: it is applicable to 
all men, be they Muslim, followers of a particular swami, Christians, or Brahmins.  I 
must underscore that for Mathurānāth dīn is employed in a variety of situations, and not 
only in those which feature the so-called “big T” Traditions like Islam or Christianity or 
even Brahmanism.  As but one example, Mathurānāth writes: 
In this quarter of the beautiful city, one who looks may 
find, indeed, many pious [pārsā] followers of the Guru 
Ravananda, whose religion [dīn] is strong [mutaqawī].268 
 
Guru Ravananda’s history and background are unknown to me, and his mention in the 
text is fleeting.269  Nevertheless, he and his followers are recorded by Mathurānāth, and 
stand to demonstrate the complex religious milieu of Benares in the early nineteenth 
century.  Furthermore, Guru Ravananda is a standalone guru of no given religious 
affiliation; Mathurānāth does not list his assumed caste or jāt, nor does he attribute his 
status to that of a pandita or yogi.  He does, however, use the term “dīn” in his 
description.  Dīn, and one’s possession of it, does not only apply to recognizable religious 
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systems or institutions, but also to those unique, unfettered individuals that feature within 
Mathurānāth’s text.   
 Here again, W. C. Smith’s gloss of the term dīn proves valuable. Mathurānāth 
characterizes upright, pious men as those with religion; he also labels the followers of 
unaffiliated gurus, swamis, and shaykhs as having religion, even if he does not 
simultaneously apply an umbrella, “Great Tradition” category to these individuals and 
their followers.  He therefore uses dīn in a way that Smith theorizes is possible.  Smith 
remarks that dīn 
is used, finally, of religious as a generic universal, in both 
senses: as generalizing personal religiousness or human 
piety at large, and as generalizing the various systematic 
religions as ideological or sociological structures.270 
 
Smith’s understanding of the term dīn is surprisingly close to the way in which 
Mathurānāth uses it.  At once, it describes a broad personal piety as well as a system in 
which that piety exists.  Mathurānāth consistently uses the term across a wide variety of 
religious actors who are described in terms of their differences but are not assumed to be 
differently pious.  In other words, dīn for Mathurānāth is that which all individuals 
partake in, even if their specific means of participation are diverse.   
I do not mean to imply that he is some sort of pluralist before such a concept 
meaningfully exists, but I do wish to highlight the ways in which dīn functions as a 
universal in terms of both religiosity and the structure within which religions can be 
classified.  This, I believe, is further supported by Mathurānāth’s use of the term niẓam 
(system).  Once again, W. C. Smith is on point here, as he argues that the use of the 
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language of system (niẓam) in conjunction with that of religion (dīn) reveals a corollary, 
Muslim or—in the case of Mathurānāth—Islamicate use, conceptualization, and 
taxonomy of religion.271  Mathurānāth employs the term niẓam in a number of locations, 
and typically does so in such a way that locates an individual actor within an overarching 
tradition.  For example, when he mentions a shaykh called Salim ud-Din from Benares 
and his followers, he writes that he is a part of the system of Islam (niẓam-i islām).272 
 That Mathurānāth employs terms both for the universal system of religion and for 
the universal applicability of religion begs a few questions, not the least of which is: what 
does this mean for the study of religion writ large?  As this chapter progresses, and as we 
more fully uncover and delve into Mathurānāth’s text, it will be an important question to 
which I will return frequently.  At this stage, it calls for a generalized attempt at an 
answer: like W. C. Smith, I posit that the term “religion” as it is currently used and 
understood is far less robust than would be desirable.  I similarly concur that a history of 
“religion” that only focuses on the Euro-American academy’s study thereof, or on a 
history that traces terms only through their Latin etymologies, is, by definition, more 
pithy than is appropriate.  
Mathurānāth’s use of dīn as indisputably universal stands as evidence not, as W. 
C. Smith would hold, to dismantle “religion,” but rather to push back on such destruction.  
Mathurānāth’s dīn demonstrates, if nothing else, that universality and the specific 
universality of religion is not the private property of one intellectual tradition.  Further, 
given his role as courtly scribe and East India Company hire, can we even state that the 
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universality of religion is the private property of European power structures?  Instead, 
Mathurānāth’s text and usage of dīn in light of his connections to multiple imperial 
powers demands that we reevaluate what we mean by “universal” and who we imagine to 
be able to participate within it. 
 Of course, while Mathurānāth uses dīn in an inclusive manner—all have access to 
or fundamentally are part of religion—this does not necessarily mean all use the term 
similarly.  As James Laine points out, just as “religion” fluctuates and shifts given period, 
speaker/author, or purpose, so too does the term “dīn.”273  While it is neither the purpose 
of this study nor within its current scope to trace the complete history of the term dīn 
across time and space in all Muslim or Islamicate writings, it is nevertheless appropriate 
to mention that the way Mathurānāth deploys the term is both part of a long-standing 
conceptualization and a distinguishing feature of his work.  As I have mentioned, 
Mathurānāth draws upon taxonomies of religion that most readily reflect Abu’l Fazl’s 
magnum opus, Ā’īn-i Akbarī; Abu’l Fazl’s work itself, of course, reflects the older 
treatises by Shahrastānī, Abu al-Ma`ali, and Bīrūnī.  He is, no doubt, part of an Islamicate 
genealogy and that his taxonomies draw upon it.  This should not suggest that 
Mathurānāth does stray from those that precede him, though.   
In what I have called his introduction, Mathurānāth writes:  
“The religion [dīn] of Benares fortuitously is plentiful, and 
this has never changed; should this ever change, the city 
would become altered in a manner unfitting.”274   
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Here, he characterizes Benares as a city with plenty of religions, but uses the singular dīn; 
Abu al-Ma`ali, for example, frequently used the plural of dīn, adyan in these 
circumstances.  Mathurānāth, in my reading of Garden of Religions, does not employ the 
plural of dīn once.  I read this as Mathurānāth applying the term religion as universal in a 
distinctive way—for him, Benares has a religion, it is a characteristic of the city itself.  
Yet he continues on in the work to list the myriad religions (maẓāhib) of that city.  When 
Mathurānāth refers to dīn, it is most often like the abovementioned example: he uses the 
singular, and does so in a manner that implies ubiquity.  On the other hand, when 
Mathurānāth indicates “religions,” he most often uses the term in his title, maẓāhib.  In 
other words, I argue that while Mathurānāth utilizes dīn in ways that have important 
precedents, because he never pluralizes the term, he fundamentally uses it to indicate 
universality.  This is a distinctive and important contribution of his writing. 
 However, Mathurānāth does not only write about religion in its universal form.  
He spends most of the text dealing with the religions of Benares and the individuals that 
adhere to them, and it is to these aspects of Garden of Religions I will turn to next. 
 
Religions 
 
 Mathurānāth does not only discuss religion as a broad concept, a general category, 
or a specific, universal phenomenon.  He talks about specific religions, as well.  In fact, 
the majority of his work deals with religions and, as will be seen below, religious groups.  
As I mentioned above, he does not pluralize the term “dīn” to “adyan” in order to discuss 
 173 
religions, he instead prefers the term featured in his title maẓāhib.275  Most of the 
descriptions of religions he offers in Garden of Religions fit rather well with those 
Islamicate, Persian texts that precede his work and time period.  He, for example, makes 
a note of Muslims’ practice, some Sufi orders, presence of legal schools in Benares, and 
also the presence of individual shaykhs or pirs.276  Similarly, he makes frequent note of 
Brahmin panditas, specific gurus, yogis, or swamis, and mentions a number of devotional 
temples.277  In no uncertain terms, Mathurānāth locates a number of religions and 
religious groups within umbrella terms, in a way that resembles both the taxonomies of 
Shahrastānī, among others, and some contemporary Euro-American categorizations.   
 Quite often, we imagine the problem of “religion” or religious studies as a field to 
be either related to religion’s assumed universality, as discussed above, or to the seeming 
infinite number of religions possible.  The famous logical endpoint of this particular line 
of reasoning is “Sheilaism,” the hyper-individualized, extremely individualistic personal 
religion of Sheila Larson, as mentioned in Robert Bellah’s classic Habits of the Heart.278  
If so many worldviews, ideas, philosophies, and practices can each be a religion, and if 
each religion can in turn look radically different from another, the question Sheilaism 
puts forth is: How do scholars—or practitioners, for that matter—meaningfully identify a 
discrete, delimited object of study or marker of identity?   
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J. Z. Smith most beneficially and eloquently describes the problem of “religions” 
within the larger context of the development of the category “religion” and its history of 
study in the Euro-American academy.  He asks: 
A different set of taxonomic questions were raised by the 
“religions” and became urgent by the nineteenth century:  
Are the diverse “religions” species of a generic “religion”?  
Is “religion” the ultimate beginner, a summum genus, or is 
it best conceived as a subordinate cultural taxon?  How 
might the several “religions” be classified?279 
 
Smith identifies the relationship between “religion” and “religions” as primary, especially 
within the development of the field of religious studies or history of religion.  He goes on 
to remind his reader that the plural “religions” begins to appear and, in fact, becomes 
“urgent” in the nineteenth century because of increased literacy, study, and colonial and 
imperial expansion globally.280  The questions for Smith coalesce around linguistic 
appearances of terms, historical contexts, and usage.  What is important to note, however, 
is that for Smith “religions” points to the overwhelming problem of a ubiquitous 
“religion.”  That is to say, Smith uses the plural (“religions”) to continue to question the 
primary uses of the singular (“religion”).  To reiterate what has been mentioned above, 
Smith bluntly, definitively states that religion is not universal, and insists that it is, in fact, 
necessarily alien to the very contexts that give cause to pluralize the term. 
 As I discussed in the first chapter, South Asia is a particularly fertile place for 
early scholars of religion to test out theories of the history of religion or the plurality of 
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religions.281  What is more relevant to this particular chapter is J. Z. Smith’s sense of what 
pluralizing the term does—what work it accomplishes, what biases it betrays, and what 
thinking it avoids.  Smith argues that a pattern quickly developed and is still widely in 
play today: “the history of the major ‘religions’ is best organized as sectarian history, 
thereby reproducing the apologetic patristic hereosiological model.”282  Linking the 
plurality of religions to the singular, universal conceptualization of religion in view of a 
particular Christian theological history provides strong evidence that “religion” is 
necessarily foreign to all traditions outside the Christian pale.  That being said, however, 
because Smith traces only the Euro-American genealogy and taxonomy of religion and 
religions—because he only examines the term “religion” and its philological, 
etymological development—he fails to imagine the possibility of both in non-Western 
contexts.  In short, he fails to imagine that any other language or cultural system might 
possess a corresponding term or concept to that of the Latinate “religion.”  
 We have already discussed the ways in which the privileging of “religion” and its 
Western, Christian lineage is important both theoretically and in terms of universality, but 
it is again of particular relevance with respect to “religions.”  Of course, translation 
always begets the typical issues: direct correspondence between terms or ideas, linguistic 
and philological contexts, and those cultural patterns of speech and usage that may be 
ultimately untranslatable.  Those basic research problems being stated and with due 
diligence to carefully navigate such terrain, we may still investigate those ideas that are 
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comparable, corollary, or in any way related.  This is especially vital if we take J. Z. 
Smith seriously: if “religion” and its plural “religions” are phenomena, categories, and 
problematics stemming from Euro-American academies and expansions, what are we to 
do with indigenous terms, concepts, and norms that do, in fact, appear rather similar?   
Mathurānāth utilizes a plural that W. C. Smith argues has links to the early ninth 
century—a full ten centuries before J. Z. Smith rightfully cites the European surge of 
interest in the very topic.283  Mathurānāth also uses “religions” as a plural between and 
amongst groups we might, at first glance, assume to be amalgamated, as well as those 
that appear both to our contemporary eyes and those of our author—with little 
differentiation between these two types of usages.  Mathurānāth’s use of “religions” is 
important and worthy of attention both because it lines up nicely temporally with J. Z. 
Smith’s European examples—Mathurānāth writes in the early nineteenth century, when 
Smith believes the need to deal with plurality becomes “urgent”—and because it is a 
counter-example to the solely European lineage Smith cites. 
 Mathurānāth very generally refers to a multitude of “religions.”  In some cases, he 
is specific that a particular person or religious leader is a member of a certain caste (in the 
case, most often, of Brahmans or, speaking categorically, Brahmanism),284 a particular 
lineage (with Sufi tariqas or orders as examples),285 or within very similar broad umbrella 
groupings like Islam.  For example, this is to say that he often recognizes Muslims 
(musulmān) as Muslims, or in a few odd places as followers of the religion of Islam (dīn-i 
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islām).286  He also references at least two Christians: one is his sponsor, Robert John 
Glyn, and another is presumably a Protestant missionary living in Benares—Mathurānāth 
makes clear this gentleman is “not Portuguese or of that church,” but does not go as far as 
to name any other particular denomination.287  In both of these examples, Mathurānāth 
refers to “high” or “great” religions, as Smith characterizes these historical taxonomies; 
to borrow scientific taxonomical language, he refers to the genus rather than the 
particular species often enough to indicate that such an understanding exists.  Put 
differently, Mathurānāth conceives of his world and many of his subjects as 
simultaneously possessing particularities (i.e. “religions”) while being part of larger, 
overarching milieus (i.e. “religion”). 
 To illustrate, Mathurānāth spends a good deal of time on delimited ascetic 
communities in Varanasi.  It is helpful to remember that the location of Varanasi is on the 
Ganges River, a significant holy site often associated with its goddess namesake, Ganga, 
who is sometimes understood as a consort of Shiva.  The banks of the Ganges have been 
the site of pilgrimage, worship, and ritual for many hundreds of years, if not longer.288 
Mathurānāth does not reflect on any of the large festivals or melas that continue to draw 
pilgrims to the city today,289 but he does observe a pilgrim (ziyāratī) he claims visited the 
city to “bathe in that holiest (aqdas) of water.”290   
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Interestingly, it is in his description of ascetics generally and individuals who are 
followers of a guru, swami, or yogi more particularly that we see both the continued 
cultural framework of Islamicate and Persian definitions as well as the insertion of 
Sanskrit comments.  For example, very early on in the work, in the section that I have 
called an introduction, he describes the religious landscape of Benares.  He writes:  
This city, city of lights, is in fact a city of light (nur) and all 
of the men are properly pious.  There are Muslims 
(musalmān) at mosques (masajid), and Christians at the 
large church (bī`at)291; followers of Guru Narayana 
(muttabi`-i guru narayana), Swami Hariradkar (swami 
hariradkar-i), and Swami Yoginder (swami yoginder-i) are 
to be seen near the ghats daily.292  
 
On its own, this passage is fairly unremarkable.  It is located in what I have called the 
introduction, and I would further state that this selection comes in the few pages where 
Mathurānāth has finished praising his sponsors and transitions to discussing the project at 
hand.  What makes this selection interesting is that for the guru and two swamis, 
Mathurānāth has inserted Sanskrit in the margins.  Next to the mention of the guru, which 
happens to fall near the margin, he translates “follower of Guru Narayana” from Persian 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
celebrated every six years; the Purna (complete) Kumbh takes place every twelve years; and the 
Maha (great) Kumbh Mela which comes after 12 complete (Purna) melas, or every 144 years, is 
held at Allahabad.  As a point of reference, the Mela Administration of the Indian Government 
estimated that the 2007 Ardh Kumbh Mela attracted 70 million pilgrims.  See: 
http://ardhkumbh.up.nic.in/ganga.htm (Accessed January 21, 2012.) 
 
290 Mathurānāth, 79. 
 
291 Mathurānāth does not mention this church by name.  The largest church in Varanasi is St. 
Mary’s, which is an Anglican Church and was built starting in 1810. 
 
292 Ibid., 8. 
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(muttabi`-i guru narayana) into Sanskrit (guru nārāyaṇasya).293  In Sanskrit, he has 
literally written “he of Guru Narayana,” which indicates that he has translated his 
statement or clause from Persian to Sanskrit, and felt the need to include it in the margins. 
He does the same thing with the two swamis mentioned above, as well. 
Because these insertions happen frequently with the mentioning of proper 
names—proper non-Muslim names, I should specify—it is possible he does so to reflect 
their difference.  It is also possible he does so because he is unsatisfied with 
transliterating their names—in the case of Guru Narayana, for example, he would be able 
to indicate the difference between the “n” consonants,294 and because Narayana is another 
name for Vishnu, it is possible this was important to Mathurānāth, a Brahmin pandita.  In 
either case I am merely speculating, but it is the case that where Sanskrit appears it is 
most often with respect to a proper name that, on its surface, can be characterized as non-
Muslim. 
 Regardless of the language in which he presents these individuals, it is clear that 
Mathurānāth imagines “religions” to be a rather broad category.  In the same sentences, 
he references Muslims, Christians, swamis we may assume come from Hindu traditions 
and a guru, also a Sanskrit honorific title.295  Noticeably he does not call the swamis or 
                                                
 
293 Ibid. 
 
294 Sanskrit has four “n” consonants, five if we include a nasalized “m,” which are known as the 
anunāsika or nasals.  “Narayana,” for example, employs two of these four: na and ṇa. 
   
295 I am hesitant to outwardly state that the guru and two swamis are necessarily Hindu.  The 
swamis are most likely from Hindu traditions, and even more specifically, those of ascetic orders 
prominent in Varanasi.  However, because “guru” just indicates, at its base, a teacher, it is 
possible this is a teacher from some aspect of the Hindu fold, but it is also possible that this is an 
honorific title.  Because I cannot be sure, I do not want to fall into the trap I am trying to portray: 
religion and religions are not fixed! 
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guru “Hindu,” which brings two issues to bear: first, as other scholars have demonstrated, 
while Hindu is often used by Indians to describe themselves, it is not necessarily a 
primary term of religious belonging296; and, second, Mathurānāth envisions “religions” in 
a way that is not limited to the categorical term.  The followers of the guru are not 
understood secondarily as followers and primarily as, for example, Hindus; they are 
primarily and singularly defined as his followers.  Along these lines, we can extrapolate 
based on the selection I have provided and a host of others297 that Mathurānāth recognizes 
religions to encompass large, powerful, historic institutions with many adherents (Islam, 
Christianity) and small, local, unaffiliated groups of unknown numbers (followers of 
gurus, swamis, and sometimes, though rarely, Sufi shaykhs). 
 Mathurānāth makes clear that “religion” exists in a non-European setting and can 
be universal, even if he understands universality differently than his European sponsors.  
By including the followers of swamis and gurus who are now unknown to us—groups 
small enough to have lost their import to time—Mathurānāth demonstrates that 
“religions,” too, is a concept at play within Islamicate and Persianate taxonomies and 
cultures.  If J. Z. Smith’s first two categories have relevance and meaning within 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
296 David Gilmartin and Bruce B. Lawrence, “Introduction,” in Beyond Turk and Hindu: 
Rethinking Religious Identities in Islamicate South Asia, eds. David Gilmartin and Bruce B. 
Lawrence (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000), 2-4. 
 
297 For the purposes of space it is obviously impossible to offer even a dozen of the examples that 
are relevant here. Mathurānāth rarely uses the term “Hindu” and instead lists any non-Muslims 
and non-Christians (though Christians themselves are highly rare) in terms of their leader.  
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Mathurānāth’s Garden of Religions, in the next section I will explore whether or not the 
third category—religious—has similar cache. 
 
Religious (Identity) 
  
If religion is the singular and religions the plural noun, then, grammatically, 
religious is the adjective at play within J. Z. Smith’s essay, and part of the structure I 
have chosen to use in this chapter.  Smith somewhat indignantly laments that on its own 
“religious” is an adjective without a noun to modify.  He writes that “the ‘religious’ (the 
unknown that the scholar is seeking to classify and explain) becomes an aspect of some 
other human phenomenon (the known).”298  He goes on to define—if I may call it that—
religious as that which “most frequently” is identified with “rationality, morality, or 
feeling.”299  Smith is accurate: historically and certainly in common use, “religious” most 
often refers to a spectrum of actions, thoughts, texts, and customs, among many other 
broad categories, that may or may not refer back to any particular theological tradition, be 
it orthodox or heterodox.  But while Smith gives short shrift to the adjectival use, as a 
category it carries far less weight than either “religion” or “religions.”   
While acknowledging the sheer breadth of applications of “religious,” Smith 
seems to use the unwieldy adjective to demonstrate that its parent category—religion—is 
itself untenable.  He does not spend nearly as much time developing the term’s history or 
its post-Enlightenment uses as he does with the other related terms; he merely disregards 
                                                
 
298J. Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” 274.  
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it as imprecise, the perfect proof of the root-word religion’s inherent ambiguity.  As has 
been demonstrated above, I do not find “religion” untenable even if it is expansive, nor 
do I imagine its adjective to be such.  Instead, following Smith’s philological lead, we 
simply need to investigate its uses with reference to specific nouns the adjective modifies.  
In the case of South Asia, I argue that “religious” most often modifies identity.  This 
relatively short section will set about proving that argument, and I will continue to use 
Mathurānāth’s Garden of Religions as a primary source and primary example thereof. 
 Before I launch into the ways in which Mathurānāth uses “religious” adjectivally, 
it is prudent that I make a case for the use of “identity” as the noun that it modifies.  
Questions of identity gain scholarly attention in recent years and most often circle around 
ideas of politics (having an identity’s effects), self-naming (the process and fact of 
determining one’s own identity), and the labeling of others (determining identity for 
someone else or a group, based on a host of markers).  Identity in South Asia nearly 
always focuses on religious identity.  As Arvind-Pal Mandair argues, the relationship 
Indians have with “religion” reflects a self-labeling in light of a colonial past which 
privileged religious identity; contemporary India is rife with politics of religion, even 
when actors claim secularity.300   I do not necessarily hold his overarching point—that 
“religion” is ultimately only part of the West’s specter—but his articulation of the 
intimate links between religious identity and South Asian subjectivity is exactly on point. 
Mandair argues that, in South Asia, both insider (the individual) and outsider 
(anyone else) use religious identity as a primary way by which to mark people, and I 
suggest it is possible to expand that notion to places as well.  Mathurānāth is but one 
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example of an author who imagines his location to be part of a sacred, religiously 
identified cosmology.  Peter van der Veer links questions of religious identity to the 
development of religious nationalism, and articulates careful, thoughtful connections 
between the end of the British Raj, the rise of nation-states in South Asia, and reifications 
of Hindu and Muslim group identities.301  Religious nationalists in South Asia—be they 
Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Christian or Buddhist—often articulate their mission in terms of 
location; most famously, of course, are the articulation of India as Bharat Mata or Mother 
India, and imagine the nation-state boundaries as that of a deity.302   
 Religious identity in South Asia extends well beyond its implications for 
nationalism, however.  The politics of religious identity, as well, extend beyond elections 
and parliamentary sloganeering.  Religious identity is a powerful tool of politics, of 
course, but it is also a powerful element of self-labeling and group-labeling.  As scholars 
have pointed out, the reification of religious identities, theologies, and even the 
terminologies used to express identity (i.e. “Hindu,” “Lingāyat,” “Sikh”) gain steam 
during the colonial period;303 I have argued throughout this book that while the colonial 
period is important, it is not the only period in which religious identities are developed, 
maintained, and important.  Mathurānāth’s early nineteenth century work prioritizes the 
                                                
 
301 Peter van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994). 
 
302See as one excellent example: Sumathi Ramaswamy, The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping 
Mother India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010). 
 
303As examples: Harjot Oberoi, The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity, and 
Diversity in the Sikh Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Dan A. Chekki, 
Religion and Social System of the Virasaiva Community (New York: Praeger, 1997); Alan M. 
Guenther, “A Colonial Court Defines a Muslim,” in Islam in South Asia in Practice, ed. Barbara 
D. Metcalf (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 293-304.   
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labeling of individuals as belonging to one group or another, and it has implications for 
the category of religious identity. 
 To be clear, Mathurānāth does not discuss his fellow inhabitants of Varanasi in 
terms of identity.  He speaks most frequently of religion (dīn) and religions (most often, 
maẓahib).  I infer, however, the issue of identity and identities from the way he labels 
individuals on their own and with respect to which groups they (might) belong.  I suggest 
that the politics of labeling individuals as part of and possessing a religious identity—the 
very politics at play in the colonial period—are not unknown to the early nineteenth 
century.  If we imagine identity politics and processes to be the domain of the colonial 
period as well as its legacy, we run the risk of omitting complex understandings of self 
and community that predate British influences and control.  Instead, it is vital to examine 
the ways in which Mathurānāth both imagines and assigns religious identity to 
individuals and groups in Varanasi. 
 Mathurānāth in a number of locations takes pains to explain the ways in which a 
given individual may or may not fit within a broader religious category.  For the most 
part, as mentioned above, he labels individuals by a generalized, overarching category 
(caste, religion, jāti) or a specific affiliation (Sufi order, follower of a given swami or 
guru).  To do so, he most often labels individuals by describing their appearance, location 
in the city, or something that might be called known facts—he lists “facts” that might 
more readily be termed assumptions about particular jātis and sects especially.  He also, 
grammatically speaking, labels individuals in terms of their master or teacher; 
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Mathurānāth describes individuals as “followers of” a number of local—and presumably 
locally recognizable—figures.304   
 For example, Mathurānāth makes mention of styles of dress with some regularity.  
He does not always mention an individual’s clothing, but it happens with some 
frequency.  He notes the color of garment occasionally, and in so doing differentiates 
between appearance as well as religious identity: he mentioned white-robed Sufis305 and 
orange-robed devotees of Shiva.306  He also, though less frequently, comments on a 
garment’s style.  He writes: “the followers of this Guru are not known to wear the orange 
lungi, but instead dress themselves in pancha.”307  Here, Mathurānāth differentiates 
between a lungi, an article of men’s clothing that is a piece of cloth tied at the waist 
(known in America more often as a sarong), and a pancha, which is another article of 
men’s clothing that, similarly, is a single piece of cloth tied around the waist that covers 
the legs entirely.  Little difference is ascribed to these garments today, but must have 
been meaningful to Mathurānāth given his abovementioned quote.   
 Along similar lines, Mathurānāth also makes mention of styles of prayer.  He does 
not spend a good deal of time on what we might call ritual, but he mentions rituals 
                                                
 
304 Grammatically speaking, Mathurānāth uses both of the major ways one expresses possession 
in Persian to accomplish this: he relies on the ezafe construction (as in “muttabi`-i guru 
ramasekar,” or “follower of Guru Ramasekar,” p. 201) as well as pronominal genitive enclitic (as 
in hartāspash or “his devotee,” p. 198). 
 
305 Mathurānāth, 88. 
 
306 Ibid., 164. 
 
307 Little difference in meaning is ascribed to these articles today, despite their differences in 
appearance; but, these differences must have been meaningful beyond style to Mathurānāth.  He 
writes: “the followers of this Guru are not known to wear the orange lungi, but instead dress 
themselves in pancha,” (Mathurānāth, 165). 
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periodically, begging our brief attention.  He mentions the seeking of alms by ascetics, 
describing the ways in which these “noble men” commit themselves so fully they cannot 
eat, and how Benares’ pious “obligingly fulfill their piety” by feeding them.308 
Mathurānāth also mentions the prominence of the congregational mosque and its 
popularity on Fridays.309  In only one location I have found reference to what might be 
called Sufi ritual: Mathurānāth describes a scene in which a visiting Chishti shaykh 
arrived from Mirzapur, and in his honor, white-robed Sufis held a ceremony and sang 
until daybreak.310  He does not mention the shaykh’s name, but does describe him as a 
Chishti shaykh (shaykh chisthiyya).  This description sounds rather uncannily like zikr; 
literally zikr means “remembrance,” but as a ritual ceremony it most often describes 
chanting or singing done to focus one’s mind on God.  Whether named or not, the process 
of giving ascetics alms and of Sufi participation in zikr reflect both long-standing 
traditions rooted in textual and social pronouncements as well as local iterations of those 
very practices. 
Each of these examples demonstrates apparently meaningful difference in 
clothing or ritual: Mathurānāth uses these differences to define and categorize his 
subjects, and he chooses these details among others to present to his sponsor—a foreigner 
unfamiliar with Varanasi.  These examples also therefore demonstrate a meaningful 
ascription of religious affiliation and identity.  Mathurānāth may not consistently focus 
                                                
 
308 Mathurānāth, 167. 
 
309 Ibid., 180. Mathurānāth identities this mosque as “Jāmi’ Masjid,” or Friday Mosque, a 
common term for congregational mosques in South Asia and beyond.  It does not help identify 
the mosque itself, however, as most mosques have proper names alongside their “nickname” of 
Jāmi’ Masjid. 
 
310 Ibid., 88-89.  Mirzapur is approximately 31 miles from Varanasi. 
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on the garb or praxis of any of his individual subjects or the groups to which they belong, 
but when he does it is always with a purpose: these individuals and their groups perform 
difference, and are able to identified as distinctive because of those differences.  It does 
not matter that the caliber of difference varies, as in what is a small dissimilarity between 
a lungi or pancha or more salient differences like Sufi ritual as opposed to those of Hindu 
ascetics.  Mathurānāth uses these differences to identify and, in turn, summarize the 
identities of his religious subjects.  Religious identities come to have great import in the 
late colonial period and continue to dominate discussions of South Asian politics, but 
they cannot be said to have their roots within Euro-American or Orientalist discourse. 
Mathurānāth’s descriptions, labeling, and ascription of meaning proves that Islamicate 
categories were in full use to define, classify, and categorize not only religion and 
religions, but also religious identities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The field of “religion” and, in fact, the term’s very meaning, has been a major 
point of theoretical investigation of this book.  Specifically, the claim that “religion” is 
necessarily European—and does not have autochthonous iterations—is one that I have 
challenged.  Mathurānāth’s Riyāz al-maẓahib stands as but one example of the use, 
employment, and development of premodern taxonomies of “religion,” “religions” and—
though it requires our inference—“religious” identity.  As such, the Garden of Religions 
stands as evidence of both indigenous (South Asian) and trans-regional (Persianate, 
Islamicate) definitions and interpretations of religion (most often for Mathurānāth, dīn).  
Mathurānāth draws upon older concepts and terminologies as well as boundaries and 
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divisions distinctive of his analysis and linked to older, prominent works, like that of 
Abu’l Fazl.  The Garden of Religions demonstrates the complex nature of “religion” in 
South Asia, but also beyond; as a text with genealogical connections and exceptional 
understandings of Varanasi’s cultural landscape, it is one answer to J. Z. Smith’s 
contention that “religion” is always European, a product of the colonial encounter, and 
necessarily part of those discourses of power.    
The taxonomies of religion present in nineteenth century South Asia stand apart 
from those that were debated, constructed, and maintained by contemporaries in Europe.  
Such indigenous systems indicate a robust self-understanding of religion, both of one’s 
own community and those that are present locally.  For Mathurānāth, this included his 
fellow Brahmin panditas, on which he expounds in a few notable sections,311 and the 
followers of myriad gurus, shaykhs, swamis, and other elders as well as Muslims, 
Christians, and Jains.  Mathurānāth expounds upon the affiliations of numerous 
individuals in terms that speak to both universality and particularity: all men are assumed 
to have religion (dīn) as well as a community (jumhūr).   
This is to say that religion is both universal and particular, and has both the 
singular noun usage and the plural—much like the Euro-American situation J. Z. Smith 
so eloquently describes.  Mathurānāth’s Garden of Religions stands to demonstrate the 
ways in which “religion” may not be able to be universally applied, but can exist in non-
Euro-American contexts and, in those contexts, articulate a parallel understanding that 
religion is universal.  Put differently, the “religion” deployed by colonial actors in their 
colonies may not have been universal, but that should not indicate that no other literary, 
                                                
 
311 Mathurānāth, 61-66, 101-103, 249-252. 
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intellectual, or cultural tradition proffered its own term and understanding of religion that 
was meant to be totalizing.     
The Garden of Religions was written at a time of great flux: the Mughal Empire 
was certainly waning in the face of internal and external pressures; the British East India 
Company continued to make territorial and economic gains across the Indian 
subcontinent; and, globally, the nineteenth century marked a time of a great shift of 
power, largely due to European and American expansion.  Mathurānāth’s work took just 
one year to complete, demonstrating not only his productivity and command of Persian, 
but also his superb command of the Persianate literature that he draws upon; he must 
have necessarily had these works at his mental disposal in order to be able to implicitly 
reference them.  Similarly, Mathurānāth referenced Islamicate and Persianate taxonomies 
of religion not for his Mughal sponsors, but for his British ones.  It is clear that both sets 
of his sponsors provided space for and demanded information on the study of local 
religion, religions, and religious identities.  In short, they demanded and supported 
universality and particularity, and Mathurānāth had the scholarly lineages and local 
expertise to provide exactly what was asked of him. 
In 1813, Mathurānāth completed and submitted the Garden of Religions to Robert 
John Glyn, a registrar and regent for the East India Company in Benares, who will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  In 1813, Mathurānāth was an imperial 
agent between empires, both of which were concerned with religion.  In what follows, I 
will explore the relationship between these two empires—the British and the Mughal—in 
order to flesh out their mutual interest in and definition of religion and religions in South 
Asia.  Much like the overvaluation of the genealogy and taxonomy of the Euro-American 
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use and definition of “religion,” the legacy of the British vis-à-vis religion, religions, and 
religious identity is overstated in South Asia.  By exploring the relationship between 
imperial entities and their shared interests in religion—and even their shared discourse 
about religion—I suggest it is possible to uncover a more robust understanding of how 
religious identities came to be formed, informed, and solidified.  In so doing, I will 
demonstrate that the Mughal and British empires shared information, scholars, interests, 
and, ultimately, taxonomical systems for religion in a process I call co-imperialism.312 
 
 
                                                
 
312 I will define this term and outline why I think it is useful, necessary, and on point in great 
detail in the next chapter.  
  
CHAPTER 4: CO-IMPERIALISM AND THE CO-CONSTITUTIVE 
DEFINITION OF RELIGION 
 
 The entirety of this work has, at its broadest, both demonstrated and explored the 
complex relationship between Euro-American definitions of religion and the related field 
of religious studies alongside South Asian, Islamicate definitions of religion and the 
scholars who employ those terminologies.  I have discussed South Asia as a discursive 
location for the interpretation, definition, and study of religion; I have demonstrated the 
historic Persianate and Islamicate taxonomies of religion present in the Ā'īn-i Akbarī by 
Abu’l Fazl; and, in the last chapter, I addressed the use and development of Abu’l Fazl’s 
categories in Mathurānāth’s Riyāz al-maẓahib.  In each of these chapters, I have 
investigated multiple genealogies of “religion,” the production of imaginaries and their 
effects on “religion,” and the relationships between these genealogies and imaginaries.  A 
major aspect of the above has been the parallel and corresponding Islamicate definitions 
of religion as evidence that the very category “religion” may not be as foreign, bankrupt, 
or outmoded as others have stated.313  This final chapter examines the ways in which 
these parallel taxonomies inform each other with respect to the auspices of imperialism.  I 
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argue that definitions of “religion” are constructed, manipulated, and reified co-
constitutively through a process of co-imperialism.    
Co-Constitutive Definition(s) of Religion 
 
The theoretical underpinnings and terminologies of this chapter’s argument 
deserve some unpacking.  I contend that historical evidence demonstrates that “religion” 
and its Islamicate corollary “dīn” do not inhabit intellectual, cultural, or imperial silos.  
Though they develop in separate geographic locations, languages, and cultural milieus, 
these terms and their uses are not sequestered poles apart from each other.  Rather, by 
processes of intellectual and economic contact as well as conflict and especially the 
process of transculturation delimited above,314 the agents who employ these terms do so 
in a way that is informed by both European and Islamicate taxonomies.  This is 
increasingly the case as we examine these terms independently and in relation to each 
other diachronically; over time, not only do we see more models and examples of 
encounter in the South Asian sphere, but we also see a greater global interest in knowing 
an other.315   
                                                
 
314 “Transculturation” has been defined in the previous chapter.  Following Flood and Ortiz, it 
describes the multidirectional process of change, emphasizing neither conflict nor peaceful 
encounter models that assume two wholly separate and distinct groups coming together but rather 
the interaction amongst centers, peripheries, and spheres. 
 
315 While Orientalism has been well studied and well theorized, its corollary Occidentalism 
remains relatively underrepresented in scholarly work.  Notable exceptions include: Mohammad 
Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001); Couse Venn, Occidentalism: Modernity and Subjectivity (California: 
SAGE Publications, 2000); Hamid Bahri and Francesco Canadé Sautman, “Crossing History, 
Dis-Orienting the Orient: Amin Maalouf's Uses of the ‘Medieval’,” in Medievalisms in the 
postcolonial world: the idea of the Middle Ages outside Europe, eds., Kathleen Davis and Nadia 
Altschul (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 174-205. 
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As we have seen throughout this book, the eras in focus have been marked by a 
shift in interest in the category of religion and the scholarly arguments about what counts 
as religion for both South Asian authors like Abu’l Fazl and Mathurānāth and Euro-
American scholars.  The deployment of parallel terminology and its development in the 
same period in seemingly disparate locations begs the following question: if “religion” is 
European, and “dīn” Islamicate and Persianate, how do we account for the coinciding use 
of, interest in, and institutionalization of these categories? 
Many have argued that this is a result of the colonial expansion of European 
powers.  As but one example, David Chidester specifically locates the development of 
comparative religion within “colonial conflict.”316  He argues that the development of the 
study of religion is rooted in three processes of understanding: first, frontier comparative 
religion, which was about local control; second, imperial comparative religion, which 
served the purpose of global control; and last, apartheid comparative religion, which 
sought local control applied with global terms.317  He writes that scholars  
can only document and analyze the process of discovery, 
or, more accurately, the process of invention, through 
which knowledge about religion and the religions of the 
world was fashioned on colonial frontiers.318 
 
This line of reasoning stresses the new and the discovery or invention of the new—
colonialism and the frontiers of empire begot new power, new encounters, new “natives,” 
new rituals, new languages.   
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It is also a model that understands colonial expansion as a revolutionary historical 
moment, but also as a series of revolutionary discoveries; to be blunt, the model of 
history that understands the interest in “religions” as related to colonial expansion 
misunderstands the complex networks of trade, exchange, and encounter present well 
before European powers existed.  Of course, I do not wish to devalue the colonial 
enterprise nor the experience of colonialism—certainly, as many scholars have far more 
eloquently proven than I am able to do here, the colonial period is one that continues to 
bear its mark on formerly colonized geographies, lands, and—as Said would have it—
minds.319  What I do wish to state is that our historical imagination for colonial agents 
inventing religion and religions is incredibly limiting for scholars of history, religion, and 
the development of these categories and their uses; furthermore, it strips meaningful and 
historically present agency from those colonized historical actors.  
I refer, more precisely, to one of the subjects of this book: Mathurānāth.  By all 
historical definitions, Mathurānāth is a colonized subject: his city, Benares, was 
colonized and under heavy foreign economic and institutional control; he presumably 
chose to work for the East India Company as opposed to the Mughal and local elites he 
had previously served, making him part of the colonial apparatus; and his work 
contributed to imperial forms of knowledge, whether or not he planned for this.  In the 
early nineteenth century, as British colonial agents began to shift toward imperial 
functions, they asked local intellectual elites to help map South Asia.  The question of 
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religion was obviously present, and one answer to that question is Mathurānāth’s Garden 
of Religions.  If we are to imagine the colonial production of knowledge as a solely 
foreign enterprise, one that is focused on the new, radical discoveries, and purposeful 
subjugation of local people, customs, and processes, I suggest that we necessarily lose the 
indigenous voices, intellectual structures, and institutions that help shape the colonial 
knowledge base.320 
The very subject of this book has been, first and foremost, the existence of an 
indigenous Islamicate corollary for “religion” that predates European colonial 
intervention in South Asian history.  The secondary project has been the ways in which 
that category comes to inform that of the British colonial enterprise.  While it is but one 
example, Mathurānāth’s work stands to represent the myriad volumes, interlocutors, and 
studies commissioned, consulted, and mined by the British; Mathurānāth is a scholarly 
informant whose work is both inherently Islamicate as well as evidence for his British 
patrons of religion’s inherent import.  In other words, I suggest that Mathurānāth is not 
merely sponsored by the British in some innocuous way, but is a colonized actor whose 
definitions and taxonomies come to be part of the British knowledge system; his work is 
part of the colonial machine that so many scholars credit—or fault—for the invention of 
religion.  I suggest that this machine, as it is comprised of colonized and colonizing 
actors alike, cannot be understood as exclusively alien. 
                                                
 
320 On the issue of production of knowledge and production of epistemologies, I am obviously 
indebted to Michel Foucault.  While much of his writing deeply addresses these issues, I have 
been most influenced in my own historical thinking about knowledge, power, and agency by 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd ed., trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995). 
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Instead of reading history as a series of set pathways, I again turn to Flood’s use 
of “routes not roots, networks not territories”321 line of thought: imagining networks of 
scholars, imperialists, and theologians rather than diametrically opposed individual 
scholars, empires, or theological systems allows us to more fruitfully investigate a term 
like religion, its impact, its use, and its indigenous iterations.  By focusing on the 
complicated networks of north India from, as I have suggested, the time of Akbar through 
the early nineteenth century, we are able to understand “religion” not necessarily as a 
foreign, invasive concept, but as one with corresponding, autochthonous lineages.  The 
process of transculturation necessarily implies that the multiplicity of interactions 
between and amongst individuals, groups, religions and empires impact on each other—
this is not a unidirectional relationship even if it is often uneven or unequal.   Religion in 
its European and South Asian articulations could not be confined with borders or 
boundaries; from Akbar’s time, Jesuits in the court debated “religion” and “religions” at 
the imperial level,322 and the multidirectional effects of these conversations, encounters, 
and processes is the co-constitutive definition of religion in question here.   
Contact, encounter, and transculturation most clearly create spaces wherein 
multiple actors of diverse backgrounds construct, maintain, and develop ideas about 
                                                
 
321 Flood, Objects of Translation, 9. 
 
322 While not a specific focus here, much scholarship has noted the relationship of European 
Catholics, especially Jesuits, to South Asian empires and, as is especially relevant here, religion.  
See as examples: Ines G. Županov, Disputed Mission: Jesuit Experiments and Brahmanical 
Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); John 
Correia-Afonso, ed., Letters from the Mughal Court : the first Jesuit mission to Akbar (1580-
1583) (St. Louis : Institute of Jesuit Sources; Anand, India: G.S. Prakash, 1981); Pierre Du Jarric, 
Akbar and the Jesuits: an account of the Jesuit missions to the court of Akbar (New Delhi : Tulsi 
Pub. House, 1979); and Antonio Monserrate, Embajador en la corte del Gran Mongol: Viajes de 
un Jesuita Catalán del siglo XVI por la India, Paquistán, Afganistán y el Himalaya (Lleida : 
Editorial Milenio, 2006). 
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religion.  Therefore, I suggest that “religion” comes to be informed by multiple 
taxonomies—indigenous and foreign, Islamicate and European—and, in turn, so do 
“religions” and “religious” identities.  Not only is religion present in South Asia, the 
indigenous definitions thereof come to inform the very definitions assumed by some to be 
applied from the outside.323  Put differently, I suggest that colonizers and colonized 
agents together constructed knowledge about religion, and this is what I indicate by using 
the phrase co-constitutive definition of religion. 
I have explored Mathurānāth’s work as one example of this phenomenon: 
utilizing Islamicate definitions and Persian literary norms, he presented Robert John Glyn 
with the information requested—a summary of the religions of Benares.  This summary 
fully, robustly described religion, religions, and religious identities in a way that we must 
consider in terms of its effects: with so many East India Company officials stationed in 
and around Benares in the same period, we must reason that any number of them could 
have observed their own surroundings and prepared a report, as they did elsewhere.324  In 
                                                
 
323 As touched on in chapter 1, these include scholarly works where the British or other European 
colonists or imperialists are imagined to have invented a religion or a religious identity and 
imposed it upon a population, either by rule within a colonized territory or by intellectual 
epistemological violence and the institutionalization of knowledge.  See as examples: Gyanendra 
Pandey, “’Encounters and Calamities’: The History of a North India Qasba in the Nineteenth 
Century,” in Selected Subaltern Studies, eds. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 89-128; Vasudha Dalmia, “The Only Real Religion of the 
Hindus: Vaisnava Self-representation in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Representing 
Hinduism: The Construction of Religious and National Identity, eds. Vasudha Dalmia and 
Heinrich von Stietencron (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), 176-210; Christopher Fuller, The 
Camphor Flame: Popular Hinduism and Society in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992); John S. Hawley, “Naming Hinduism,” in Wilson Quarterly, Summer (1991), 20-34. 
 
324 The gazetteers of India are one place where European agents—especially British, Scottish, and 
Irish authors—wrote articles about life in South Asia, which often included discourse about 
religion.  For a catalogue of these series, see: Gazetteers of India in the British period, Leiden, 
The Netherlands: IDC, 1991. 
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the same year that Mathurānāth presented his work to his sponsors, Warren Hastings, the 
once-Governor General of India and former head of the East India Company, testified 
before the House of Lords and House of Commons about the religions in India, among 
other things.  He stated: 
What I have to add must be taken as my belief, but a belief 
impressed by a longer and more intimate acquaintance with 
the people than has fallen to the lot of many of my 
countrymen.  In speaking of the people, it is necessary to 
distinguish the Hindoos, who form the great proportion of 
the population, from the Mahometans, who are intermixed 
with them, but generally live in separate communities; the 
former are gentle, benevolent, most susceptible of gratitude 
of kindness shewn them, than prompted to vengeance for 
wrongs inflicted, and as exempt from the worth 
propensities of human passion as any people upon the face 
of the earth; they are faithful and affectionate in service, 
and submissive to legal authority; they are superstitious it is 
true, but they do not think ill of us for not thinking as they 
do.  Gross as the modes of their worship are, the precepts of 
their religion are wonderfully fitted to promote the best 
ends of society, its peace and good order; and even from 
their theology, arguments may be drawn to illustrate and 
support the most refined mysteries of our own.  The 
intolerant and persecuting spirit of Mahometanism has 
spared them through a course of three centuries, and even 
bound them into union with its own professors, without any 
ill consequences that I have ever heard resulting from it.  I 
verily believe both classes would unite in resisting any 
attempts, should any be made, to subvert the religion of 
either.325  
 
                                                
 
325 Warren Hastings, esq., as quoted in Minutes of Evidence taken before the Right Honourable 
The House of Lords in the Lords Committees, appointed to take into consideration so much of the 
speech of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent as relates to the Chapter of the East-India 
Company, and to the Providing effectually for the future Government of the Provinces of India; 
and to report to the House; and to whom were referred the Petition of the United Company of 
Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, respecting their Charter; and also the several 
Petitions presented against and in favour of the Renewal of the said Charter (London: Printed by 
Order of the Court of Directors of the Information of the Proprietors, Cox and Son, 1813), 2.  
Interesting spellings are the property of the original text. 
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Clearly, the East India Company and the British Parliament had their own fellow, 
trustworthy British informants from which to draw and construction knowledge of South 
Asia.  Back home in London, both the Company and Parliament saw fit to interrogate 
those informants as part of the annual review of the East India Company and its holdings 
in India and the East Indies.326  But these informants were not the only ones asked that 
year to offer their estimation of the religious milieu of India. 
The locally based regents of the East India Company, presumably just as capable 
of offering their own observations about religion and the populace of India as their more 
renowned colleagues did before Parliament, asked the capable Mathurānāth to offer his 
observations.  Mathurānāth did so in the imperial Mughal style—that is, using Persian 
language and Persianate forms.  We must deduce that Mathurānāth’s Garden of Religions 
was an attempt by the British to understand the religions of Benares—if not the religions 
of India writ large—on the account of its own scholars.327  In turn, the account of 
Mathurānāth—read here as but one example of many like it328—should be understood as 
evidence that British officials determined their categories of religions based upon 
indigenous actors.  This relationship demonstrates the co-constitutive definitional process 
at work. 
                                                
 
326 While I quote from the 1813 hearings to purposefully highlight their contemporaneous nature 
with respect to Mathurānāth’s work, it should be noted that these hearings began in the 
seventeenth century and continued until 1867. 
 
327 A famous albeit Orientalist (and dismissive) example of the use of Indian historians is: Sir 
Henry Miers Elliott, The history of India, as told by its own historians. The Muhammadan 
period., ed. John Dowson (Calcutta: Susil Gupta [1956]). 
 
328 Nicholas B. Dirks, “Colonial Histories and Native Informants: Biography of an Archive,” in 
Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, ed. Carol Appadurai 
Breckenridge (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 290. 
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In this vein, it is important to note a bit about John Glyn’s personal story.  
Because he worked for the East India Company, there exists quite a good bit of detail 
about his life.329  He was born Robert Thomas John Glyn on September 5, 1788 to 
Richard Carr and Mary Glyn, and was baptized about a month later, in October 1788 at 
the Parish of Saint James, Westminster.  John Glyn starting work with the Company in 
1807 as the Assistant to the Register of the Provincial Court of Benares, and proceeded to 
move up within Company hierarchy rather quickly; in 1810 he became the Register of 
Benares, and in 1813 he was both the Register and a Judge and Magistrate of 
Bundelcund, a region that spans the contemporary states of Madhya Pradesh and 
Chhattisgarh which was under the jurisdiction of Benares during the early nineteenth 
century.  He left India for London in 1817, but returned a year later to Meerut, a city 
approximately forty-five miles northwest of Delhi.  Glyn’s service “in-country” with the 
Company ended in 1823, but he continued to work at the London offices until his 
retirement in 1828 at the age of forty.330  Glyn is reported to have commissioned the work 
in question here, Garden of Religions, as well as a work on glassmaking.331   
John Glyn’s long and successful career with the East India Company, and his 
patronage of at least two separate works, demonstrates an Orientalist aid in the 
                                                
 
329 The British Library is currently and continually updating its East India Company Office 
Records, which includes family backgrounds, birth certificates, baptismal records, and so forth, 
not only for serving officers but also their family (born either in the United Kingdom or India).  
 
330 From online India Office Family Records, British Library.  Last updated 9 Sept 2010: 
http://indiafamily.bl.uk/UI/FullDisplay.aspx?RecordId=014-000106202. Accessed 10/19/10, 
using reader number and login. 
 
331 Ghulam Yahya, The Eleven Illustrations, or The Illustrated Book About Makers Of Glassware, 
etc., And A Description of Their Tools, edited, translated and introduced 
by Mehr Afshan Farooqi. http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/sasia/crafts1820/. Accessed 
April 17, 2012. 
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production of knowledge.  In fact, aspects of the Orientalist production of knowledge are 
part of the vocabulary, sources, and ideas that form co-constitutive definitions of religion.  
Whether or not Orientalist scholars looked upon their subjects with the same critical 
approaches we value today is irrelevant for the moment; what is relevant are the ways in 
which Orientalist scholars prided themselves on having indigenous, “authentic” 
knowledge in their formulations of history, philosophy, and philology.  It would not be an 
oversimplification to suggest that most of the Orientalist works—including 
dictionaries,332 histories, (proto-) ethnographies, translations, and biographies—draw 
upon indigenous sources.333  In fact, it would be entirely accurate to describe a very 
particular, purposeful valuation of the use of indigenous sources in both official and 
scholarly narratives and monographs.  This demonstrates the ways in which colonialists 
and colonized people are necessarily imbricated in the production of knowledge. 
Acknowledging this imbrication is of particular import with respect to the 
category of religion writ large as well as the development of taxonomies of religions.  By 
asserting that the construction of religion is co-constitutive, I suggest that South Asian 
agents—be they Muslim, Hindu, high or low caste, or otherwise—directly inform the 
categories British imperialists use in their legal, economic, and cultural understandings of 
India.  I believe that acknowledging and demonstrating the imbrication—as was one 
                                                
 
332 As examples of dictionaries specifically committed to the use of original or authentic 
Persianate or South Asian sources: Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English dictionary 
etymologically and philologically arranged with special reference to cognate Indo-European 
languages (Oxford The Clarendon Press, 1899); Arthur N. Wollaston, A complete English-
Persian dictionary; compiled from original sources (London: John Murray, 1904); John T. Platts, 
A dictionary of Urdū, classical Hindī, and English (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal 
Publishers, 1997 [1884]).  
 
333 Many histories, ethnographies, biographies and texts in translation have been listed and 
examined above, so I will not repeat them here.  
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purpose of delving into Mathurānāth’s work—helps recover indigenous, Islamicate 
narratives of self-definition; further, this is a recovery of agency often stripped of local 
persons and groups in scholarly and popular accounts of the colonial period.  
Additionally, taking seriously the ways in which Orientalists did not necessarily concoct 
realities without respect to indigenous voices is an important point: while Orientalists, 
colonists, and imperialists often misuse—even abuse—local knowledges for their own 
purposes, the issue here is that we fully acknowledge that they use local knowledges.  
This flies in the face of rhetorics that would depict the British colonial period as one that 
necessarily ignored indigenous voices, histories, and customs.  Instead, I suggest that 
these knowledges inform the processes of knowledge production, especially with respect 
to religion. 
Many scholars have investigated the ways in which Orientalists construct religion 
in South Asia from the vantage point of Hindu traditions.  In some ways, those histories 
and critiques are perfectly fitting here: after all, Mathurānāth was a Brahmin pandita, a 
Hindu presumably entrenched within a particular religious community of other 
Brahmins.334  A typical understanding of Indian contributions to British definitions of 
religion—and especially of Hinduism—is summarized neatly as follows: 
Indians adopted some of the Orientalist and colonial ideas, 
combined these with elements from their own (pre-
colonial) culture and used this combination for their own 
purposes. Two elements are generally identified as the pre-
colonial foundations of Hinduism, namely Brahmanism or 
                                                
 
334 Mathurānāth does not mention, beyond his caste affiliation, to what, if any, jāt he belongs, and 
what his personal or familial religious predilections might be.  In many cases, Hindus have a 
particular deity to which great value is assigned or follow a subset of philosophical, praxis, or 
temple affiliation most closely.  For example, Śrivaiṣnava individuals are typically Brahmin 
whose jāt indicates a deep devotion to Vishnu. 
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the Vedāntic religion of the brahmans, and a pre-colonial 
Hindu self-awareness.335  
 
Mathurānāth certainly fits the bill in terms of a viable interlocutor; as a Brahmin, 
presumed to have special knowledge about religion, he and his knowledge could be 
deemed valuable to the British colonial regime.  While scholars have taken this neatly 
formulated history to task on the grounds that “Hinduism” and “religion” is far too 
complicated to ever be this neat,336 a major set of categories remain absent: Islam, 
Muslims, Islamicate power and Islamicate definitions. 
 The debates about the category of religion, the ways in which British colonial 
power structured those initial debates, and the role of agency is one that, I suggest, 
focuses almost solely on Hinduism.  A few scholars even suggest that Islam, as an 
identifiable system, was not entirely part of the discourse about religion in South Asia; 
more often, however, scholars root Hindu self-identification within a discourse of 
opposition to or with Islam.  For example, David Lorenzen notes that the term “Hindu” 
comes into wider use and, in fact, gains a religious connotation during the period of 
Muslim rule.  He continues on to argue, “much of modern Hindu identity is rooted in the 
history of the rivalry between Hinduism and Islam.”337  Lorenzen makes very clear the 
                                                
 
335 Marianne Keppens and Esther Bloch, “Introduction,” in Rethinking Religion in India: the 
Colonial Construction of Hinduism (New York: Routledge, 2010), 7-8.  
 
336 There has been much productive debate about the nature of “Hinduism,” whether or not it is a 
useful category, one of total fabrication by outsiders, or one with inherit and indigenous meaning, 
as has been discussed above (see especially chapter 1).  A few highlights of this debate include: 
S. N. Balagangadhara, ‘The Heathen in his Blindness…’: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (New Delhi: Manohar Press, 1994 [2nd ed. 2005]); Wendy Doniger, “Hinduism by any 
other Name,” Wilson Quarterly, 1991, 15: 35-41; R. E. Frykenberg, “Constructions of Hinduism 
at the nexus of history and religion,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1993, 23: 523-550; 
Richard King, “Orientalism and the modern myth of ‘Hinduism’,” Numen (1999), 46: 146-185. 
 
337 Lorenzen, “Who Invented Hinduism?” 631. 
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historical groundings of this claim, and I do not doubt that the development of 
“Hinduism” and “Hindu” as religious categories both comes into fashion during Muslim 
rule as well as sharply informs modern conceptualizations of “rivalry” between the 
groups.   
In this midst of this important literature, what stands out, however, are the ways in 
which few scholars have brought the pre-colonial set of definitions that were either 
instantiated by Muslims or heightened by their political presence into the conversation 
about category construction, both in and outside South Asia.  I suggest that, were we to 
imagine a binary, both sides of this discussion—internal articulations of self and external 
categorizations—are directly impacted by Islamicate and Persianate definitions, which 
can be and have been imagined as both internal and external modalities.  As I have noted 
above, and as Lorenzen notes as well, Muslim scholars used the term “Hindu” and 
referred to the “religion of Hindustan” well before a European colonial presence emerged 
in South Asia; the earliest of these appears to be al-Bīrūnī, who clearly mentions the 
religion of Hindus and Hindustan.338  Scholars have rightfully pointed to the role of 
Muslims in constructing or furthering the definitional schemes which included “Hindu” 
or “Hindu religion;” but the role of not only Muslim scholars but of Islamicate 
scholarship has been under-theorized with respect to its relationship to the overarching 
category of religion developed in and in response to South Asia.  To be a bit more blunt, 
Muslims and Islamicate systems are either under-represented or missing altogether from 
the conversation about South Asian religion and religions. 
                                                
 
338 al-Bīrīnī, Alberuni’s India, trans. E. C. Sachau, 2 vols in 1 (New Delhi: S Chand, 1964). 
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In light of this, I suggest that acknowledging that South Asian agents participated 
in co-constitutive definitions of religion serves to better theorize not only “religion” as a 
concept and discipline, but also the individual religions of South Asia themselves.  
Specifically, the integral role of Islamicate, Persianate categories, norms, and institutions 
alongside the actors who employed them demand further attention as they influenced 
epistemologies of religion for South Asians of diverse backgrounds as well as later 
colonial agents.  In some ways, what I suggest is that in recognizing the co-constitutive 
nature of religion, it is possible not to escape Western uses of “religion,” but rather to add 
local epistemologies to a heavily critiqued field.  In so doing, we gain not only historical 
voices that had previously been silent (or silenced), but we also manage to demonstrate 
the ways in which local, vernacular, indigenous categories came to inform supposedly 
foreign entities.339  
One such historic example would include that of Horace Hayman Wilson, who 
wrote a number of books, articles, and lectures on the subject of Hindus and the various 
iterations of Hindu traditions.340  Like many Orientalists and Sanskritists of his time, 
Wilson’s works seem preoccupied with charting, classifying, and formulating the patterns 
of praxis and doxa within Hindu traditions.  Unlike others, however, Wilson directly cites 
                                                
 
339 Sheldon Pollock makes a similar observation about ideas, their transferences, and the spheres 
of influence they exhibit, albeit about Sanskrit in an earlier historical period.  See, as a 
theoretically savvy historical example: Sheldon Pollock, “The Sanskrit Cosmopolis, 300-1300: 
Transculturation, Vernacularization, and the Question of Ideology,” in Ideology and Status of 
Sanskrit, ed. Jan E. M. Houben (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 197-247. 
 
340 Wilson was widely published, but most relevant to the discussion here are two works: H. H. 
Wilson, Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus, from “Asiatic Sketches,” vols XVI and XVII 
(Calcutta: Bishop’s College Press, 1846) and Essays and lectures on the religions of the Hindus, 
Volume 1 (London: Trüber & Co., 1861 [1828-1832]).  Both are currently available digitally 
through the GoogleBooks Project. 
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Mathurānāth’s Garden of Religions as one of two primary sources vital to make his case.  
He writes that it would have been “impossible” to read all of the numerous works on the 
different “sects of the Hindus,” and so instead made due with reliable sources from South 
Asia.341  Wilson nicely demonstrates the co-constitutive process of definition by noting, 
in the first person, that: 
I have been obliged to content myself, therefore, with a 
cursory inspection of a few of those compositions, and to 
depend for much of my information on oral report, filling 
up or correcting from these two sources the errors and 
omissions of two works, on this subject professedly, from 
which I have derived the ground work of the whole 
account.342 
 
Wilson continues, stating: 
The works alluded to are in the Persian language, though 
both were written by Hindu authors; the first was compiled 
by Sital Sinh, múnshí to the Rájá of Benares; the second by 
Mathurá Náth, late librarian of the Hindu College, at the 
same city [Benares], a man of great personal respectability 
and eminent acquirements: these works contain a short 
history of the origin of the various sects, and descriptions 
of the appearance, and observances, and present condition 
of their followers: they comprise all the known varieties 
with one or two exceptions, and, indeed, at no one place in 
India could the enquiry be so well prosecuted as Benares.343 
 
Wilson goes on to note that “the work of Mathurá Náth is the fullest and most 
satisfactory,” and, in so doing, clearly acknowledged the breadth, scope, and import of 
Garden of Religions and its author.344 
                                                
 
 
341 Wilson, Essays and lectures on the religions of the Hindus, Volume 1, 8. 
 
342 Ibid. 
 
343 Ibid., 8-9.  Emphases, diacritical marks, and punctuation in original. 
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 Wilson’s lengthy passage on the worth of the texts he uses to form the foundation 
of his own work on the variety of Hindu traditions demonstrates a few key issues broadly 
speaking as well as with reference to this book.  First, he notes that Benares is distinct 
among other Indian cities, claiming that at no other location would such studies of 
religion be possible or done with such high standard.  This is, in many ways, reminiscent 
of the argument I made in chapter 1 about the particular location of South Asia and 
Benares as a site of discourse for and about categories of religion.  Second, Wilson notes 
the special case of Mathurānāth, citing the fullness and quality of his study, Garden of 
Religions.  Last, Wilson demonstrates simply by recognizing the two Persian texts as 
foundational the ways in which his conclusions, observations, and categorizations are 
fundamentally based upon the voices of South Asian scholars.  It is clear that 
Mathurānāth stands as an important part of the definitional and categorization processes 
both within his own context and as part of the broader colonial conversation. 
If we imagine the process of definition to be one of translation and reflexivity 
across time and place, we are able to better envision religion, religions, and religious 
identities of South Asia not as imposed by imperial elites—be they Muslim or British—
but rather part of a multifaceted, multidirectional discourse.  The role of an imperial 
power, imperialism, and individual empires in the definitional process is an important 
one, and it is one that I address next in the following section. 
Co-Imperialism: Definitions, Connections, and Significance 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
344 Ibid., 9. 
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Much as definitions of “religion” that traced their origins to European or 
Islamicate foundations do not exist and did not develop in mutually exclusive silos, these 
definitions do not appear in or from vacuums.  Rather, many of the treatises on “religion” 
and its plural “religions” are part of what I termed intellectual empires in the first chapter.  
Patronage by colonial and imperial entities, official governmental or imperial studies, and 
courtly debates all structure many of the early works on religion.  Furthermore, these 
works—including those of Abu’l Fazl and Mathurānāth—are read and employed by 
colonial and imperial entities as part of the process of rule and definition.  This is all to 
say that the role of power in shaping, constructing, and reifying taxonomies of religion 
cannot be ignored.  Not only did imperial and colonial agents commission works on 
religion, they also used existing works to further support working definitions as part of 
rule.   
I suggest that the imperial modes of knowledge are not limited to one empire or 
another in the case of South Asia, but rather extend to and exist among both empires 
directly in question here, Mughal and British.  Because imperial power, knowledge, and 
patronage are heavily intertwined with definitions of religion and religions, I contend that 
these definitions are part of a process of co-imperialism.  I use co-imperialism to indicate 
two related but admittedly different issues: first, this term denotes the historic realities of 
nineteenth century north India; and second, the process through which information, 
identities, and this very history were produced.  Therefore, I define co-imperialism in two 
related ways: first, as a descriptor of an era in which an individual could be the subject of 
multiple courts; and second, as the very avenues through which Mughal and British 
 209 
officials, policies, and cultural norms affect each other and produce knowledge, 
information, policies, and norms together.345   
To better flesh out this term and the two related ways in which I use it, let me 
explicate each thread a bit more.  The first aspect of co-imperialism is descriptive: it 
indicates a time period in which any one agent could be the subject of multiple crowns.  
Co-imperialism can be used descriptively to indicate the historical milieu and power 
structures of north India, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, because it 
was a time in which Mughal power structures overlapped with those of the British.346  
Given the long history of the East India Company and its agents, and their battles, 
skirmishes, and contestations for control, the idea of stable imperial boundaries is flawed; 
while we today imagine a globe divided in dark, uninterrupted lines to demarcate 
                                                
 
345 “Coimperialism” or “coimperialisms” are terms that are very seldom used.  In fact, I have 
found one English-language citation of the term, which itself draws from a Spanish-language 
article.  These usages both discuss Cold War-era understandings of Soviet and US policy, actions, 
and diplomacy.  I use the terms as stated above, in terms of the historic realities of north India as 
well as the process through which north Indian realities were produced; by using these terms in 
these ways, I realize I may be using a neologism.  The Spanish-language source is: Maria Elena 
Rodríguez de Magis, “Una interpretación de la guerra fría en Latino-américa,” Foro internacional 
4, no. 4 (April-June 1964).  The English-language work in which this was cited: Jorge I. 
Dominguez, “Consensus and Divergence: The State of the Literature on Inter-American Relations 
in the 1970s” Latin American Research Review , Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), pp. 87-126.  
  
346 While a hilarious commentary and great stand-up routine, Eddie Izzard’s sense—and that of 
many traditional narratives—that the British conquered the world by “showing up,” planting flags 
in the name of the Queen, and immediately ruling South Asia does not hold historic water.  (See 
his bit in Dressed to Kill, 1999).   Rather, control was won, often in the form of physical battles 
as well as those of a more economic nature.  As has been mentioned above, the East India 
Company traces its roots in India to the early 17th century, and slowly accumulated land and the 
power that comes from land-holding within the Mughal system.  That being said, however, 
British power, dedicated armies, and institutions gained quite a bit of steam in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, coming to a head after the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion, which marks the time India went 
from being a colony to being a formal part of the British Empire. 
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autonomous states, this was hardly the case until very recently.347  The presence of 
frontiers and borderlands that may oscillate between hazy, distant, poignant, or forceful 
control from a political or economic center makes it reasonable to envision that 
individuals interacted with multiple ruling institutions or moved between and among 
spaces structured by rival entities.348  This is especially true in the period in which the 
British hired Mathurānāth—after he had previously worked for the Mughals.   
In the early nineteenth century, Mughal authorities still reigned, even if in 
comparatively diminished capacities to early periods; likewise, the early nineteenth 
century marked a time in which British power increased dramatically across the Indian 
subcontinent.349  Multiple seats of imperial power therefore typify this period.  Some of 
these seats of power are geographically defined, as in the British colonial and imperial 
use of Calcutta (Kolkata) and Madras (Chennai) as bases, which were peripheral to the 
Mughal regime or outside of it altogether.  Others of these seats of power can be defined 
in terms of competing interests, as in the example of Benares, where both ruling elites 
                                                
 
347 For discussions of the politics and imaginaries created by mapping, see as examples: Arthur 
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 40-49, 137-193. 
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had stable articulations and positions of authority.350  In any case, when I use co-
imperialism as a descriptor it is precisely these formations I wish to illustrate: the 
sometimes shared, sometimes contested, but ultimately overlapping spectra of authority 
between Mughal and British imperial agents, institutions, and structures.  I mean to 
indicate a time period in which individual subjects could be imagined to be subject to 
more than one center of authority.351 
I suggested that co-imperialism is not merely a term used to describe an historic 
milieu or period, but additionally indicates the production of information, policies, 
institutions, and norms that comes about as a result of the presence of multiple 
authorities.  Above, I have used Marshall Hodgson’s term Islamicate to indicate the 
myriad effects of the rule of Muslims; Islamicate represents the complex nature of an 
area, its ideological framework, and its cultural production that is influenced directly by 
Muslims, the rule of Muslims, and the legacies of the rule of Muslims.  In a similar vein, 
I use co-imperialism to denote the ways in which multiple seats of control affect an area, 
its ideological framework, and its cultural production—but instead of imagining one 
overarching specter of power, I reserve space for multiple specters to exert influence.  In 
this case, of course, I refer to those realms of Mughal and British control, and the 
products of that control. 
                                                
 
350 Diana L. Eck, Banāras: City of Light (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 83-93. 
 
351 I do not expect “co-imperialism” to take off as a term, but I do hope, in other work, to explore 
the ways in which it can be used to describe historical realities outside of the time period on 
which my work currently focuses.  By no means do I wish to indicate in defining my term vis-à-
vis the case study I cite that this is somehow unique; there are many examples, in South Asian 
history and elsewhere, of competing, overlapping, and contested authority over a populace.  In 
fact, it is this flexibility of “co-imperialism” to describe geographic regions in history that are in 
flux that I think makes it a compelling and useful term, to be used alongside the theoretical 
frameworks that frontiers, borderlands, and boundaries already provide. 
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Certainly, others have theorized and argued that the very process of colonization 
created new epistemologies, discourses, and even selves.  Postcolonial and decolonial 
scholarship is the most relevant set of examples, here; many of these works have taken a 
very critical stance toward the ways in which superiority in the colonial period came to 
be.  The idea proffered traditionally—that “civilized” Europeans went to foreign lands to 
help in the civilizing process—is the most heavily critiqued idea and historical 
narrative.352  Specifically, that Europe was itself well articulated before the colonial 
period has been a hallmark of these critiques.  Frantz Fanon stated this most sharply: 
“Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.”353  Scholars and commentators have 
been quick—and correct—to point out the reflexive way in which creating colonized 
others created colonizers.  Fanon’s point is apt, here, because the existence of colonized 
foreign lands defined Europe; it is a co-constitutive, reflexive, relational identity. 
I contend that co-imperialism as I have defined it does not negate the work of 
postcolonial or decolonial scholars; rather, I use the term to highlight the very 
relationship they have articulated so well.  The affiliation between colonized and 
colonizer is one that necessarily affected both parties: this defines European alongside 
Indian, to use the relevant examples.  However, in retaining “colonized” and “colonizer” 
                                                
 
352 As but a few examples of very many, see: Homi K. Bhabha, “The Other Question: Difference, 
Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism,” in Houston A. Baker, Manthia Diawara, Ruth 
H. Lindeborg, eds., Black British cultural studies: a reader (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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353 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Richard Philcox; with commentary by 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha (New York: Grove Press, 2004 [1965]). 
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as the primary descriptors of the populations involved in these contestations for power, 
we lose the historic, indigenous landscape of power, rule, authority and authorities, and 
empire.  In other words, as is the case study in question, co-imperialism purposefully 
denotes the presence, importance, and influence of indigenous imperial powers 
(Mughals) alongside and in conversation with foreign imperial powers (British).  I see the 
term co-imperialism building upon the reflexivity of power dynamics expressed by other 
scholars, but specifically incorporating and providing space for autochthonous authority 
and elites.  By doing so, I maintain that we are better able to account for South Asian 
agency in the face of British colonialism and imperialism, the legacy and influence of 
Islamicate systems, and a more robust history of the mechanisms of colonialism and 
imperialism in India.354 
Mathurānāth’s Garden of Religions is, in many ways, an ideal example of a 
product of co-imperialism.  As an author of the Mughal court (munshī), he inhabited a 
very particular sphere of elites, and, as we saw in chapter 3, produced a work that 
demonstrated a high level of familiarity with Islamicate and Persianate texts, norms, and 
styles.  In 1812, he was commissioned to write by John Glyn—which indicates his local 
notoriety as well as a British practice of hiring courtly authors.  There is no need to repeat 
                                                
 
354 While I certainly see both Mughal and British Empires as empires, both capable of and 
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the details that have already been discussed above, but there is a good deal of theorization 
that still requires our attention.  Specifically, the structures and processes that allow for a 
work like Garden of Religions demand careful consideration. 
Mathurānāth cannot be thought of as an historic anomaly.  As a number of 
scholars have demonstrated, the British purposefully—and fruitfully—hired 
accomplished South Asians, especially those previously acculturated into the Mughal 
courts, as part of the processes of colonialism and imperialism.355  While he serves as my 
primary example, he and his work cannot be imagined as oddities, but rather represent a 
pattern of imperial practices, Persianate and Islamicate as well as British.  Bernard S. 
Cohn’s widely read Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge spends a great deal of time 
and space articulating the ways in which British authorities came to know—and to 
reify—India, Indians, and more broadly, its Others.  He specifically mentions the 
production of knowledge, albeit in slightly different language, stating: 
The conquest of India was a conquest of knowledge.  In 
these official sources [those of the East India Company] we 
can trace the changes in forms of knowledge which the 
conquerors defined as useful for their own ends.  The 
records of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reflect 
the Company’s central concerns with trade and commerce; 
one finds long lists of products, prices, information about 
trade routes, descriptions of costal and inland marks, and 
political information in about the Mughal empire, and 
especially local officials and their actions in relation to the 
Company.356 
                                                
 
355 See: Ronald Inden, Imagining India (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 180-188; C. A. 
Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (The New Cambridge History of 
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While the work of Mathurānāth is certainly not within the scheme of trade and 
commerce, his work deals with political realities of the late Mughal regime when we 
consider the ramifications of religion, religions, and religious identities to imperial 
structures.  If we take a more cynical view of Glyn, we can reasonably conceive that he 
hired Mathurānāth in order to flesh out the political and religious landscape of Benares 
for the purposes of stronger, more pointed Company or British control; more generously, 
perhaps, we may simply see his actions within a program of collecting information for 
the specific purpose of building knowledge for the Company’s use.  In either case, 
Cohn’s point is apt: British officials used indigenous knowledge for the purposes of 
conquest, control, and authority.  Mathurānāth’s work can be read as a transaction within 
this framework. 
The realm of intellectual productivity is not the only place where we see 
transactions between British and Mughal elites; as Cohn mentions, trade and commerce 
are central features of the colonial period.  One scholar comments on the economic ties 
between East India Company officers and the nawab or princely state authority of the 
lingering Mughal regime: 
[A]ssociates, representatives and beneficiaries of the nawab 
of Arcot continued to exert pressure on Company politics 
for years: some contemporary observers have suggested 
that as many as twelve members of Parliament—most of 
them with Parliamentary seats purchased with money from 
Arcot—continued through much of the [late eighteenth] 
century to advance the interests of the nawab.357 
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In this instance, the ruling elite, affiliated with the Mughal Empire, purposefully paid off 
East India Company officials in order to gain favor in and from Parliament.  Of course, 
these payments and gradual accrual of debt ultimately led to the economic demise of 
many South Asian elites, but it temporarily turned the tables: while Company officials 
exerted power and control over India, some nawabs used financial influence to gain 
power and control in the very seat of Empire, the London-based Parliament.  While 
uneven, this relationship still maintains reciprocity and reflexivity—both parties 
participate in it and get some benefit from it. 
This example is in many ways the inverse of the relationship garnered between 
Glyn and Mathurānāth: in our primary case study, the Company officer paid an 
intellectual elite affiliated with the Mughal Empire in order to gain information relevant, 
presumably, to both imperial entities.  From the East India Company records, we know 
that Mathurānāth was paid to write his survey of religion in Benares because he had 
previously been affiliated with the Mughals—the record indicates his affiliation 
specifically.358  Further, H. H. Wilson takes Mathurānāth to be the best and most reliable 
resource for information on the sects of Hindus, demonstrating the particular use of this 
specific text as well as the demand for such a work more broadly.359  In both our primary 
                                                
 
358 East India Register and Directory, 1813 1st Ed. 3; corrected to the 30th December 1812; 
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359 H. H. Wilson, Essays and Lectures on the Religions of the Hindus, 9. 
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example and the abovementioned, the relationship between the British and the Mughals is 
one that both used for their own definitions of profit. 
These relationships—financial, commercial, intellectual—are reflexive, 
reciprocal, and coinciding, even when they are uneven, distorted, or inherently designed 
to be advantageous at another’s expense.  In fact, I am relatively unconcerned here with 
the imbalanced flow of power between the Mughal elites and Company officials; that 
they are in a relationship, however dysfunctional, demonstrates the very fact that South 
Asians had agency within the colonial structures, even as the British gained and took 
more and more control over time.  It is in this way that I hope co-imperialism speaks to 
the exceptionally complex processes of authority; while Cohn’s work is amazingly useful 
and impressive in its scope, in focusing on the construction of knowledge of the colonists, 
he only briefly pays attention to the sources from which colonists draw their 
knowledge—South Asian and often Mughal affiliated elites.  Cohn’s work purposefully 
explores but one side of a multifaceted issue.  If we are to better approximate the 
complexities of shifting authorities in South Asia, thinking critically about multiple 
imperial entities is a place to start; thinking through these entities and their effects upon 
each other simultaneously is the process I propose as co-imperialism.   
The contours of historical analysis that privilege victors and kingships tend to 
privilege the rise and fall model of history discussed in chapter 3.  A model of co-
imperialism purposefully aims to avoid this model of history insofar as one lineage—one 
narrative thread—is not placed squarely at the front; instead, as is relevant here, the 
multiplicity of authority and the myriad ways it acts upon agents and institutions are 
taken seriously.  In this model, we do not necessarily have to read Mathurānāth as 
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jumping ship from the Mughals to the British as part of the overarching decline of one 
and gain of the other, where he may have had little choice in the matter of employment.  
Mathurānāth can instead be read as an actor engaged, presumably, in his own self-
betterment—he accepts the patronage of the British over that of Mughals, and we might 
presume this to be the case based upon the ebb and flow of power, money, and prestige. 
But beyond a model for analysis, I contend that co-imperialism offers a 
mechanism through which to view the production of knowledge—especially with respect 
to religion, religions, and religious identities.  In the next section, I will address the ways 
in which this is plausible, as well as evidence that supports the model of co-imperialism I 
suggest is valuable. 
Conclusion: Co-imperialism and the Making of “Religion” 
 Thus far, I have discussed the co-constitutive definition of religion, and how 
“religion” cannot be thought of as a foreign, imposed category on South Asia.  Above, I 
made this claim by citing the existence of taxonomies of religion present in Islamicate 
literature alongside the uses of indigenous texts by Orientalists.  I have also discussed the 
definitions and utility of co-imperialism, a term I believe helps capture an historical 
moment as well as the ways that moment came to be produced.  In this section, I will 
address the ties between co-imperialism and the definitions of religion, and I aim to 
demonstrate why the two are imperatively linked.  I argue, finally, that the relationship 
between elites, elite intellectual cultures, and imperialisms are integral in the construction 
of the category of religion in South Asia, and that Islamicate taxonomies of religion (dīn) 
informed those of British scholars and officers.  Moreover, ignoring these intertwined 
definitional systems underestimates South Asian agency and Islamicate systemizations, 
and overstates the creative power of British colonizers and imperial authorities. 
 219 
 Historians have long argued that India was governed with ideas imported from 
Europe; recent scholarship, however, has sought to reevaluate the foreign nature of such 
ideas.360  Of the latter, some have demonstrated the Orientalist reliance upon traditional 
Indic sources.  Michael S. Dodson summarizes the debate well: 
It has often been argued that British orientalist research in 
India during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries served 
to consolidate and authorize the rule of the colonial state, 
and contributed to an emerging European-authored 
narrative of global history. While it is now evident that 
orientalism served principally to construct forms of 
European power, it is often unrecognized that orientalist 
scholarship in India drew much of its authority from the 
cultural standing and intellectual expertise of the 
“traditional” guardians of Sanskrit-based knowledge, the 
brāhman panditas (“learned men”).361 
 
Dodson points to the issue with which I wish to conclude this chapter: namely, the role of 
Indians in contributing to the scholarship of Orientalists as well as the lack of recognition 
of non-Brahmin scholars—or, like Mathurānāth, the Brahmin scholars fully invested in 
Islamicate norms.  The construction of the category of “religion” was part of Orientalist 
research, and was part of collaborative, corresponding, and co-constitutive projects.   
 During the time period in which definitions of religion were formed, maintained, 
and eventually enforced, governmental power structures were in great flux.  What this 
indicates—beyond a complex, dynamic landscape upon which definitions were 
inscribed—is that parallel power structures were influenced by and has great influence 
over the development of categories.  Dodson notes that Orientalism can be thought of 
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having “double” practices: first, scholars and officers aimed to understand, utilize, and 
ultimately redirect modes of indigenous expertise for their own uses; second, scholars 
and officers sought to usurp the position held by the very systems from which they 
gained information.362  There is little use denying this doubly-edged function of the 
colonial enterprise in India; Orientalists, Company officials, and, later, officers of the 
British Empire relied upon Indian sources—living interlocutors as well as material texts 
and artifacts—in order to comprehend and dominate their new populace, land, and 
political landscape. 
 It is important to highlight the ways in which South Asians participated in the 
creation of colonial knowledge.363  As mentioned briefly above, Cohn has masterfully 
argued that the creation of knowledge as part of colonialism did more to shape European 
states than their colonies.364  Certainly, though, the effects of co-constitutive definitions 
of religion are manifold—and work in both directions.  Because Orientalism, as a 
category of inquiry, relied so heavily upon Indian texts, artifacts, scholars, traditions, and 
norms, the intelligentsia provided a way by which to empower the colonial state; 
simultaneously, though, they forged new ideas and visions for the very categories the 
British were interested in from extant resources.  These existing sources included, of 
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course, Sanskritic literature and mores, as many have indicated.365  They also necessarily 
included Islamicate literature and mores, as our primary example demonstrates.  
 Mathurānāth existed between what some insist are competing realms: clearly 
educated in Sanskrit and Sanskritic literary forms as well as Persianate and Islamicate 
ones, he superficially appears as one who moves between “Hindu” and “Muslim” 
modalities.  I am uncomfortable with such categorization, because it implies—and indeed 
insists—that specific religious affiliations were static, maintained their own special sets 
of intellectual projects, and existed within mutually exclusive public spheres.  Instead, 
Mathurānāth far more clearly represents what it meant to participate in and construct an 
intelligentsia: knowledge of multiple languages, courtly practices, and literary customs 
mark the South Asian topography.  Abu’l Fazl himself claimed literacy in both Islamicate 
languages as well as Indic ones, namely Sanskrit.  Assuming a fundamental division 
between Hindu and Muslim, and their associate languages and literary traditions, makes 
little historical sense.366  Mathurānāth existed not between competing realms, but as part 
of an iteration of identity within northern India. 
 Mathurānāth’s familiarity with Persian cannot be understood as novel.  As the 
official language of the Mughal court, we would necessarily expect a man of 
Mathurānāth’s station to have been trained in the language; moreover, because we know 
he was a one-time servant of the court, it is absolutely clear that he would have needed 
Persian for this task before being hired in any capacity.  Further, his use of Persian while 
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serving the British is not in and of itself remarkable: the British retained Persian as their 
official language of government until 1837—a full twenty-four years after Mathurānāth 
finished Garden of Religions.  By using the language of empire, the British were able to 
communicate generally with princely states and other political—and religious—
authorities.  This included the negotiations of treaties and alliances; the training of 
armies; and the administration of their holdings, which itself consisted of royal and 
judicial courts, tax collection, and some civil services.367  While the British and other 
Orientalists imagined Sanskrit as the religious and erudite language of India, it is 
nevertheless true that Persian was afforded great value as well.368 
 However, that Sanskrit is imagined as inherently “religious” and Persian as 
“courtly” itself belies a larger theme that has been the subject of this project: these 
imaginations of belonging are not necessarily part and parcel of actualities as they were 
lived.  Mathurānāth wrote about religion and religions in Persian and Sanskrit, 
maintaining courtly norms of both empires—the British in India and the Mughals.  Riyāz 
al-maẓahib should not be categorized as a religious text akin to Qur’anic or Vedic 
exegesis because it does not refer to these proof texts, nor does it really offer more 
general, proscriptive statements about worship, deities, or philosophical truths.  And yet it 
contains a healthy dose of Sanskrit; Sanskrit used, I might add, to describe scenes in 
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Varanasi and clarify imperfect Persian—in other words, Sanskrit imagined as better 
suited to explain issues the supposedly administrative language could not adequately 
encapsulate.369  Of course, classifying a particular language as “courtly” or “religious” 
does not necessarily hold water, much in the same way classifying a concept or term as 
innately the property of one intellectual tradition or another does not reflect historical 
realities.  What matters here are the ways in which Mathurānāth reflects an elite culture 
that utilizes markers of identity far more fluidly than some expect; and, moreover, 
participates in producing knowledge in multiple vernaculars.370  
 The British, as an empire establishing itself in South Asia, used Persian as its 
language of business.  This can and should be seen, at once, as pragmatic as well as 
something more; that the British did not immediately, forcibly change the language of 
court to something utterly foreign indicates, perhaps, a common sense approach to 
establishing authority.371  But, it also suggests that all of the things languages codes and 
carries were also part of the early British enterprise in South Asia: language, of course, is 
more than words, it is a way through which entire systems are conveyed.372 
 It is this understanding of system, translation, and language that directly speak to 
religion and a process of co-imperialism.  In retaining Persian as a language of business 
and government, the British do not merely ingratiate themselves to local elites or even 
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integrate themselves to long-standing institutions of authority, but they also participate 
within Persianate and Islamicate customs, milieus, and knowledge systems.  The 
conditions present in this period that allow for British economic and political control—
waning Mughal centralization, increased interest in Indian products, European trading 
companies’ establishment along coastlines, and a rising discontent from jāt communities 
near the Mughal center—create possibilities for networks of participation between and 
among British and South Asian elites.373  This participation can be read pragmatically, 
but I think it is equally fruitful to read it in terms of networks and the construction of 
knowledge: how the British come to establish imperial authority within South Asia is 
directly linked to their participation within extant South Asian—i.e. Islamicate and 
Persianate—imperial authority. 
 As we have seen, Islamicate definitions of religion or dīn existed, were 
acknowledged by imperial structures (as in the case of Akbar and Abu’l Fazl), and were 
part of the ways in which elites identified and interpreted their communities (as in the 
case of Mathurānāth).  Similarly, we have seen that Mathurānāth, as an informant for the 
British, interpreted Islamicate categories and fortified them for his patrons, carrying with 
him the cache of Mughal affiliation, elite Sanskrit community, and literary prowess.  This 
parallel definitional system of religion is, therefore, in many ways not entirely parallel—
during the early colonial period, at least, we have evidence that nodes of contact between 
these two lineages intersected.   
 Specifically, the intersection happened with the benefit, mark, and sanctioning of 
the two primary imperial entities: the Mughal intellectual tradition represented and 
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translated by a munshī as well as the British East India Company patronage system which 
sponsored that munshī and demanded his local understanding of religion, religions, and 
religious identities.  During a period in which political and economic authority was very 
much contested and contentious, the production of knowledge about religion came from 
imperial institutions working in tandem and participating within Islamicate and 
Persianate norms; co-imperialism structured the co-constitutive definition of religion. 
 Acknowledging that agents of the Mughal and British Empires worked together to 
craft ideas about, boundaries between, and definitions of religion allows for a 
comprehensive appraisal of how “religion” came to operate in South Asia.  More 
importantly, perhaps, it bestows agency not only to South Asian actors, but also to the 
structural institutions of the Mughal Empire, which far outlasted their centralized rule.  If 
we are to imagine Islamicate not in terms of a descriptor of Muslim rule, but rather the 
complexity of networks affected by the rule and influence of Muslims, even over non-
Muslim populations and power structures, then we must also imagine the ways in which 
Islamicate systems come to affect, inform, and shape later empires in South Asia—
including that of the British.  I have suggested moving away from a narrative that 
imagines the colonial period as a shattering rupture to one that insists upon multiple 
imperialists negotiating power through processes of transculturation and co-imperialism.  
Following Hodgson’s lead in many ways, I suggest that the impact of Islamicate 
categories far outlasted the rule of Muslims in South Asia, and indeed helped shape those 
supposed foreign definitions of religion. 
In the next section, I will conclude the dissertation by way of summarizing my 
evidence and my findings, and returning to questions of historiography, imperialism, and 
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taxonomies of religion. 
  
CONCLUSION: RELIGIONS OF EMPIRE 
 
 Through the investigation of two primary manuscripts, archival research, and 
theoretical investigation, this dissertation has demonstrated two primary issues: first, 
imaginaries of South Asia were a site of discourse in the development of the category of 
“religion” in Euro-American scholarship; and second, Islamicate and Persianate 
taxonomies of “religion” pre-existed the colonial period.  I suggested further that 
Islamicate definitions of religion informed later British and Orientalist definitions by 
citing historical trends as well as the particular case study of Mathurānāth’s Riyāz al-
maẓāhib  or Garden of Religions.  In so doing, I have argued that definitions of religion 
are far from foreign, as many have stated, but were instead co-constitutive, created 
through a process I termed co-imperialism.   
 Theories of religion that developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
rarely took seriously non-Christian traditions as anything but varieties, deviations, or 
unformed ideas opposed to the one religion.  Scholars that shaped the discipline of 
religious studies, like Max Müller, aimed to classify and systematize the plurality of 
religions; as J. Z. Smith pointed out, as the colonial enterprise grew, so did the impetus to 
order the practices, belief systems, and textual traditions of colonized peoples.374  What 
these theories often took seriously was the specific example of South Asia: India served 
for many as a site of difference, a site of comparison, or a foil to the site of Europe—but 
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in all of these iterations, India served as a site of discourse in the development of the 
category of religion.  Müller’s drive to “classify and conquer”—to figure out a scientific 
manner by which to talk about religion—was innately related to his expertise in Sanskrit 
and Indic literature.  In any event, we see that early discussions about religion, even 
through the eyes of Orientalists, hinge upon an Other, and specifically a South Asian 
Other.375  I suggested that classification systems which imagined India as central affected 
definitions of religion as created by Orientalists and later Euro-American scholars, but 
were not the only set of taxonomies of religion. 
 To assume that “religion” was an invention of European philosophers and 
scholars ignores the possibility that non-Europeans may have had similar, corresponding 
systems of categorization.  This is especially the case with respect to South Asia: if this 
region and its traditions featured so heavily within early conceptualizations of “religion,” 
it would seem outlandish to suppose that indigenous systems had no way of thinking 
about such a topic.  Further, it is deeply problematic to attribute contemporary 
understandings of self and of the category of religion solely to colonial interventions; 
while these encounters inform the contemporary era, certainly the colonial period does 
not mark the first time South Asians recognized similarities, differences, or institutions 
related to what we call “religion.”  Indeed, during the reign of Akbar (1556-1605), Abu’l 
Fazl was already articulating a sense of “religion” (dīn) as well as describing the religions 
of others, namely Hindus.376  What is more are the ways in which he did so as part of 
official, royal documentation of Akbar and the Mughal Empire.  This demonstrates an 
                                                
 
375 In many ways, this is the basis of Said’s Orientalism: the gaze of Euro-American scholars 
upon the “East” structures the “West.”   
 
376 Abu’l Fazl, Ā'īn-i Akbarī, 198-203. 
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imperial development and use of a corollary for “religion.”  The fame of Akbar, the 
importance of the Ā'īn-i Akbarī, and its later afterlife for Orientalist researchers also 
indicate a relationship between the Mughal documents and European ideas that help 
shape definitions of religion.  The position of South Asia and its Islamicate institutions 
inhabit an imaginary in which “religion” featured prominently, no matter how foreign the 
English-language word “religion” is to Persian-language systems. 
 Islamicate taxonomies of “religion” center on the term “dīn.”  As W. C. Smith 
argued fifty years ago, dīn functions in both the singular, universal as well as the 
particular variation represented, in English, as “religion” and “religions.”  Mathurānāth’s 
Garden of Religions certainly features dīn as a primary term for the category of universal 
religion; he assumes all people to “have religion,” and sees his task as explaining the 
myriad ways in which religion is performed (i.e. maẓahib or religions).377  The text helps 
demonstrate the local ways religion and religions were categorized within Islamicate 
frameworks, as Mathurānāth clearly draws upon genealogies of definitions from older 
texts.  This also helps illuminate the ways in which Islamicate influence need not be 
limited in its scope to the temporally bounded reign of Muslims; the early-nineteenth 
century marked a time in which Mughal rule was seriously diminished, and yet Mughal-
era norms, mores, systems, and imaginaries persisted. 
Mathurānāth was more than just a courtly scribe, citing Islamicate and Persianate 
taxonomies: he was hired by the British East India Company, and in this way, serves to 
represent autochthonous informants to colonial and imperial English regimes.  More 
importantly, Mathurānāth helps co-author the very understanding of religion scholars like 
                                                
 
377 Mathurānāth, Riyāz al-maẓāhib, 32. 
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J. Z. Smith insisted are necessarily foreign; he participates in constituting information 
required to define religion, religions, and religious identities in Benares and, indeed, the 
East India Company’s South Asia.  In fact, it is reasonable to assert that he was a conduit 
through which Islamicate and Persianate definitions were themselves interpreted and 
translated to his own definitions and usages, and in turn, used and translated to his British 
sponsors.  This is the process of the production of knowledge, which is itself a major 
aspect of what I have called co-imperialism—the process through which Mughal and 
British elites constructed, contoured, and maintained definitions of categories like 
religion.     
In light of seminal works like Edward Said’s Orientalism, many scholars have 
formulated important and meaningful critiques of the production of Euro-American 
knowledge.  Particularly, the subject of “religion” has featured prominently in such 
critique, and with good reason: there can be no doubt that trajectories of the category of 
“religion” start, in Euro-American contexts, from a place of comparison with 
Christianity—comparisons of unequal footing, where non-Christian traditions, practices, 
and people are consistently imagined as Other.378  There is also little doubt that because 
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Religion: the Discourse on sui generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); J. Z. Smith, Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion (Chicago: 
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“religion” is largely studied in the Euro-American academies that the definitions forged 
within these scholarly lineages have taken precedent within historic and contemporary 
research.  It would be folly, however, to assume that because this particular taxonomy of 
religion has been privileged that it is the sole taxonomy, or unique to the West at the 
exception of non-Western locations.  It would be further folly, as I have argued, to 
assume that Euro-American scholars invented “religion” in their home countries and 
exported it to places like South Asia, only to leave South Asians with no choice but to 
respond to such categorization.  This narrative may help unravel Orientalist historical 
models as well as acknowledge epistemological violence inherent in Orientalist 
knowledge production, but it obfuscates indigenous agency, self-definition, and the 
affects of South Asian articulations upon Orientalist definitions.  Islamicate and 
Persianate taxonomies of religion not only existed before colonialism, they informed 
colonial power, authority, and definitions through a process of co-imperialism. 
Abu’l Fazl and Mathurānāth demonstrate the presence of an alternate, parallel, 
and corollary taxonomy of religion.  The conversations, interactions, and exchange of 
ideas present between Mughal and British elites demonstrate the plausibility of a co-
constitutive definition of religion; Mathurānāth’s text speaks directly to the ways in 
which local agents informed, shaped, and dictated British definitions of religion.  The 
legacy of colonialism and imperialism upon religion, religions, and religious identity is 
well established, but few have taken seriously the role of Mughal taxonomies of religion; 
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the affects of Islamicate imperial structures upon religion have consistently been 
imagined as secondary to those imperial impositions and constructions of the British.  If 
we imagine, instead, a co-constitutive process forged within an era of multiple 
imperialisms, we can better envision the religion—and religions—of empire: Islamicate, 
Persianate, and indigenous as well as part of colonial and epistemological patterns of 
domination. 
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